Jansen v. City of Cincinnati
| Decision Date | 21 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-3783,89-3828,89-3783 |
| Citation | 904 F.2d 336 |
| Parties | 54 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,059, 17 Fed.R.Serv.3d 138 Timothy JANSEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Cross-Appellants, v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants, v. Tilford YOUNGBLOOD, et al., Prospective Intervenors, Appellants, Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
William S. Wyler (argued), Donna M. Bergmann, Schwartz, Manes & Ruby, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellees cross-appellants.
Julie F. Bissinger, City Solicitor's Office, for the City of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.
John E. Schrider (argued), Lori K. Elliott, Legal Aid Society of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, for intervenors-appellants cross-appellees.
Before KEITH and MILBURN, Circuit Judges; and WOODS, District Judge. *
A class of black applicants and black employees of the Division of Fire of the City of Cincinnati ("proposed intervenors") 1 appeal from the district court's July 27, 1989 order denying their motion to intervene in this civil rights case. Plaintiffs Timothy Jansen, Daniel Geons, Robert Prasse, Evan Wood and Mark Monahan ("plaintiffs") cross-appeal from the above-referenced order. The proposed intervenors argue that because they have a significant interest in the litigation and their motion to intervene was timely, they should be permitted to intervene as a matter of right. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). Plaintiffs argue that although the denial of the motion to intervene was proper, the district court also should have found that the disposition of the present action would not impair or impede the proposed intervenors' ability to protect their interest because the City of Cincinnati ("City") adequately protects such interest. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court's denial of the motion to intervene.
In 1973, two black applicants who had been rejected for the position of "fire recruit" sued the City. They alleged that various city officials practiced racial discrimination in promoting firefighters and in the recruitment, testing and hiring of applicants for the fire recruit position. Youngblood v. Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360, 361 (6th Cir.1986). On May 7, 1974, the parties entered into a court-approved consent decree. The City and its officials denied engaging in racial discrimination, but recognized that past practices might give rise to an inference of a pattern or practice of past discrimination. Id. The consent decree certified a class consisting of: (1) all minority persons who, since January 1, 1968, applied for or might hereafter apply for the position of fire recruit; and (2) all currently employed minority firefighters who, since January 1, 1968, sought or might seek promotion within the Division of Fire. Joint Appendix at 269 (Youngblood v. Dalzell, No. 8774 (S.D.Ohio May 7, 1974) (consent decree)).
The consent decree establishes an affirmative action program governing hiring and promotion decisions in the Division of Fire. Paragraph 8 of the consent decree permanently enjoins the City from:
[A]ny act or practice which has the purpose or effect of wrongfully discriminating against any minority applicant or potential applicant, or any minority employee of the Division of Fire, because of such individual's race with respect to recruiting, testing, selecting, hiring, training, conditions of employment, and promotions and from engaging in any other acts or practices which have the purpose or effect of denying equal employment opportunities to minorities.
Joint Appendix at 270-71. The purpose of the consent decree is to eliminate discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. It provides: (1) goals and timetables for increasing the proportion of minorities in the Division of Fire; (2) procedures for recruiting minority applicants; and (3) requirements concerning the selection process. Subject to the availability of qualified applicants, the consent decree compels the City to achieve a racially integrated work force in the Division of Fire. 2 The consent decree sets out specific guidelines for the use of written examinations in hiring firefighters. Paragraph 25 states:
In no event shall the Division of Fire be required to hire a person as a fire recruit who is not qualified. Scores on selection procedures which have not been validated in accordance with the EEOC guidelines or scores on validated standards which are not sufficiently different as to predict a significant difference in job performance shall not be used in determining the qualifications of applicants. A valid ranking of applicants for the position of fire recruit is not prohibited by this paragraph.
In the 1988 fire recruit selection process, the City administered a written examination. Those applicants who passed the written examination and other portions of the selection process were placed, according to their race, on separate eligibility lists. One eligibility list was designated for whites; the other was designated for minorities. From the two eligibility lists, the City hired 24 white fire recruits and 16 black fire recruits in August 1988.
Plaintiffs, white applicants who were denied admission to the 1988 fire recruit class, filed suit against the City and its officials on February 2, 1989. 3 Plaintiffs allege that the City's use of separate race-based eligibility lists and its use of a predetermined 40 percent minority quota violated the consent decree and 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1983 and 1988.
On March 3, 1989, the City filed its answer to plaintiffs' complaint. The City defended the challenged practices based on its compliance with the consent decree. The district court scheduled discovery through January 1, 1990. Trial was tentatively set to commence in February 1990.
On April 17, 1989, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. Plaintiffs advanced two arguments. First, they maintained that the consent decree never required or authorized the City to use separate eligibility lists. Second, even if the consent decree originally authorized the use of separate eligibility lists, when the 18 percent minority composition goal was met, 4 the use of separate eligibility lists was no longer permitted.
The City responded to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on May 23, 1989. It argued that the 18 percent minority composition goal is merely an interim goal. As such, the consent decree authorizes the use of separate eligibility lists to meet other established hiring and promotion goals. 5
The proposed intervenors filed their motion to intervene on June 9, 1989, contending that the City failed to advance important arguments in support of its 1988 hiring practices. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) and (b). Specifically, the proposed intervenors maintained that the City failed to rely on Paragraph 25 of the consent decree which prohibits the use of: (1) scores in selection procedures which have not been validated in accordance with the EEOC guidelines; and (2) scores on validated standards which are not predictive of job performance. Joint Appendix at 278. The proposed intervenors argued that the consent decree's general requirement that the City engage in race-conscious hiring, as well as its authorization that the City ignore scores "on validated standards which are not sufficiently different as to predict a significant difference in job performance" support a finding that the use of separate eligibility lists to select the 1988 fire recruit class was authorized by the consent decree. Id.
On July 20, 1989, the proposed intervenors filed a motion for leave to file a memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The memorandum was tendered with the motion.
On July 27, 1989, the district court denied the proposed intervenors' motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court found the proposed intevenors' interest in the litigation insufficient to support intervention and their motion untimely.
The proposed intervenors filed a timely notice of appeal on August 18, 1989; plaintiffs cross-appealed on August 28, 1989.
Our review of this matter is confined to the issue of whether the district court erred in denying the proposed intervenors' motion to intervene. Intervention balances two competing interests--judicial economy resulting from the disposition of related issues in a single lawsuit and focused litigation resulting from the need to govern the complexity of a single lawsuit. As a general rule, a person cannot be deprived of his or her legal rights in a proceeding to which such person is neither a party nor summoned to appear in the legal proceeding. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 2185, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) (citing Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441, 54 S.Ct. 475, 479, 78 L.Ed. 894 (1934)). The need to settle claims among a disparate group of affected persons militates in favor of intervention.
Rule 24(a)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: ... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). Intervention as a matter of right is proper when the proposed intervenors demonstrate that the following four criteria have been met: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the proposed intervenors have a significant legal interest in the subject matter of the pending litigation; (3) the disposition of the action may impair or impede the proposed intervenors'...
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