Jarvis v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 1903
• Citation: 138 Ala. 17,34 So. 1025
• Parties: JARVIS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

34 So. 1025

138 Ala. 17

JARVIS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1903

Appeal from City Court of Mobile; O. J. Semmes, Judge.

Gilbert Jarvis was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

During the impaneling of the jury for the trial of the defendant one J. L. Fincher, who had been regularly summoned as one of the jurors in said case, was examined upon his voir dire as to his qualifications as a juror. So far as his examination as to having a fixed opinion as to the defendant's guilt which would bias his verdict, the bill of exceptions contains the following recitals: "In answer to the question propounded to him by said clerk, as to whether he had a fixed opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the prisoner at the bar which would bias his verdict, he replied, 'I would like to answer that in my own language.' The court here interposed and said, 'No, no; I will explain. Is the opinion that you now have so fixed in your mind that you cannot lay that opinion aside and try the case entirely upon the evidence; or, in other words, if the evidence should be different on the stand from that which you now have heard said about the case, would the opinion that you now have have some influence on your mind in coming to a verdict, or could you lay that opinion aside and be governed by that evidence without reference to the opinion?' The juror then said 'No, sir; I have it not fixed that way.' The court then said, 'Well, have you a fixed opinion now after this explanation?' The juror answered, 'I have.' The court then said, 'Do I understand the opinion is determined entirely upon the evidence?' To which the juror replied, 'I will try the case entirely upon the evidence.' This was all of the juror's testimony on the subject of a fixed opinion. The court then ruled that the juror was competent, and to this ruling the defendant then and there excepted."

Upon the examination of one J. W. Cook, who was regularly summoned as a juror in said case, upon his voir dire as to his having a fixed opinion which would bias his verdict, the bill of exceptions contains the following recitals: "In answer to the question propounded to him by the clerk as to whether he had a fixed opinion which would bias his verdict, he replied, 'As far as the evidence I now have, I have a fixed opinion.' The court then interposed and asked the juror the following questions: 'Is the opinion that you now have of such a nature that you could not be governed entirely by the evidence that comes up in the case; in other words, if the evidence should be different on the stand from that which you now have, would the opinion that you now have have some influence on your verdict, or could you lay that opinion aside and be governed by the evidence without reference to the opinion?' The juror replied, 'I think so; it depends on the case. I could.' The court then asked, 'What?' The juror replied, 'I could.' This was all of the juror's testimony on the subject of a fixed opinion. The court ruled that the juror was competent, and the defendant then and there excepted."

During the examination of one John W. Rabby, who had been regularly summoned as one of the jurors in said case, as to his qualifications as a juror, he was asked by the solicitor for the state the following question: "Whether he was related to the defendant by blood or marriage." The defendant objected to the question propounded by the solicitor. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant duly excepted. The juror answered, "No," and was then challenged peremptorily by the state.

During the examination of one O. M. McMillan, who was regularly summoned as a juror in said case, as to his qualifications as a juror, he was asked by the solicitor for the state whether he was related by blood or marriage to the defendant. The defendant objected to this question asked by the solicitor. The court overruled the objection, and to this ruling the defendant duly excepted. The juror answered that he was not and was subsequently accepted by both the state and defendant, and served as a juror.

During the examination of one Curtis Bush, Jr., who had been regularly summoned as a juror in said case, as to his qualifications as a juror, he testified that he would not convict on circumstantial evidence in a capital case. The solicitor for the state then asked said Bush the following question: "Are you opposed to capital punishment in a murder case?" The defendant objected to this question as asked by the solicitor. The court overruled the objection and the defendant duly excepted. The juror then answered "I do not know that I am." In answer to other questions propounded by the court, the juror answered, "Under certain circumstances I would hang a man for murder." The state then challenged the juror peremptorily.

One of the jurors who had been regularly summoned as a juror in this case having been called, and not answering to his name when it was drawn from the hat from which the jurors' names were being drawn by the clerk of the court, the defendant was informed by the court that he was on a hung jury which was trying another case pending in the same court. The defendant objected to proceeding with his case until this juror was sent for. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant then and there excepted. The court then proceeded with the calling of other jurors in the case.

One Y. W. Pringle, who had been regularly summoned as a juror in said case, upon answering to his name handed to the court his commission as first lieutenant, Battery A, First Artillery, Alabama National Guard, and claimed that he was exempt because he belonged to the military. Said Pringle testified that the commission had been issued to him, and he was a member of the Alabama National Guard, and his membership in the Alabama National Guard was shown by the commission. Thereupon the court excused the juror, to which action of the court the defendant duly excepted.

The evidence in this case tended to show that on the 30th day of September, 1902, between 2 and 3 o'clock p. m., the defendant fatally shot the deceased, Harry Reardy, with a pistol; that the shooting took place at the store of Bloch Bros., on the southeast corner of Exchange alley and Water street, in the city and county of Mobile, state of Alabama. The state introduced Dr. Inge, who testified that he examined Reardy a few minutes after he was shot, and found him in a collapsed, and in his opinion at the time a dying, condition from three mortal wounds; that he survived the wounds about 24 hours; that, about 9 or 10 o'clock the night before Reardy died, he informed Reardy that he was not going to get well and could not live much longer, and that his father wished him to make a dying statement; Reardy said, "Doctor, do you think I am absolutely beyond recovery?" and he told Reardy he was going to die, and Reardy answered he was ready to make any statement; that Reardy gradually grew weaker and died next day; that between 11 and 12 o'clock next day he (the doctor) saw Reardy was dying, and informed him of his condition.

There was evidence tending to show that the deceased, several months before the shooting, had been paying attention to the defendant's niece-in-law, Miss Laura Dana, as her accepted lover; that he had given her an engagement ring and bracelet, and that he had seduced her and impregnated her with a bastard child; that, about a week before the shooting, the mother of the young lady, and her aunt, Mrs. Gilbert R. Jarvis, the wife of the defendant, discovered the young girl's condition, and disclosed it to the defendant and the other relatives of the family, except the father of the young lady, who was an engineer on one of the pilot boats of the United States government, and at the time away from home; that efforts were made by the male relatives of the young lady to get the deceased to repair the injury he had done as far as he could by marrying the young lady; that several interviews were held with him by an uncle and brother-in-law of the young lady, and that at one of these interviews, held a few days before the shooting, and in the office of the attorneys the deceased had employed to represent him in the matter, the deceased had refused to marry the young lady, and as one of the reasons he gave for such refusal stated that the young lady had informed him that the defendant had told her to marry him (the deceased), and that then they (the defendant and the defendant's niece-in-law) would have a good time together. There was other evidence tending to show that the statement made by Reardy was untrue, the defendant swearing that he made no such suggestion to the young lady, and the young lady swearing that she made no such statement to Reardy; that the defendant was informed of what the deceased had stated at this said interview, and had attempted to see the deceased on several occasions after this by going to his place of business and once to his house, but had failed until the day on which the shooting took place; that the defendant sought the deceased in order to try to induce him to marry the young lady, and in order to get him to see her for the purpose of having an explanation in reference to the remark the deceased had claimed, at the interview had between him and the young lady's uncle and brother-in-law, at his lawyers' office, that the young lady had made about the defendant.

As to the circumstances of the killing, the evidence tended to show that on the day of the shooting the defendant went to Bloch Bros.' store, where deceased was employed, and found the deceased there in his shirt sleeves; that he told him he wanted to see him; that deceased informed him that he was busy and couldn't see him then; that the defendant then asked two...