Jarvis v. Parker

• Decision Date: 31 January 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–350 CKK
• Citation: 13 F.Supp.3d 74
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: Derek N. Jarvis, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Darryl S. Parker and C. Hope Brown, Defendants.

13 F.Supp.3d 74

Derek N. Jarvis, et al., Plaintiffs

v.Darryl S. Parker and C. Hope Brown, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13–350 CKK

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

January 31, 2014

Jaime T. Zeas, Bethesda, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Aaron L. Handleman, Shannon L. Chaudhry, Eccleston & Wolf, P.C., Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR–KOTELLY, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' [31] Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Upon consideration of the pleadings¹ , the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion. Accordingly, this action remains DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their [1] Complaint in this action on March 18, 2013. On April 16, 2013, Defendant Parker filed a[ 12] Motion to Dismiss. On April 17, 2013, Defendant Brown filed a [15] Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. As explained in greater detail in the Court's [23] May 13, 2013 Memorandum Order, under the Federal and Local Rules, Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendant Parker's motion was due on Friday, May 3, 2013, and Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendant Brown's motion was due on Monday, May 6, 2013. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) ; LCvR 7(b). Plaintiffs served neither opposition by the required deadline. Nor did Plaintiffs file a motion seeking an extension of time to respond to either motion, as was required by this Court's standing order. See Order Establishing Procedures for Cases Assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar–Kotelly (Mar. 19, 2013), ECF No. [2], at ¶ 7.

Accordingly, on May 8, 2013, the Court issued an [20] Order which (1) granted Defendant Brown's motion to dismiss as conceded, due to Plaintiffs' failure to timely file an opposition memorandum, and (2) dismissed without prejudice Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendant Brown. On May 13, 2013, the Court issued a separate [23] Order which, inter alia, struck Plaintiffs' late-filed opposition memorandum to Defendant Parker's motion to dismiss. The Court further granted Plaintiffs until May 15, 2013 to file a motion requesting reconsideration of the Court's Order dismissing without prejudice their case against Defendant Brown, and requesting post-deadline extensions for the filing of Plaintiffs' opposition briefs. See Order (May 13, 2013), ECF No. [23].

On May 15, 2013, Plaintiffs timely filed a [24] Motion for Reconsideration Seeking Extensions of Time for the Filing of Plaintiff Beneficiaries' Post–Deadline Opposition Briefs, which both Defendants opposed. On May 31, 2013, however, Plaintiffs filed a [28] Motion to Withdraw their Motion for Reconsideration, which requested, inter alia, that the Court permit Plaintiffs to withdraw their motion for reconsideration. On June 3, 2013, the Court subsequently issued an [29] Order granting Plaintiffs' motion to withdraw and, in light of this motion, dismissed Plaintiffs' case without prejudice in its entirety.

The Court also used the [30] Memorandum Opinion accompanying this Order as an opportunity to make an important clarification for the record. In Plaintiffs' motion to withdraw their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs vaguely indicated that they untimely filed their opposition motions “due to Plaintiffs' counsel's serious illness during April 2013.” See ECF No. [28], at 1. However, the Court noted that in their motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs represented more specifically that Plaintiffs' counsel was incapacitated from influenza

only from Monday, April 22, 2013 until Tuesday, April 30, 2013. See ECF No. [24], at 2. Plaintiffs also represented that Plaintiffs' failed to timely file their opposition briefs because Plaintiffs' counsel made an inadvertent error in that he believed Plaintiffs had twenty-one (21) days, see id. at 3, instead of the fourteen (14) days provided by this Court's Local Rules plus three (3) additional days, where service is made through electronic filing, see LCvR 7(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Plaintiffs' counsel provided no explanation for his failure to consult this Court's Local Rules governing the time for responding to motions at the time Defendants' motions to dismiss were filed, which was prior to Plaintiffs' counsel's alleged incapacitation—specifically, on April 16, 2013 and April 17, 2013. Nor did Plaintiffs' counsel provide any explanation for his failure to consult the Local Rules in the days immediately following his alleged incapacitation. The Court noted the well-established rule that “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect.” See

Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 392, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).

See also, e.g., Inst. for Policy Studies v. C.I.A., 246 F.R.D. 380, 383–86 (D.D.C.2007). Therefore, although the Court had no occasion to rule on Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration in view of their withdrawal of that motion, the Court noted, for purposes of the record, that the explanation proffered by Plaintiffs for their failure to timely file their opposition memoranda “left much to be desired.” Mem. Op. (June 3, 2013), ECF No. [30] at 3.

Subsequently, on September 21, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the present [31] Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Both Defendants have filed oppositions and Plaintiffs have filed replies. Accordingly, this motion is ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a district court is permitted to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” on one of six enumerated grounds. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Here, Plaintiffs' counsel relies upon Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to relieve a party from an order based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b)(6) represents a catch-all provision, permitting a court to relieve a party from an order for “any other reason that justifies relief” besides Rule 60(b)(1)-(5). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to the relief. Norris v. Salazar, 277 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D.D.C.2011).

III. DISCUSSION

In support of his Rule 60(b) motion, Plaintiffs' counsel offers the following explanation for his late filing. Because of incapacitating illness, he was unable to file an extension request or prepare the motion in time. Pls.' Mem. ¶¶ 8–15. Further, both because of his mistake as to the rules of this Court and the lingering effects of his illness, Plaintiffs' counsel assumed that he had twenty-one days to file his response rather than the actual seventeen days provided by the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. In its June 3, 2013 Memorandum Opinion, although not called upon to decide a Rule 60(b) motion, this Court indicated that these reasons for relief “left much to be desired.” Mem. Op. (June 3, 2013), ECF No. [30] at 3. Now, presented with the same reasons (almost verbatim), the Court concludes that they are inadequate to justify relief under Rule 60(b).

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs' counsel's illness is something of a red herring, providing an incomplete explanation for his failure to timely file Plaintiffs' oppositions. Plaintiffs' counsel states that he began to feel the symptoms of influenza

beginning on April 19, 2013. Pls.' Mem. ¶ 7. The Court notes, as it did in its June 3, 2013 Order, that these symptoms developed three days after Defendant Parker's motion to dismiss was filed and two days after Defendant Brown's motion was filed. Plaintiffs' counsel states that due to his illness he was incapacitated from April 22, 2013 to April 30, 2013. Id. ¶ 12. Yet, Plaintiffs' oppositions to Defendant's motions were due on May 3, 2013 and May 6, 2013, respectively.² Accordingly, even subtracting the time when Plaintiffs' counsel claims he was ill, he still had significant time to consult the Local Rules and either respond to Defendants' motions or (more likely) seek an extension of time to respond based on the good cause provided by his illness. Specifically, Plaintiffs' counsel had six days in which to take this action with respect to Defendant Parker's motion—three days prior to his illness and three days afterwards. Similarly, Plaintiffs' counsel had eight days to take this action with respect to Defendant Brown's motion—two days prior to his illness and six days afterwards.

In light of these facts, the remaining reason for Plaintiffs' counsel's late filing and failure to seek an extension request is his mistake as to the rules of this Court, which required that Plaintiffs' oppositions to Defendants' motions to dismiss be filed within seventeen days of the filing of these motions. Plaintiffs' counsel describes this as “an inadvertent error in that he believed that Plaintiff Beneficiaries' had twenty-one (21) days ... to file Plaintiff Beneficiaries' two (2) oppositions akin to other federal courts to which counsel is admitted and/or has practiced.”³ Id. ¶ 14. This mistake of the rules of this Court, Plaintiffs' counsel appears to contend, justifies relief under Rule 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6). Id. ¶29. The Court finds neither provision applicable here.

1. Rule 60(b)(1)

As noted, Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to relieve a party from an order based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The Supreme Court has set out four factors for determining when a late filing may constitute “excusable neglect.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489. These factors are: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the [opposing party], (2) the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was...