Jarupan v. Hanna

• Decision Date: 27 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06AP-1069.,06AP-1069.
• Citation: 878 N.E.2d 66,173 Ohio App.3d 284,2007 Ohio 5081
• Parties: JARUPAN, Appellant, v. HANNA, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

878 N.E.2d 66

173 Ohio App.3d 284

2007-Ohio-5081

JARUPAN, Appellant, v. HANNA, Appellee.

No. 06AP-1069.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided September 27, 2007.

Robol Law Office, L.P.A., Richard T. Robol, and Melanie Frankel, for appellant.

Roy Hanna, pro se.

KLATT, Judge.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Sumonta Jarupan, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in favor of defendant-appellee, Roy Hanna. For the following reasons, we reverse in part and remand.

{¶ 2} On May 17, 2005, Jarupan filed a complaint asserting claims for breach of contract and conversion against Hanna. In the complaint, Jarupan alleged that she had hired Hanna, who does business as AAA Roofing & Home Improvement, to do repair and renovation work at her home and at a rental property that she owns. According to Jarupan, Hanna failed to perform all of the work that he agreed to do, and the work that he did complete was substandard.

{¶ 3} On July 19, 2006, Jarupan tried her case to the bench. At the close of Jarupan's case, the trial court sua sponte granted a "directed verdict" in Hanna's favor. In its written judgment, the trial court reiterated its oral ruling, stating, "Plaintiff offered no evidence of breach of contract by Defendant, Plaintiff presented no evidence of proximate cause and zero evidence was put forth regarding damages."

{¶ 4} Jarupan filed a motion for a new trial in which she argued, in part, that the trial court's judgment was contrary to law because she had adduced evidence as to each element of her claims. On September 26, 2006, the trial court issued a decision and judgment entry denying Jarupan's motion. Again, the trial court found that Jarupan had failed to carry her burden of proof because "[n]ot one word was offered to prove damages."

{¶ 5} Jarupan now appeals from that judgment and assigns the following errors:

1. The Trial Court committed reversible error in sua sponte directing a judgment for the Defendant-Appellee on grounds that "not a word was offered to prove damages."

2. The Trial Court committed reversible error in directing a judgment sua sponte for Defendant-Appellee on grounds that Plaintiff-Appellant had failed to offer any evidence of damages from Defendant-Appellee's failure to perform its contracts.

3. The Trial Court committed reversible error in directing a judgment sua sponte for Defendant-Appellee on grounds that Plaintiff-Appellant had failed to offer any evidence of damages from Defendant-Appellee's failure to perform its services in a workmanlike manner.

4. The Trial Court committed reversible error in directing a judgment sua sponte for Defendant-Appellee on grounds that Plaintiff-Appellant had failed to offer any evidence of damages from Defendant-Appellee's conversion.

5. The Trial Court committed reversible error in directing a judgment sua sponte for Defendant-Appellee after having reserved Plaintiff-Appellant's Right to Re-Direct Until the Completion of Defendant-Appellee's Cross Examination of All Witnesses.

{¶ 6} By her first assignment of error, Jarupan argues that because she presented evidence as to each element of her claims, the trial court erred in entering judgment in Hanna's favor. In essence, Jarupan asserts that this court must review this case under a directed-verdict standard because the trial court declined to weigh the evidence offered at trial.

{¶ 7} Civ.R. 50(A)(4), governing directed verdict, is inapplicable in nonjury trials. Whitestone Co. v. Stittsworth, Franklin App. No. 06AP-371, 2007-Ohio-233, 2007 WL 155299, at ¶ 11; Daugherty v. Dune (Dec. 30, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1580, 1999 WL 1267342. Only juries render verdicts; trial courts render judgments. Tillman v. Watson, Champaign App. No. 06-CA-10, 2007-Ohio-2429, 2007 WL 1454781, at ¶ 8. Consequently, in a bench trial, a defendant seeking a favorable disposition after the close of the plaintiff's case must move to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2). Sharaf v. Youngman, Franklin App. No. 02AP-1415, 2003-Ohio-4825, 2003 WL 22100140, at ¶ 6. The distinction between a Civ.R. 50(A)(4) directed verdict and a Civ.R. 41(B)(2) involuntary dismissal is important, as the two require trial courts and appellate courts to apply different standards of review.

{¶ 8} According to Civ.R. 50(A)(4), a trial court must grant a motion for directed verdict if, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, it concludes that "reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to [the nonmoving] party." See Groob v. KeyBank, 108 Ohio St.3d 348, 2006-Ohio-1189, 843 N.E.2d 1170, at ¶ 14; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842, 769 N.E.2d 835, at ¶ 3. A motion for directed verdict tests whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant a jury's consideration, so in deciding whether to grant a directed verdict, a trial court considers neither the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of the witnesses. Estate of Cowling v. Estate of Cowling, 109 Ohio St.3d 276, 2006-Ohio-2418, 847 N.E.2d 405, at ¶ 31; Wagner v. Roche Laboratories (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 119, 671 N.E.2d 252. The trial court's sole concern is whether the non-moving party adduced evidence of substantial probative value in support of each element of her claims. Estate of Cowling at ¶ 31; Wagner at 119, 671 N.E.2d 252; Cooper v. Grace Baptist Church of Columbus, Ohio, Inc. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 728, 734, 612 N.E.2d 357. If she has, then the trial court must deny the motion. Estate of Cowling at ¶ 31; Cooper at 734, 612 N.E.2d 357. Because a directed verdict tests only the sufficiency of the evidence, it presents a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Groob at ¶ 14; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. at ¶ 4.

{¶ 9} In contrast to Civ.R. 50(A)(4), Civ.R. 41(B)(2) allows a trial court to determine the facts by weighing the evidence and resolving any conflicts therein. Whitestone Co., 2007-Ohio-233, 2007 WL 155299, at ¶ 13; Sharaf, 2003-Ohio-4825, 2003 WL 22100140, at ¶ 8. If, after evaluating the evidence, a trial court finds that the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof, then the trial court may enter judgment in the defendant's favor. Daugherty, Franklin App. No. 98AP-1580, 1999 WL 1267342. Therefore, even if the plaintiff has presented evidence on each element of her claims, a trial court may still order a dismissal if it finds that the plaintiff's evidence is not persuasive or credible enough to satisfy her burden of proof. Tillman, 2007-Ohio-2429, 2007 WL 1454781, at ¶ 11. An appellate court will not overturn a Civ.R. 40(B)(2) involuntary dismissal unless it is contrary to law or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Whitestone Co. at ¶ 13; Sharaf ¶ 8.

{¶ 10} In the case at bar, the trial court directed a verdict in Hanna's favor at the close of Jarupan's case because it found that Jarupan had failed to present any evidence of certain elements of her claims. As Jarupan tried her case to the bench, the trial court erred in applying the Civ.R. 50(A)(4) directed-verdict standard rather than the standard for involuntary dismissal under Civ.R. 41(B)(2). In most cases, appellate courts have ignored such error and reviewed the "directed verdict" as if it were a Civ.R. 41(B)(2) involuntary dismissal. Whitestone Co., 2007-Ohio-233, 2007 WL 155299, at ¶ 15; Daugherty, Franklin App. No. 98AP-1580, 1999 WL 1267342. These courts reason that no prejudice results from the erroneous application of the directed-verdict standard because that standard is "`much more rigorous than the involuntary dismissal standard,'" and thus, "`[s]atisfaction of the Civ.R. 50(A) standard implies satisfaction of the Civ.R. 41(B)(2) standard.'" Whitestone Co. at ¶ 15, quoting Fenley v. Athens Cty. Genealogical Chapter (May 28, 1998), Athens App. No. 97CA36, 1998 WL 295496.

{¶ 11} Generally, such reasoning is correct. A plaintiff's failure to provide any evidence as to one or more elements of her claim would mandate the failure of the claim under either standard. In such a situation, the trial court could deem plaintiff's evidence insufficient (necessitating a directed verdict in a jury trial) or unpersuasive (necessitating an involuntary dismissal in a nonjury trial).

{¶ 12} However, application of the different standards may render different results when a plaintiff succeeds in adducing evidence as to each element of her claim. In that situation, a trial court must deny a directed-verdict motion because the sufficiency of the evidence would require submittal of the case to the jury. However, the trial court could grant a Civ.R. 41(B)(2) involuntary dismissal if it, in its role as trier of fact, finds that the plaintiff's evidence fails to satisfy the required burden of proof.

{¶ 13} Difficulty on appeal arises if, in a nonjury trial, the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence, and the trial court erroneously grants a "directed verdict" anyway. Such a "directed verdict" could mean that the trial court entered judgment on the plaintiff's claim without, as required by the Civ.R. 41(B)(2) standard, weighing the evidence of that claim. Absent a weighing of the evidence, an appellate court cannot review the "directed verdict" under the manifest-weight standard applicable to Civ.R. 41(B)(2) involuntary dismissals. Cf. Crawford v. Northeastern Oklahoma State Univ. (1983), 713 F.2d 586, 587-588 (refusing to apply the standard applicable to former Fed.R. 41[b] motions in an appeal of a "directed verdict" entered in a bench trial where the plaintiff had presented a prima facie case). As part of the manifest-weight standard, the appellate court must presume that the trial court's findings of fact are correct. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 79-80, 10 OBR 408, 461 N.E.2d 1273. In granting a "directed verdict," however, the trial court does...