Jarvis v. Hines Furlong Line, Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-CV-00014-TBR-LLK |
| Parties | Joseph JARVIS, Plaintiff v. HINES FURLONG LINE, INC., Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
David K. Homra, Farmer and Wright PLLC, Paducah, KY, Megan C. Misko, The Young Firm, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff.
Robert Nienhuis, Jacob D. Curtis, Goldstein & Price, L.C., St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant Hines Furlong Line, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment. [DN 21]. Plaintiff Joseph Jarvis responded. [DN 25]. Defendant replied. [DN 26]. The motion is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED .
Plaintiff Joseph Jarvis ("Jarvis") brought this action against Defendant Hines Furlong Line, Inc. ("Hines Furlong"), alleging claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and general maritime law for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. [DN 1]. In his complaint, Jarvis alleges that he was a crew member of a motor vessel owned by Hines Furlong on or around April 12, 2019, when he was injured lifting and moving water pumps. Id. at 1-2 ().
Jarvis sets forth that he worked as a deckhand first for Hunter Marine, and then for Hines Furlong when it acquired Hunter Marine in December 2017. [DN 2 at 2]. Jarvis further says that he was a deckhand aboard the vessel the M/V MAE ETTA HINES when he began suffering from a non-occupational illness in February 2018. Id. The parties agree that in March 2018, Jarvis was permitted to continue his employment in the shipyard at National Maintenance in Paducah, Kentucky where the M/V WARREN HINES was undergoing repairs. [DN 21 at 2]; [DN 25 at 2]. The parties explain that reassignment to the shipyard, as opposed to continuing work aboard the M/V MAE ETTA HINES, allowed Jarvis to be closer to home and urgent medical treatment in the event it was needed to treat his non-occupational illness. Id. Jarvis alleges that during the time he was working in the shipyard on repairs of the M/V WARREN HINES, he suffered a back injury. [DN 21 at 4]; [DN 25 at 4] ("He was diagnosed with a herniated disc
at the L5-S1 level and underwent a microdiscectomy on July 1, 2019 ... Mr. Jarvis has had ongoing and increasing lower back pain complaints, ultimately resulting in a new recommendation for an additional surgery, a lumbar decompression and fusion, made earlier this year by Dr. Strenge.") (footnotes omitted).
Hines Furlong argues that because Jarvis was reassigned to work in the shipyard, he was "a land-based maritime laborer, not a seaman," and therefore, he cannot recover under the Jones Act or general maritime law. [DN 21 at 1]. Moreover, the basis for Hines Furlong's motion for summary judgment is that Jarvis was not a seaman. Jarvis responds that summary judgment should be denied because there are genuine fact issues that preclude summary judgment. [DN 25 at 1]. Specifically, Jarvis argues that he was a seaman despite his reassignment to work in the shipyard. As further explained below, the Court finds that Jarvis was not a seaman, and thus, Hines Furlong's motion for summary judgment will be granted.
A district court will grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Thus, the initial burden of establishing no genuine dispute of material fact rests with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court "need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). If the moving party satisfies this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to produce "specific facts" showing a "genuine issue" for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Where "a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact," the Court may treat that fact as undisputed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
"Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Williams v. Maurer , 9 F.4th 416, 430 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Payne v. Novartis Pharm. Corp. , 767 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2014) ). "A fact is ‘material’ if the underlying substantive law identifies the fact as critical." Morgan v. Kentucky , No. 3:17-CV-474-CHB, 2021 WL 3684249, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 19, 2021) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). " Id. (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). "A ‘genuine’ issue exists if ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’ " Id. (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). "In reviewing a decision on a motion for summary judgment, we view the factual evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Williams , 9 F.4th at 430 (quoting See v. City of Elyria , 502 F.3d 484, 491 (6th Cir. 2007) ). "The ultimate question is whether the evidence presents a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury, or whether the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Payne v. Novartis Pharm. Corp. , 767 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2014) ).
Jarvis argues, and Hines Furlong appears to agree, that summary judgment on a party's status as a seaman is appropriate only where the law and facts will only support one conclusion. [DN 21 at 5 (citing Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis , 515 U.S. 347, 371, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995) ); McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander , 498 U.S. 337, 356, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991) ]; [DN 25 at 6-7 (citations omitted)]. Further, the parties agree that the two-part test established by the Supreme Court in Chandris to determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman applies here. [DN 21 at 6]; [DN 25 at 7]. As this Court has previously stated:
In Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis , 515 U.S. 347 [115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314] (1995), the Supreme Court held that the two essential requirements for seaman status are (1) that "an employee's duties must ‘contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission,’ " and (2) that the employee "must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature." Id. at 368 (citations omitted). The Court explained that "[t]he fundamental purpose of this substantial connection requirement is to give full effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea." Id.
Roberts v. Ingram Barge Co. , No. 5:06-cv-00210-R, 2009 WL 1034111 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 16, 2009).
Hines Furlong argues that Jarvis must qualify as a seaman to recover under the Jones Act for negligence or under general maritime law of the United States for unseaworthiness or maintenance and cure, and because he does not qualify as a seaman, his claims must be dismissed in their entirety. [DN 21 at 1]. Jarvis does not dispute Hines Furlong's argument that only seaman may recover under the claims Jarvis asserts, and the Court finds no reason to question it.1 Thus, Jarvis may only recover under the claims he asserts if he qualifies as a seaman. Nonetheless, Jarvis urges the Court to deny summary judgment, arguing that genuine fact issues remain which should be left to the jury. [DN 25 at 1].
Hines Furlong has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Hines Furlong argues: (1) Jarvis lost his status as a seaman when he was permanently reassigned to a land-based position; (2) Jarvis did not have a connection to a vessel in navigation because the M/V WARREN HINES was not in navigation as a matter of law; (3) Jarvis did not have a connection to a vessel in navigation that was substantial in nature. [DN 21 at 5-13]. Jarvis responds, challenging each of these claims. However, because the Court finds that the M/V WARREN HINES was not in navigation, the Court will grant the summary judgment motion.
Even assuming that Jarvis can show that he satisfies the first prong of the Chandris test, the Court finds that he cannot satisfy the second prong of the test. Namely, Jarvis cannot demonstrate that he had a connection to a vessel in navigation that was substantial in terms of duration and nature. As Hines Furlong states, "the fact that Plaintiff had worked on the rivers as a deckhand/seaman for multiple companies in previous years has no relevance to whether he was a seaman after he was reassigned to work in the shipyard on a vessel that was out of navigation." [DN 26 at 4].
In its motion, Hines Furlong indicates that the M/V WARREN HINES spent 21 months in the Shipyard undergoing "a complete refurbishment." [DN 21 at 3]. Hines Furlong sets out the details of the refurbishment as follows:
By all accounts, the work performed on the...
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