Janklow v. Viking Press
| Decision Date | 18 July 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 16778,16778 |
| Citation | 459 N.W.2d 415,17 MediaL.Rep. 2220 |
| Parties | 17 Media L. Rep. 2220 William JANKLOW, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The VIKING PRESS and Peter Matthiessen, Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Charles Rick Johnson of Johnson, Ecklund & Davis, Gregory, Brent A. Wilbur of May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson, Pierre, Joseph M. Butler of Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons, Rapid City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Lawrence L. Piersol and Timothy M. Gebhart of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellee Peter Matthiessen.
Martin Garbus of Frankfurt, Garbus, Klein & Selz, P.C., New York City, Gerald L. Reade of Brady, Reade & Johnson, Yankton, for defendant and appellee The Viking Press.
This is an appeal of a summary judgment against the plaintiff, William Janklow (Janklow), in favor of the defendants, Peter Matthiessen (Matthiessen) and Viking Press (Viking). The underlying action is based on libel. Janklow claims that Matthiessen, as the author, and Viking, as the publisher, included libelous statements within the book In the Spirit of Crazy Horse. We affirm.
In May 1983 Janklow initiated this suit in South Dakota circuit court. Matthiessen and Viking joined to remove the case to federal district court. The district court remanded the case to the circuit court to determine the validity of the claim under state law. On remand Matthiessen and Viking filed motions to dismiss on grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5). The dismissal was granted by the trial court.
The dismissal was appealed to this court in Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875 (S.D.1985). This court considered two issues: (1) did the trial court err in granting the defendants' motions under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5); and, (2) is the neutral reportage doctrine applicable in defamation cases in South Dakota? This court held that the dismissal was unwarranted and that the neutral reportage doctrine would not be adopted in South Dakota. Janklow, supra.
After the dismissal was reversed, the circuit court decided to limit discovery to the issue of actual malice. After several years of intensive discovery, Matthiessen and Viking filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions. 1
Matthiessen's book was released for distribution by his publisher in the spring of 1983. Janklow alleges that there are portions of this book containing libelous statements in reference to him. The statements concern allegations of a rape, driving drunk while nude from the waist down, and shooting dogs while riding a motorcycle in the residential area of a reservation. Matthiessen admits that the book is not entirely objective; however, the purpose of the book is to promote the historical viewpoint of traditional Indians. 2 The first allegedly libelous statement is the rape allegation by Jancita Eagle Deer. This passage states:
On January 14, 1967, according to delegates from the Rosebud Reservation, a fifteen-year old girl named Jancita Eagle Deer, who sometimes worked in the white community at Rosebud as a baby-sitter, reported to her school principal that she had been raped on her way home the night before by her employer, a young white lawyer named William Janklow who served as director of the tribe's Legal Services program. A complaint was made to a BIA investigator, who filed a report; the principal escorted the shocked girl to the hospital, where a doctor found evidence that an attack had occurred.
P. Matthiessen, In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, 108-09 (1983). Janklow claims there is no evidence that the doctor who examined Jancita Eagle Deer found any evidence of an attack. In support of his claim, Janklow relies on the examining doctor's deposition testimony. 3
The second allegedly libelous statement is a quote attributed to Dennis Banks:
Crazy Horse, at 110. Janklow contends that these statements have no foundation except for Dennis Banks' quote. He asserts that if Matthiessen had obtained the BIA affidavits and the sworn testimony referred to in Banks' quote, then the truth would be known. Janklow claims that Matthiessen's failure to investigate these matters shows actual malice on his part.
Finally, the third allegedly libelous statement is a passage quoting Russell Means, again relating to the rape allegation:
Crazy Horse at 449. Janklow asserts that this is stated in a factual manner lending credibility to the claim.
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT UPON WHICH A
JURY COULD FIND ACTUAL MALICE BY CLEAR
This appeal concerns a summary judgment against a public official on the merits of a libel suit. This is a case of first impression. 4 Significantly, this appeal presents issues concerning the standard of review and burden of proof in a libel suit at the summary judgment stage of a proceeding.
Summary judgment has been governed by the well known rules adopted in Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Company, 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968). Recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has sculpted an exception for libel suits brought by public officials and figures. This exception announces a different standard of review and burden of proof for a plaintiff in a libel suit. The exception is stated in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 5 Anderson concludes:
[W]here the New York Times "clear and convincing" evidence requirement applies, the trial judge's summary judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Thus, where the factual dispute concerns actual malice, clearly a material issue in a New York Times case, the appropriate summary judgment question will be whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not. (footnote omitted).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-56, 106 S.Ct. at 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d at 216. Clearly, the plaintiff has a much greater burden of proof, not only at the trial level, but at the summary judgment stage.
The trial court limited discovery to the issue of actual malice. This limitation was based on the necessity of actual malice for any recovery by a public official as noted in New York Times, supra, and Hackworth, supra. The first step is proving that there has been a publication of a false or defamatory statement with knowledge of its falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth. Harte-Hanks, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989).
This case focuses on the standards upon which there can be a finding of reckless disregard. Reckless disregard for the truth is incapable of definition within one concise statement. The following are several cases which provide helpful guides to determining the presence of a reckless disregard for the truth. "[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262, 267 (1968). Further, "[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. Not only must a defendant entertain serious doubts as to the truth, but the evidence must permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Finally, the reporting of a third party's allegations involves recklessness when, "there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." (footnote omitted). St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326, 20 L.Ed.2d at 268.
It is evident that there is no "bright line" rule upon which a determination of reckless disregard can be made. However, it is clear that the plaintiff in a libel suit must prove:
(1) libel by clear and convincing evidence;
(2) more than a defendant's failure to investigate;
(3) that the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth;
(4) that the defendant had a high degree of awareness of falsity; and
(5) that the defendant had obvious reason to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.
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