Jarrett v. Valley Park, Inc.

• Citation: 922 P.2d 485,277 Mont. 333
• Decision Date: 25 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-417,95-417
• Parties: Maurice JARRETT, Harry S. Walls, Judith S. Kennedy, Ken Kivlin, Joan Bell, Elizabeth M. Brogan, William Brooks, Jake Crounse, Annette Dunseth, Henry and Mary Endler, Edgar H. Greene, Thomas and Ann Jochum, Kenneth and Myrna Kautz, Elwood T. Kennedy, Edward Lenahan, William McCostlin, Joe Mullins, Jerry and Alpha Myers, Vince and Olga Orme, Carrie Pasewark, Carl and Betty Penly, John and June Roach, Delphin and Rosario Santos, Doug Stein, Eunice and Betty Taylor, and Kevin Roberts, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. VALLEY PARK, INC. and St. Marie Village Association, Inc., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

Page 485

922 P.2d 485

277 Mont. 333

Maurice JARRETT, Harry S. Walls, Judith S. Kennedy, Ken

Kivlin, Joan Bell, Elizabeth M. Brogan, William Brooks, Jake

Crounse, Annette Dunseth, Henry and Mary Endler, Edgar H.

Greene, Thomas and Ann Jochum, Kenneth and Myrna Kautz,

Elwood T. Kennedy, Edward Lenahan, William McCostlin, Joe

Mullins, Jerry and Alpha Myers, Vince and Olga Orme, Carrie

Pasewark, Carl and Betty Penly, John and June Roach, Delphin and Rosario Santos, Doug Stein, Eunice and Betty Taylor, and Kevin Roberts, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. VALLEY PARK, INC. and St. Marie Village Association, Inc.,

Defendants and Appellants.

No. 95-417.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Feb. 29, 1996.

Decided July 25, 1996.

J. David Penwell, Bozeman, for Appellants.

Kathleen H. Richardson; Young, Brown & Richardson, Havre, for Respondents.

GRAY, Justice.

Valley Park, Inc. and St. Marie Village Association, Inc. appeal from the judgment entered on the order of the Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Valley County, granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoining enforcement of the restrictive covenant at issue. We reverse and remand with instructions.

We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Did the District Court err in granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that the restrictive covenant at issue is void and unenforceable?

2. Are Valley Park, Inc. and St. Marie Village Association, Inc. entitled to summary judgment?

3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in permanently enjoining enforcement of the restrictive covenant at issue?

Valley Park, Inc. (Valley Park) is the developer of a retirement community (the village of St. Marie) located in Valley County, Montana, and the original owner of all of the property comprising the village of St. Marie. In September of 1988, it subjected the village of St. Marie to Montana's Unit Ownership Act by filing the statutorily-required declaration. See § 70-23-103, MCA. Pursuant to the Act, each unit owner must comply with the covenants governing the property. See § 70-23-506, MCA. By the time this action commenced, Valley Park had sold 208 lots and condominium units to other individuals and entities and still owned the remaining unsold property and 464 condominium units.

On August 12, 1992, Valley Park executed the "First Amended Protective Covenants of the Village of St. Marie" (Protective Covenants). By their express terms, the Protective Covenants run with the land and are binding on Valley Park and its grantees, successors and assigns. The stated purpose of the Protective Covenants is "maintaining a uniform and stable value, character, architectural design, use and development of the property."

The Protective Covenants are divided into eleven sections which cover subjects ranging from the use of the property to the procedure for amending the Protective Covenants. Section II establishes an architectural committee and contains numerous restrictions on alterations and improvements by lot and unit owners; under many of the restrictions, owners must obtain approval from the architectural committee prior to undertaking alterations or improvements. Section III provides for the establishment of the St. Marie Village Association, the purpose of which is to carry out the "intent, purpose and function of [the Protective Covenants]."

On August 1, 1994, Maurice Jarrett applied to the architectural committee for permission to install an eighteen-inch television satellite receiving dish on the exterior wall of his condominium unit. The architectural committee denied his request based on Section II(Q) of the Protective Covenants (Covenant II(Q)) which prohibits the installation of "television satellite receiving dishes" within the village of St. Marie except by Valley Park or its designate. Approximately three weeks later, he applied to install a television antenna and the architectural committee approved his request.

In November of 1994, Maurice Jarrett and thirty-four other owners of either lots or condominium units (collectively, Jarrett) filed a complaint against Valley Park and the St. Marie Village Association (collectively, VPI). Jarrett requested the District Court to declare Covenant II(Q) void and unenforceable and permanently enjoin VPI from enforcing it. In response, VPI denied that the covenant was void and unenforceable. Both parties conducted discovery.

In May of 1995, both Jarrett and VPI moved for summary judgment. The District Court granted Jarrett's motion, declaring Covenant II(Q) void and unenforceable and ordering that VPI be permanently enjoined from enforcing it. Thereafter, Jarrett filed a motion to amend, pursuant to Rule 59(g), M.R.Civ.P., to include an award of attorney's fees and the District Court awarded Jarrett $5,000 in attorney's fees. VPI appeals.

1. Did the District Court err in granting Jarrett's motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that Covenant II(Q) is void and unenforceable?

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by that court. In re Estate of Lien (1995), 270 Mont. 295, 298, 892 P.2d 530, 532 (citation omitted). Ordinarily, such a review requires that we first determine whether the moving party met its burden of establishing both the absence of genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Estate of Lien, 892 P.2d at 532.

In this case, however, the parties agree on the material facts relating to the legal issue of whether Covenant II(Q), which prohibits the installation of television satellite receiving dishes in the village of St. Marie except by VPI or its designate, is enforceable. Through their cross motions for summary judgment, each party asserted entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The District Court granted Jarrett's motion, concluding that Covenant II(Q) is ambiguous, lacking quantifiable and objective standards of review by the architectural committee and insufficiently connected to a general plan or scheme. We address in turn the District Court's conclusions.

a. Ambiguity

We interpret restrictive covenants by applying the rules of construction applicable to contracts. Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n (1983), 205 Mont. 221, 227, 666 P.2d 1247, 1250 (citation omitted). The language of the covenant is to be understood in its plain and ordinary sense. Hillcrest Homeowners Ass'n v. Wiley (1989), 239 Mont. 54, 56, 778 P.2d 421, 423; § 28-3-501, MCA. "[W]here the words [used in restrictive covenants] are plain, unambiguous, direct and certain and admit of but one meaning, then it is the duty of this Court to declare what the terms of the covenants contain...." Higdem v. Whitham (1975), 167 Mont. 201, 208, 536 P.2d 1185, 1189.

Covenant II(Q) states:

No television satellite receiving dishes shall be placed on any portion of the property except by [VPI] or its designate. Radio and television antennas and aerials may be placed on the property as approved by the architectural committee.

The first sentence of the covenant, which is at issue here, absolutely prohibits installation of television satellite receiving dishes except by VPI or its designate. The second sentence authorizes the placement of radio and television antennas in the event the architectural committee approves such placement.

In interpreting Covenant II(Q), the term "television satellite receiving dish" must be understood in its ordinary and popular sense. See Hillcrest, 778 P.2d at 423. Here, the parties do not dispute that the eighteen-inch dish Jarrett wanted to install is, in fact, a "television satellite receiving dish." Thus, by the plain meaning of the language used, Covenant II(Q) prohibits installation of satellite dishes except by VPI or its designate.

Nor does Jarrett contend that the term "television satellite receiving dish" is susceptible to two definitions or understandings. Rather, Jarrett argues that the term "television satellite receiving dish" is ambiguous under the facts of this case due to advancing technology. In this regard, Jarrett states that

"television satellite receiving dishes" were commonly understood to be large, metal contraptions installed on the ground ... [which were] arguably unsightly. The new eighteen inch dishes can be affixed to the exterior of buildings in the same way that radio and television antennas and aerials are, and are no larger than other antennas and aerials.

Notwithstanding the myriad values and impacts of "advancing technology," technology does not--in and of itself--render ambiguous language which is otherwise direct and clear. Nothing in the language used in Covenant II(Q) relates to the size of the dish. Moreover, nothing in Covenant II(Q) qualifies the prohibition based on the means or manner by which the television satellite receiving dishes are affixed to buildings. We conclude that Covenant II(Q) is unambiguous and, according to the plain meaning of the language used, prohibits the installation of television satellite receiving dishes--regardless of size or manner of installation--except by VPI or its designate.

Jarrett's final argument relating to the term "television satellite receiving dish" used in Covenant II(Q) is that the District Court properly relied on Higdem in determining that applying that language to the eighteen-inch dishes would result in a prohibited extension of the covenant to cover a "question later developing." We disagree.

In Higdem, the defendants commenced construction of a garage on their property and the plaintiffs sued based on restrictive covenants governing use of the property in the subdivision. Higdem, 536 P.2d at 1187. The restrictive covenants at issue provided, in relevant...