Janusz v. City of Chi.
| Citation | 832 F.3d 770 |
| Decision Date | 10 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-1330,15-1330 |
| Parties | Thomas M. Janusz, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. City of Chicago, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Edward T. Joyce, Edward T. Joyce & Associates, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Julian Nunes Henriques, Jr., City of Chicago Law Department, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before Ripple, Kanne, and Williams, Circuit Judges.
Williams
, Circuit Judge.
Thomas Janusz sued the City of Chicago and several of its police officers, alleging that the officers had acted unlawfully in arresting him. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the officers. In doing so, it applied the single-recovery rule and found that in a separate but related state court action, Janusz had already obtained the damages to which he was entitled. We conclude that the district court correctly found that the single-recovery rule barred Janusz from recovering damages in his federal lawsuit, since both lawsuits involve a single, indivisible set of injuries for which Janusz has already received compensation. We also agree with the district court that Janusz is judicially estopped from arguing that the judgment in the state action was not fully satisfied—a position at odds with several statements he made to the state court. So we affirm the district court's judgment.
In December 2001, three Chicago police officers—Defendants Alan Lucas, Parris George, and Gina Liberti—approached Plaintiff Thomas Janusz at a Chicago-area gas station. The officers claimed that they went to the area after receiving an anonymous tip about a drug transaction, and that they approached Janusz after noticing that his license plate was expired and that he was pacing around the gas station parking lot with a duffle bag. The officers further claimed that as they advanced, Janusz's companion, Paula Siragusa, informed them that Janusz had been smoking crack cocaine and that a plastic cup containing cocaine was in Janusz's car. The officers proceeded to search Janusz's duffle bag, discovered that it contained several thousand dollars in cash, and arrested Janusz. The police also discovered a white substance in a plastic cup in Janusz's car. However, the substance was later determined not to be cocaine.
At the police station, the three arresting officers were joined by a fourth officer—Defendant Amy Mugavero Lucas—and obtained Janusz's consent to search his apartment, which was located above one of the funeral homes he manages for Keystone Illinois, Inc. (Janusz claims that this consent was acquired through coercion.) At the apartment, the officers allegedly found approximately $18,000 in cash and several illicit drugs—crystal methamphetamine, cocaine, and illegal anabolic steroids.
Approximately five months later, Janusz filed a motion to quash his arrest. A judge granted the motion, finding that the officers' stated reasons for approaching and ultimately arresting Janusz at the gas station were implausible. (The district court has explained in some detail why the state judge likely concluded this. See generally Janusz v. City of Chi. , 797 F.Supp.2d 884, 886–89 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
. Regardless, that finding is not relevant for this appeal.) The charges against Janusz were dropped immediately thereafter. By that time, however, the arrest had set other negative events in motion.
Keystone suspended Janusz following his arrest and installed Brian Durante as his replacement. Durante and another coworker, Thomas Kotrba, later told several individuals within and outside of Keystone that Janusz had been selling crystal meth, operating a meth lab in his apartment, and stealing from clients. Unsurprisingly, Janusz was fired.
Janusz filed two separate suits in connection with his arrest and termination. He sued Keystone, Durante, and Kotrba (“Keystone defendants”) in Illinois state court, alleging breach of employment contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also sued the City of Chicago and Officers Lucas, George, Liberti, and Mugavero Lucas ( ) in federal court, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights and various state laws.
The Keystone case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in Janusz's favor and awarded approximately $3,177,500. But both sides were disappointed with the result and appealed. In order to stay collection of the judgment, Keystone also filed an appeal bond for approximately $4.8 million. While the appeals were pending, the parties executed a settlement agreement requiring Janusz to execute a release in exchange for $3 million ($177,500 less than the jury award). Critically, however, the parties stipulated to the trial judge that “Keystone ha[d] paid [Janusz] all monies due and owing him as the result of the Judgment previously entered against Keystone.” The trial judge vacated the judgment and dismissed the appeal pursuant to 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12–183(h)
and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 309.
Meanwhile, the City case remained at the summary judgment stage. The original district judge denied in part the City defendants' summary judgment motion, and in doing so declined to determine the effect of the Keystone settlement on Janusz's damages claim. After a new judge was assigned, the City defendants renewed their summary judgment motion as to damages, arguing that Illinois's single-recovery rule prevented Janusz from recovering any damages relating to the lost wages and the emotional injuries for which the Keystone settlement had compensated him. The defendants also argued that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Janusz from claiming that the Keystone judgment had not been fully satisfied when the state court vacated it. The district court granted the City defendants' motion; however, the accompanying court order did not constitute a final appealable judgment, since the Keystone settlement did not encompass all of the damages Janusz sought from the City defendants. This prompted the parties to stipulate that Janusz would “permanently waive[ ] and relinquish[ ] his right to seek to recover all damages that were not barred” by the summary judgment opinion. The district judge entered a judgment to that effect, and this appeal followed.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of Janusz as the non-moving party.
Goodman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, In c . , 621 F.3d 651, 653–54 (7th Cir. 2010)
. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also
Draper v. Martin , 664 F.3d 1110, 1112–13 (7th Cir. 2011).
On appeal, Janusz argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in the City defendants' favor on his damages claim. Specifically, he contends that the single-recovery rule does not prevent him from obtaining damages here because the judgment in Keystone was vacated, and that he should not be judicially estopped from claiming that the parties in Keystone settled for an amount less than the judgment. We disagree.
Janusz has brought claims under both federal and Illinois law, and in both jurisdictions, “[a] tort victim can obtain only one recovery for his harm, no matter how many tortfeasors inflicted it.”1 Reliance Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Aviation, Ltd. , 430 F.3d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Bosco v. Serhant , 836 F.2d 271, 280 (7th Cir. 1987) ); see also
Thornton v. Garcini , 237 Ill.2d 100, 340 Ill.Dec. 557, 928 N.E.2d 804, 811 (2010) (). “That is so ‘regardless of whether or not the plaintiff has recovered all that he or she might have recovered’ in the initial proceeding.” Saichek v. Lupa , 204 Ill.2d 127, 272 Ill.Dec. 641, 787 N.E.2d 827, 835 (2003) (quoting Dillon v. Evanston Hosp. , 199 Ill.2d 483, 264 Ill.Dec. 653, 771 N.E.2d 357 (2002) ). The rule applies if “the amount of the loss has been judicially determined and a valid and final judgment has been entered.” Id. , 272 Ill.Dec. 641, 787 N.E.2d at 833 ().
We find that the Keystone litigation involved a “valid and final judgment” for purposes of the single-recovery rule. The court in Keystone vacated the judgment and dismissed the case pursuant to § 12–183(h) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure
, which states, “Upon the filing of a release or satisfaction in full satisfaction of judgment, signed by the party in whose favor the judgment was entered or his or her attorney, the court shall vacate the judgment, and dismiss the action.” 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12–183(h). Generally, a vacated judgment in one case has no effect on future cases under Illinois law, and Illinois law “is determinative on the question because the judgment in question was rendered by an Illinois state court.” Pontarelli Limousine, Inc. v. City of Chi. , 929 F.2d 339, 340 (7th Cir. 1991) ; see also
Matchett v. Rose , 36 Ill.App.3d 638, 344 N.E.2d 770, 779 (1976). However, in Saichek v. Lupa , 204 Ill.2d 127, 272 Ill.Dec. 641, 787 N.E.2d 827 (2003), the Illinois Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception for the preclusive effect of vacaturs and dismissals made under § 12–183(h).
The plaintiff in Saichek
was a passenger in a taxicab that was involved in a traffic collision. The...
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