Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., No. 62S04-9412-CV-1213
| Docket Nº | No. 62S04-9412-CV-1213 |
| Citation | 644 N.E.2d 118 |
| Case Date | December 15, 1994 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Page 118
v.
LANDMARK COMMUNITY NEWSPAPERS OF INDIANA, INC., and News
Publishing Company, Inc., Barbara Friedman, Individually and
in her capacity as General Manager of News Publishing
Company, Inc., Defendant-Appellees.
Rehearing Denied May 26, 1995.
Page 120
Michael C. Kendall, Kendall Law Office, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Richard A. Bierly, Barbara W. Gernert, Wyatt, Tarrant, Combs & Orbison, New Albany, for appellees.
James S. Cunning, Kevin C. Woodhouse, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, for amicus curiae, The Indiana Legal Foundation.
DICKSON, Justice.
This case arises from the alleged wrongful discharge of the plaintiff-appellant, Tearle J. Jarboe, by the defendants-appellees, Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., et al. (Landmark). Applying the employment-at-will doctrine, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Court of Appeals reversed. Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers (1993), Ind.App., 625 N.E.2d 1291.
The summary judgment proceeding presents the following assertions of fact. The plaintiff was hired by the defendant's predecessor company as a full-time employee in 1972. He subsequently worked with the defendant's predecessor and then the defendant until he was terminated on September 7, 1988. During the time that the plaintiff worked for the defendant, he possessed a copy of its employee manual, which described various policies such as sick leave. This manual put a three-month cap on the amount of sick leave which could be taken for any one incident. In 1981, the plaintiff's doctor, Dr. Heinrich, recommended surgery on the plaintiff's knee. The plaintiff then applied for and was granted sick leave. After approximately five months, the plaintiff returned to his position. In 1984, the plaintiff once again was informed by his doctor that he would require surgery. He requested and was granted sick leave and subsequently returned to work after approximately four months. Finally, in early May of 1988, the plaintiff was informed that his problems necessitated a total knee replacement. The doctor told the plaintiff that he wished to perform the surgery shortly thereafter; however, the plaintiff requested a one-month delay so that he could prepare his department for his absence. They scheduled the surgery for June 6, 1988. The next day the plaintiff spoke to defendant-appellee Barbara Freidman, his supervisor, concerning sick leave and the operation. He informed her that the doctor had estimated that he would be unable to work for approximately three months. In reply to this, Freidman stated: "[T]ake as long as you need, because your health is the most important thing." Record at 410-11. On June 6, 1988, the plaintiff entered the hospital and the necessary procedure was performed. After the surgery, it came to light that the plaintiff would be absent for a period of time potentially to exceed three months. Upon learning this fact, the plaintiff's supervisor contacted him and informed him that if he were unable to return to work by September 6, 1988, he would be terminated. The plaintiff was unable to return to his job in the allotted time and was thereafter discharged from the defendant's employ. After this discharge, the plaintiff continued to receive medical coverage and long-term disability benefits at sixty percent of his salary until after his physician unconditionally released him to return to work in early December, 1988.
In his appeal from the entry of summary judgment, plaintiff-appellant Jarboe presents two claims for review: 1) that the trial court erred in finding that his oral contract of employment was unenforceable under Indiana's Statute of Frauds, and 2) in the alternative, that Landmark is promissorily estopped from discharging him for not returning to work within a time period shorter than that promised to be permitted by his employer.
Page 121
In Part II of its decision, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court correctly ruled that Jarboe cannot recover on the breach of contract action because the oral contract for over one year is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Ind.Code § 32-2-1-1. Id. We summarily affirm this determination. Ind.Appellate Rule 11(B)(3).
As to the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim, the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment, finding such claim to be available and summary judgment precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Jarboe, 625 N.E.2d at 1295. The court characterized its opinion as deciding whether a person with an unenforceable oral employment contract "may pursue a wrongful discharge claim under the doctrine of promissory estoppel." Id. at 1292. The defendants seek transfer, asserting that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is in error in two respects: 1) it erroneously decides a new question of law by holding that an at-will employee can utilize the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce an alleged promise of continued employment, and 2) the plaintiff failed to present specific material facts to support the application of promissory estoppel. We grant transfer to address these matters.
The essence of the employment-at-will doctrine is that an employment contract of indefinite duration is presumptively terminable at the will of either party. McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines (1988), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 390, 392; Streckfus v. Gardenside Terrace Cooperative, Inc. (1987), Ind., 504 N.E.2d 273, 275. The doctrine is deeply rooted in Indiana jurisprudence. See Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1060. The doctrine has only rarely been limited. See, e.g., Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan (1991), Ind., 571 N.E.2d 282, 285 (allowing claim for tortious interference with at-will employment relationship); McClanahan v. Remington Freight, Inc. (1988), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (holding that employee stated claim by alleging he was wrongfully discharged for refusing to commit criminal act for which he would be held personally liable); and Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co. (1983), 260 Ind. 249, 253, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (permitting claim for wrongful discharge when employee terminated for filing of worker's...
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Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., No. 49S05–1111–CV–672.
...forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994).I Resolution of this appeal hinges on the scope and application of Indiana Code section 32–30–1–5, the CSoR.4 This statute ......
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Dow Chemical Co. v. Ebling, No. 22A05-9812-CV-625.
...issue, and only then is the nonmoving party required to come forward with contrary evidence. Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind.1994); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Thus, Affordable, as the moving party, had the initial burden of designating some evidence that it applied ......
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Barker v. State Ins. Fund, No. 93,154.
...of other state courts. See, Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686-88 (Ala.1989); Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994); Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 479-80 (Ky. 1991); Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 2......
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Slaughter v. Des Moines Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., No. 17-1732
...only state to reject the federal Celotex approach to summary judgment. See, e.g. , Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc. , 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1995) ; Minnie v. City of Roundup , 257 Mont. 429, 849 P.2d 212, 214 (1993) ; see also Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment......
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Gill v. Evansville Sheet Metal Works, Inc., No. 49S05–1111–CV–672.
...forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994).I Resolution of this appeal hinges on the scope and application of Indiana Code section 32–30–1–5, the CSoR.4 This statute ......
-
Dow Chemical Co. v. Ebling, No. 22A05-9812-CV-625.
...issue, and only then is the nonmoving party required to come forward with contrary evidence. Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind.1994); Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Thus, Affordable, as the moving party, had the initial burden of designating some evidence that it applied ......
-
Barker v. State Ins. Fund, No. 93,154.
...of other state courts. See, Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686-88 (Ala.1989); Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994); Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 479-80 (Ky. 1991); Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 2......
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Slaughter v. Des Moines Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., No. 17-1732
...only state to reject the federal Celotex approach to summary judgment. See, e.g. , Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc. , 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind. 1995) ; Minnie v. City of Roundup , 257 Mont. 429, 849 P.2d 212, 214 (1993) ; see also Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment......