Jarvis v. Vill. Gun Shop, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–2249.,14–2249.
• Citation: 805 F.3d 1
• Parties: Russell JARVIS, James Jarvis, Robert Crampton, and Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc., Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. VILLAGE GUN SHOP, INC., d/b/a Village Vault, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

805 F.3d 1

Russell JARVIS, James Jarvis, Robert Crampton, and Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc., Plaintiffs, Appellants

v.VILLAGE GUN SHOP, INC., d/b/a Village Vault, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 14–2249.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Oct. 30, 2015.

David D. Jensen, with whom David Jensen PLLC, Patrick M. Groulx, and Grollman, LLP were on brief, for appellants.

Mark I. Zarrow, with whom Lian, Zarrow was on brief, for appellee.

David R. Marks, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Maura Healey, Attorney General, was on brief, for Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, amici curiae.

Before BARRON, SELYA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

There are circumstances in which the actions of private parties become so entangled with the actions of public entities that the former may become liable as state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But the line that separates private action from state action is sometimes difficult to plot. This case, which involves the actions of a privately owned storage facility with respect to firearms confiscated by Massachusetts police officers, illustrates the point.

The district court, ruling at the summary judgment stage, concluded that the storage facility that was sued here was not a state actor and, accordingly, entered summary judgment in its favor. After careful consideration, we affirm.

I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME

We begin our odyssey with a sketch of the key elements of the Massachusetts statutory scheme for firearms ownership.

In Massachusetts, an individual who wishes to own or possess a firearm in his residence or place of business must obtain a Firearms Identification (FID) card. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §§ 129B, 129C ; Com. v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 965 N.E.2d 774, 785 n. 14 (2012). Under certain defined circumstances, an FID card may be denied, suspended, or revoked. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, §§ 129B, 131(d), (f), (i). Pertinently, Massachusetts law provides that if a court issues an abuse prevention order against a person who presents “a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse,” the court must order that person to surrender all of his firearms and his FID card (as well as any other firearms license). Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 3B. One who has surrendered his firearms pursuant to an abuse prevention order yet wishes to challenge the suspension or revocation of his FID card or license, may petition the ordering court for relief—and a hearing must be held within 10 days. See id.

An FID card will expire if the holder does not renew it within the time fixed by law. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 129B(9). If an FID card expires, law enforcement officials are authorized to confiscate both the expired card and any firearms possessed by the former cardholder. See id. § 129B(12). The holder may at any time take steps to renew his card and reclaim his property.

The surrender of firearms pursuant to this statutory scheme does not terminate a gun owner's ownership rights. After such a surrender has occurred, the gun owner may arrange for the firearms to be transferred or sold to any person with a valid FID card or other firearms license within one year after the date of surrender. See id. § 129D. The police cannot dispose of the confiscated firearms for one year, but they are not required to maintain custody of the firearms for that length of time. Rather, the police “may transfer possession of such weapon[s] for storage purposes to a federally and state licensed dealer of such weapons and ammunition who operates a bonded warehouse ... that is equipped with a safe for the secure storage of firearms....” Id. The statutory scheme therefore puts gun owners on constructive notice that if they do not take action with respect to their confiscated firearms, the police have a right to transfer those firearms for storage.¹

Once a licensed dealer takes possession of confiscated firearms and any associated property, the dealer must inspect the firearms, furnish the owner with a detailed inventory, and store the items as specified by the statute. The gun owner becomes liable for all “reasonable storage charges,” but he may at any time avoid the continuing accrual of such charges by selling or transferring the firearms to a person with a valid FID card or other firearms license. Id. If the owner does not either reclaim the confiscated firearms or arrange for a permitted transfer of them and then fails to pay the accumulated storage charges for a period of no less than 90 days, the dealer is authorized to auction the property in order to recoup its fees.See id. So, too, if one year has elapsed and the owner still has not either reclaimed or transferred his confiscated property, the dealer may sell the property at public auction and defray all accumulated storage charges out of the proceeds. See id. Any surplus proceeds will be remitted to the owner.² See id.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

With this foundation in place, we turn to the case at hand. There are three groups of plaintiffs here: we rehearse their facts and circumstances separately.

A. James and Russell Jarvis.

Plaintiff James Jarvis is a gun owner residing in Cheshire, Massachusetts. In the early morning hours of July 9, 2010, Massachusetts State Police troopers arrested him for domestic assault and battery. His wife proceeded to obtain an ex parte temporary abuse protection order. Based on this order and in pursuance of state law, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209A, § 3B, the state police confiscated all firearms and ammunition found in James Jarvis's home. The confiscated property included firearms owned by not only James Jarvis himself but also his son (James Jarvis, Jr.) and his father (Russell Jarvis).

That same morning, James Jarvis and his wife appeared in court. A state judge extended the protection order until August 9, 2010, and it was thereafter extended to August 2, 2011.

James Jarvis moved into his parents' residence in Adams, Massachusetts, where he remained for two years. As long as the order of protection was still velivolant, the state police could not lawfully return his firearms to him. Moreover, his presence in his parents' home inhibited the ability of the police to return Russell Jarvis's firearms (and at any rate, Russell Jarvis did not himself possess a valid FID card or other firearms license at that time).

On August 11, 2010—over a month after the firearms had been taken from James Jarvis's home³ —the state police transferred custody of the confiscated firearms to defendant Village Gun Shop, Inc., doing business as “Village Vault” (the Gun Shop). As part of its business, the Gun Shop operates a bonded warehouse for the secure storage of firearms and ammunition. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 129D. The Gun Shop inventoried the confiscated property and, in a letter to James Jarvis dated that same day, laid out its storage terms (including fees and costs). The letter, to which a formal inventory was attached, explained James Jarvis's options for exercising dominion over his firearms, noting that he could “at any time transfer or sell [his] firearms to a firearms dealer or a properly licensed individual.” The inventory included Russell Jarvis's firearms; and even though the Gun Shop did not send a separate letter to Russell Jarvis, he has acknowledged that he saw the Gun Shop's letter and was generally aware that the police had transferred his property (along with his son's) to the Gun Shop.

On September 11, 2010, the Gun Shop sent James Jarvis its initial invoice. This invoice listed out the accumulated storage charges, the administrative fee, and the handling fee. When over 9 months elapsed without payment, the Gun Shop sold the confiscated firearms and associated property at public auction.

B. Robert Crampton.

Plaintiff Robert Crampton is a gun owner domiciled in Tewksbury, Massachusetts. In the spring of 2010, Crampton reported a burglary at his home, and the local police discovered that Crampton owned several firearms for which he did not possess a valid license. In point of fact, Crampton's FID card had expired decades earlier. On June 2, 2010, the police confiscated Crampton's guns and associated paraphernalia and explained to him that he needed to acquire a new FID card.

Crampton did nothing, and on November 15, 2010—over five months after the firearms had been taken from his home—the police transferred the guns to the Gun Shop for storage. That same day, the Gun Shop wrote to Crampton, furnishing him with an inventory and delineating the sundry charges that he would be incurring. When arrearages mounted and Crampton failed to pay them for a period of more than 90 days, the Gun Shop sold his firearms at public auction.

C. Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc.

Plaintiff Commonwealth Second Amendment, Inc. (CSA) is a non-profit corporation, which has a stated purpose of “education, research, publishing and legal action focusing on the constitutional right to privately own and possess firearms.” CSA asserts that it “expends significant resources assisting those people whose firearms are held by bonded warehouses under the authority of [Massachusetts law].” It does not allege that any firearms owned by it have been either confiscated or auctioned.

III. TRAVEL OF THE CASE

In 2012, James Jarvis, Russell Jarvis, Robert Crampton, and CSA brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Gun Shop and Mary E. Heffernan, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Executive Office of Public Safety and Security. The plaintiffs sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, maintaining that they had been deprived of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Specifically, they alleged that they were forced to pay storage charges and were permanently deprived of their property (the firearms) without proper notice and opportunity to be heard. Both the Gun Shop and Heffernan denied any constitutional breach.

In due course, the...