Jarrard v. Moats
| Decision Date | 30 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:20-cv-2-MLB |
| Parties | Reverend Stephen Jarrard and Ollie Morris, Plaintiffs, v. Sheriff Johnny Moats, Chief Deputy Al Sharp, and Deputy Dustin Strop, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Plaintiffs Ollie Morris and Reverend Stephen Jarrard sued Defendants Sheriff Johnny Moats, Chief Deputy Al Sharp, and Deputy Dustin Strop for banning inmate baptism at the Polk County Jail and for preventing Plaintiff Jarrard from ministering in the Jail. Defendants now move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. 18.) The Court grants Defendants' motion in part and denies it in part.
Plaintiff Jarrard is an Evangelist for the Church of Christ. (Dkt. 16 ¶ 1.) He regularly ministers to inmates in jails and prisons. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) He believes baptism by immersion is necessary for salvation. (See id. ¶ 18.) Defendant Moats is the Sheriff of Polk County. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendants Sharp and Strop are deputies in the Polk County Sheriff's Office. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff Morris is a former inmate at the Jail. (Id. ¶ 2.)
In 2014, Plaintiff Jarrard began ministering to inmates in Polk County Jail. (Id. ¶ 9.) Jail officials expelled him five months later after other ministers complained "regarding [his] teaching about baptism." (Id. ¶ 14.) The Jail let him return in December 2015. (Id.)
In February 2016, the Jail issued a written policy governing "religious services" ("2016 Policy"). (Dkt. 16-2.) The policy said (among other things) that "[r]eligious rituals such as baptism and wedding ceremonies will not be conducted for inmates, as the Polk County Jail is a short term facility." (Id. at 4.) Despite this language, the Jail allowedPlaintiff Jarrard to baptize two inmates in late 2016 using a horse trough filled with water. (Dkt. 16 ¶¶ 11-12.) Jail officials were present for both baptisms, with each lasting about ten minutes. (Id. ¶ 13.)
In January 2017, Defendant Sharp told Plaintiff Jarrard (1) he could no longer teach inmates that baptism is "an essential part of the doctrine of Christ" and (2) if any other inmates requested baptism, he "would be excluded from coming into the jail as [a] volunteer minister[]." (Dkt. 16-1 at 2.) Jail officials made good on this threat just a few days later, telling Plaintiff Jarrad "he could no longer come into the facility as too many inmates had requested baptism." (Dkt. 16 ¶ 15.) About 26 inmates were actively seeking baptism at the time. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendant Sharp told these inmates that, "as baptism was not required for their salvation, the facility would not provide that service." (Id. ¶ 17.)
In June 2017, the Jail issued a new "religious services" policy that made no explicit reference to baptism ("2017 Policy"). (Dkt. 18-1.) It is unclear whether this policy replaced or supplemented the 2016 Policy but, either way, the Jail's baptism ban remained in place at least as a matterof practice.2 For example, when Plaintiff Morris asked to be baptized in February 2018, Defendant Strop told him "we don't do baptisms or other religious rituals here." (Dkt. 16 ¶ 49.) Plaintiff Morris appealed, but Defendants Sharp and Moats upheld the decision on the ground that "inmates at Polk County Jail will not participate in religious rituals." (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) The Jail also denied baptism requests from other inmates. (Id. ¶ 53.)
In June 2018, Plaintiff Jarrard sent Defendant Moats a letter expressing interest in returning to the Jail as a volunteer minister. (Dkt. 16-1 at 3.) It is unclear whether Defendant Moats ever responded but, either way, Plaintiff Jarrard did not resume his ministry in the Jail.3
In April 2019, Plaintiffs sent Defendant Moats a letter threatening to sue over the Jail's baptism ban and Plaintiff Jarrard's expulsion from the Jail's ministry program. (Dkt. 16 ¶ 54.) Defendant Moats replied the next month, characterizing Plaintiffs' claims as "exaggerated and mostly false." (Dkt. 16-4 at 2.) Defendant Moats explained that (1) Plaintiff "Jarrard was barred from the Polk County Jail, not because of his insistence on baptizing inmates, but because of his disruptive behavior toward other members of the jail ministry program that did not share his radical religious views"; and (2) "[o]ur stance is since the Polk County Jail is a short term detention center, baptism can wait until after release since it is not a requirement for salvation." (Id. at 2-3.)
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in January 2020 challenging the Jail's baptism ban and Plaintiff Jarrard's expulsion from the Jail. (Dkt. 1.) Two months later, the Jail issued a new "religious services" policy ("2020 Policy"), which superseded all prior policies. (Dkt. 16-5.) The new policy says nothing specific about baptism but establishes a process for inmates to request "rites that are integral [to] their religious faith." (Id.at 1.) Under this process, (1) the inmate must submit the request; (2) the Jail will discuss the request with "a local cleric of the inmate's professed religion"; (3) the Jail considers "the security concerns based upon the inmate's classification and housing assignment"; and (4) "[a]fter evaluation of the cleric's guidance and security concerns," the Jail will grant the request "to the extent that [doing so] will not jeopardize the safety, security, and good order of the facility." (Id. at 1-2.)
The 2020 Policy also describes the circumstances under which "clergymen and religious advisors [may] hold services or conduct programs in the jail." (Id. at 2; see also Dkt. 18-1 at 2.) The clergymen or religious advisors "must make written application to the Polk County Sheriff's Office with supporting documentation, attend a training session and then be approved by the Jail Administrator." (Dkt. 16-5 at 2; see also Dkt. 18-1 at 2.) The policy does not say how the Jail Administrator will decide whether to approve an application. But the Jail's application form does say applicants must comply with certain "guidelines" during their jail ministry, including "don't use profane language," "don't carry contraband," and "don't take sides against authority." (Dkt. 16-6 at 2, 4.) At the end of the form, applicants must certify: "I understand that if Iviolate any of the [guidelines] listed that my volunteer status can be terminated and that, in some instances, I can be criminally charged." (Id. at 4.)
In April 2020, Plaintiff Jarrard submitted a written application to volunteer in the Jail as a "chaplain/Bible teacher/councelor [sic]." (Id. at 3.) The Sheriff's Office denied his application the next month on the ground that he "has a history of being involved in contentious behavior and conflict" both in Polk County Jail and other regional jails. (Dkt. 16-7 at 2.) The Sheriff's Office said its decision had "no relationship to the existence of pending litigation or any religious doctrinal consideration." (Id. at 1.)
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint asserting three counts against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Count 1 claims Defendants violated Plaintiff Morris's rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") when it banned inmate baptisms during his incarceration. (Dkt. 16 ¶¶ 60-66.) Count 2 claims Defendants violated both Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights by banning inmate baptisms at the Jail. (Id. ¶¶ 67-73.) And Count 3 alleges Defendants violated Plaintiff Jarrard'sFirst Amendment rights by retaliating against him when it precluded him from ministering in the Jail "because of the baptism issue." (Id. ¶¶ 75-83.) Both Plaintiffs seek damages arising from the Jail's baptism ban. (Id. ¶¶ 66, 71.) Plaintiff Jarrard also seeks equitable relief to ensure he can resume his jail ministry and perform baptisms in the Jail. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 83.)4
Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Defendants seek dismissal under several theories, including standing, mootness, sovereign immunity, statute of limitations, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim.
"[A] motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) can be based upon either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint." McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't ofAugusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007). "A facial attack on the complaint requires the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Id. "Factual attacks, on the other hand, challenge the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits are considered." Id. Defendants lodge a facial attack here. (See, e.g., Dkt. 18-2 at 2 n.2.)
"To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. This requires more than a "mere possibility of misconduct." Id. at 679. The plaintiff's well-pled allegations must "nudge[] [his] claims across the line fromconceivable to plausible." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
In making this plausibility determination, the court must "assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and give the plaintiff[] the benefit of reasonable factual inferences." Wooten v. ...
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