Jaramillo v. Frewing
| Citation | 347 F.Supp.3d 827 |
| Decision Date | 28 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV 17-0673 JB/SCY,CIV 17-0673 JB/SCY |
| Parties | Rick JARAMILLO; Steve Duran ; Railyard Brewing Company, LLC and Ringside Entertainment, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. David FREWING; U.S. Bowling Corporation and Craig Dill, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed July 24, 2018 (Doc. 20)("PFRD"), advising the Court to: (i) grant Defendant Chapter 11 Trustee Craig H. Dill's Amended Motion to Dismiss and to Sanction Plaintiffs, filed November 6, 2017 (Doc. 12)("Dill MTD"); and (ii) grant Defendant David Frewing and U.S. Bowling's Amended Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion to Stay Proceedings, filed November 15, 2017 (Doc. 14)("Frewing MTD"). The parties have not filed any objections to the PFRD, which waives their right to review of the PFRD. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996) (" One Parcel"). Because the Court concludes that the PFRD by the Honorable Steven C. Yarbrough United States Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico is not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion, the Court will: (i) adopt the PFRD as its own; (ii) grant the Dill MTD; and (iii) grant the Brewing MTD. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Complaint to Recover Compensatory, Consequential and Punitive Damages for Defendants' Breach of Contract, Promissory Estoppel, and Negligent Misrepresentation, filed June 23, 2017 (Doc. 1)("Complaint"), with prejudice.
District courts may refer dispositive motions to a Magistrate Judge for a recommended disposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1) (). Rule 72(b)(2) governs objections to those recommendations: "Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Finally, when resolving objections to a Magistrate Judge's recommendation, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 636 provides:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
"The filing of objections to the magistrate's report enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues -- factual and legal -- that are at the heart of the parties' dispute." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (quoting Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) ). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has noted, "the filing of objections advances the interests that underlie the Magistrate's Act,[1 ] including judicial efficiency." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (citing Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass'n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986) ; United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981) ).
The Tenth Circuit held in One Parcel"that a party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review." One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. "To further advance the policies behind the Magistrate's Act, [the Tenth Circuit], like numerous other circuits, ha[s] adopted ‘a firm waiver rule’ that ‘provides that the failure to make timely objections to the magistrate's findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.’ " One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (citations omitted). In addition to requiring specificity in objections, the Tenth Circuit has stated that "[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived." Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). See United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 2001) (). And, in an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit stated that "the district court correctly held that [a petitioner] had waived [an] argument by failing to raise it before the magistrate." Pevehouse v. Scibana, 229 F. App'x 795, 796 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).2
In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit, in accord with other Courts of Appeals, expanded the waiver rule to cover objections that are timely but too general. See One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. The Supreme Court of the United States of America -- in the course of approving the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's use of the waiver rule -- has noted:
It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings. The House and Senate Reports accompanying the 1976 amendments do not expressly consider what sort of review the district court should perform when no party objects to the magistrate's report. See S. Rep. No. 94-625, pp. 9-10 (1976)(hereafter Senate Report); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, p. 11 (1976); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 6162 (hereafter House Report). There is nothing in those Reports, however, that demonstrates an intent to require the district court to give any more consideration to the magistrate judge's report than the court considers appropriate. Moreover, the Subcommittee that drafted and held hearing on the 1976 amendments had before it the guidelines of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts concerning the efficient use of magistrates. Those guidelines recommended to the district courts that "[w]here a magistrate makes a finding or ruling on a motion or an issue, his determination should become that of the district court, unless specific objection is filed within a reasonable time." See Jurisdiction of the United States Magistrates, Hearings on S. 1283 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 24 (1975)(emphasis added)(hereafter Senate Hearings). The Committee also heard Judge Metzner of the Southern District of New York, the chairman of a Judicial Conference Committee on the administration of the magistrate system, testify that he personally followed that practice. See id., at 11 ( ). The Judicial Conference of the United States, which supported the de novo standard of review eventually incorporated in § 636(b)(1)(C), opined that in most instances no party would object to the magistrate's recommendation, and the litigation would terminate with the judge's adoption of the magistrate's report. See Senate Hearings, at 35, 37. Congress apparently assumed, therefore, that any party who was dissatisfied for any reason with the magistrate's report would file objections, and those objections would trigger district court review. There is no indication that Congress, in enacting § 636(b)(1)(C), intended to require a district judge to review a magistrate's report to which no objections are filed. It did not preclude treating the failure to object as a procedural default, waiving the right to further consideration of any sort. We thus find nothing in the statute or the legislative history that convinces us that Congress intended to forbid a rule such as the one adopted by the Sixth Circuit.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 150-52, 106 S.Ct. 466 (emphasis in original)(footnotes omitted).
The Tenth Circuit also noted, "however, that ‘[t]he waiver rule as a procedural bar need not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate.’ " One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060 . Cf. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 154, 106 S.Ct. 466 (). In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit noted that the district judge had decided sua sponte to conduct a de novo review despite the lack of specificity in the objections, but the Tenth Circuit held that it would deem the issues waived on appeal because it would advance the interests underlying the waiver rule. See 73 F.3d at 1060-61 ().
...
To continue reading
Request your trial