Jarvis v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue

• Citation: 473 P.3d 869,312 Kan. 156
• Decision Date: 09 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. 119,116,119,116
• Parties: Nathan A. JARVIS, Appellee, v. Kansas DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

312 Kan. 156

473 P.3d 869

Nathan A. JARVIS, Appellee,

v.Kansas DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellant.

No. 119,116

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed October 9, 2020

Joanna Labastida, Adam D. King, and Ted E. Smith, of Kansas Department of Revenue, were on the briefs for appellant.

Sheena Foye, of Wyrsch Hobbs & Mirakian, P.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, was on the brief for appellee.

Adam D. Stolte, of Stolte Law, LLC, of Overland Park, was on the brief for amici curiae Kansas Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and National College of DUI Defense.

The opinion of the court was delivered by Luckert, C.J.:

In this appeal, we interpret and apply K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(p). Among other things, that provision identifies issues a court can consider when reviewing the validity of an administrative order suspending a driver's license because a driver failed or refused a blood alcohol test. The question presented is whether a court can set aside a driver's license suspension because the suspension flows from a law enforcement officer's unlawful seizure of the driver.

We hold that, on judicial review under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(p), a court may "consider and determine any constitutional issue, including, but not limited to, the lawfulness of the law enforcement encounter." And under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(o) through (q) a court may set aside a driver's license suspension order if the driver meets the burden of establishing the encounter was unlawful.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After following Jarvis’ vehicle, a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop. The officer could smell alcohol on Jarvis, and he observed that Jarvis had bloodshot eyes. The officer administered field sobriety tests and then, when Jarvis exhibited signs of intoxication, arrested Jarvis for driving under the influence.

At the police station, the officer read and presented a written implied consent advisory that informed Jarvis his driver's license would be suspended if he failed or refused a blood alcohol test. Jarvis refused to provide a breath sample, and the officer prepared the DC-27 form that certified Jarvis’ test refusal and notified Jarvis his driver's license was suspended.

Jarvis administratively appealed the suspension. An administrative hearing officer affirmed the suspension, and Jarvis petitioned for de novo review by the Johnson County District Court. A district court judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and ultimately concluded the officer's testimony was not credible, the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the traffic stop, and the officer's seizure of Jarvis was unlawful. The judge interpreted K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(p) to allow him to set aside the suspension based on his determination that the law enforcement encounter was unlawful.

KDR timely appealed the reversal of the suspension order to the Court of Appeals. In a published opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. Jarvis v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 56 Kan. App. 2d 1081, 1098, 442 P.3d 1054 (2019). KDR then timely petitioned for review. This court granted review and has jurisdiction under K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (petition for review of Court of Appeals decision).

ANALYSIS

We begin our analysis by deciding the legal question of whether K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020 allows a court to set aside a driver's license suspension based on an unlawful law enforcement encounter. After determining that issue, we will examine the district court's ruling that Jarvis was stopped unlawfully because the law enforcement officer lacked a reasonable suspicion that Jarvis had committed a traffic offense.

The parties’ arguments about a court's power to set aside an administrative order focus on K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(p) and amendments to that provision enacted in 2016. Subsection (p) is one of three subsections of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020 that explicitly apply when a court reviews a driver's license suspension order. Those subsections—(o) through (q)—state, with the 2016 amendment emphasized:

"(o) The licensee may file a petition for review of the hearing order pursuant to K.S.A. 8-259, and amendments thereto. Upon filing a petition for review, the licensee shall serve the secretary of revenue with a copy of the petition and summons. Upon receipt of a copy of the petition for review by the secretary, the temporary license issued pursuant to subsection (b) shall be extended until the decision on the petition for review is final.

"(p) Such review shall be in accordance with this section and the Kansas judicial review act. To the extent that this section and any other provision of law conflicts, this section shall prevail. The petition for review shall be filed within 14 days after the effective date of the order. Venue of the action for review is the county where the person was arrested or the accident occurred, or, if the hearing was not conducted by telephone conference call, the county where the administrative proceeding was held. The action for review shall be by trial de novo to the court and the evidentiary restrictions of subsection (l) shall not apply to the trial de novo. The court shall take testimony, examine the facts of the case and determine whether the petitioner is entitled to driving privileges or whether the petitioner's driving privileges are subject to suspension or suspension and restriction under the provisions of this act. Notwithstanding K.S.A. 77-617, and amendments thereto, the court: (1) May also consider and determine any constitutional issue, including, but not limited to, the lawfulness of the law enforcement encounter, even if such issue was not raised before the agency; and (2) shall also consider and determine any constitutional issue, including, but not limited to, the lawfulness of the law enforcement encounter, if such issue is raised by the petitioner in the petition for review, even if such issue was not raised before the agency. If the court finds that the grounds for action by the agency have been met, the court shall affirm.

"(q) Upon review, the licensee shall have the burden to show that the decision of the agency should be set aside." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020 ; L. 2016, ch. 69, § 2.

To answer the issue of whether the Legislature intended this language to provide a basis for setting aside a suspension based on an unlawful law enforcement encounter, we must interpret K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(o) through (q). Issues of statutory interpretation present questions of law to which we apply an unlimited standard of review. This means we give no deference to the district court's or the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute. State v. Fowler , 311 Kan. 136, 139, 457 P.3d 927 (2020) ; State v. Gross , 308 Kan. 1, 7, 417 P.3d 1049 (2018).

All Kansas courts use the same starting point when interpreting statutes: The Legislature's intent controls. To divine that intent, courts examine the language of the provision and apply plain and unambiguous language as written. If the Legislature's intent is not clear from the language, a court may look to legislative history, background considerations, and canons of construction to help determine legislative intent. Gross , 308 Kan. at 10, 417 P.3d 1049.

With those rules in mind, we turn to consideration of the parties’ arguments, which we have grouped into three categories for purposes of our analysis: (1) KDR arguments as to why the lawfulness of the law enforcement encounter is not within the scope of a court's review of an administrative suspension order; (2) the basis for KDR's assertion that K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020 does not provide a remedy for an unlawful law enforcement encounter; and (3) KDR's contention the exclusionary rule does not apply to driver's license suspension proceedings and the Court of Appeals’ analysis creates bad policy. None of KDR's arguments persuade us.

1. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020 The parties in this and another appeal, State v. Whigham , 312 Kan. ––––, 473 P.3d 881 (2020) (No. 117,043, this day decided), have framed many of their arguments by discussing how, if at all, a 2016 amendment to K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 8-1020(p) affected various holdings in Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 285 Kan. 625, 176 P.3d 938 (2008), overruled on other grounds by City of Atwood v. Pianalto , 301 Kan. 1008, 350 P.3d 1048 (2015). This framing has confused the discussion in many ways because Martin ’s holdings address issues that do not perfectly align with the analytical steps in this case. For example, Martin discussed whether the judicial remedy of suppressing evidence through use of the exclusionary rule is available in driver's license suspension proceedings, but the 2016 amendment relates to statutorily authorized remedies. To explain the significance of the difference between Martin ’s focus and the 2016 amendment to subsection (p), we begin by summarizing the holdings in Martin .

In Martin , this court held that K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2) provides an exclusive list of issues an administrative hearing officer can consider when a driver appeals from a law enforcement officer's notice of suspension. And that list does not include the lawfulness of the law enforcement encounter. Martin , 285 Kan. at 631-32, 176 P.3d 938. Martin also noted that "we have repeatedly recognized that administrative agencies are not empowered to decide constitutional questions; courts are." 285 Kan. at 632, 176 P.3d 938. Thus, the question of the lawfulness of the law enforcement encounter was not a statutory basis for invalidating the suspension order even if the encounter violated constitutional protections.

The Martin court then turned to the constitutional question raised by the driver: Whether the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to seize the driver and thus lacked a lawful basis for stopping the vehicle. The Martin court first noted that a traffic stop is generally a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas...