Jason O. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist. No. 114
| Decision Date | 29 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14 C 7778 |
| Citation | 173 F.Supp.3d 744 |
| Parties | Jason O. and Jill O., individually and as next friends of Jacob O., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. Manhattan School District No. 114 and Illinois State Board of Education, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Pamela R. Cleary, Cleary Law Office, Munster, IN, Harlan Kent Heller, Heller, Holmes & Associates, P.C., Mattoon, IL, for Plaintiffs.
Laura Manzi Sinars, Heeral A. Patel, Colin B. White, Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
Colin B. White, Chicago, IL, pro se.
This is an administrative review action brought by Plaintiffs, the parents of Jacob, a seven-year-old child with behavioral problems, under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 –1491. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants Manhattan School District No. 114 and the Illinois State Board of Education (together, “Defendants” or the “School District”) failed to provide Jacob with appropriate educational placements under the statute. There was a six-day administrative hearing in August and September 2014, and, in a 38-page decision dated September 22, 2014, the hearing officer found for the School District on every issue but one.
Plaintiffs now challenge all of the hearing officer's decisions, and the parties cross-move for summary judgment [51] [55]. This Court, giving the requisite deference to the hearing officer's decision, and having independently reviewed the Administrative Record, grants in part, and denies in part, each motion for summary judgment, and finds as follows:
I. Legal Standard
Enacted by Congress in 1975, the IDEA entitles all children with disabilities to access to public education, and mandates that every school district receiving federal funding must provide such children with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1), together, to the maximum extent appropriate, with nondisabled children (“least restrictive environment” or “LRE”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5). In order to map out an IDEA-compliant education for each child, the statute draws parents together with school professionals, and any relevant experts (retained by the parents, the school district, or both), to draft an individualized education program (“IEP”). 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). Generally, an IEP is valid under the statute when: (1) the school district adheres to the IDEA's procedures; and (2) the IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits” by responding to “all significant facets of the student's disability both academic and behavioral.” Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District, Westchester County v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 206–07, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) ; Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley Community Unit School District No. 221 , 375 F.3d 603, 611–15 (7th Cir.2004). The “reasonably calculated” standard means “likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational advancement,” and the “requisite degree” of such progress varies depending upon the student's abilities. Alex R. , 375 F.3d at 615. When a dispute arises under the IDEA mandate, the parties may seek administrative review under the statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), known as a “due process” hearing, which in turn may be appealed to this Court.
The standard of review in cases brought to this Court under the IDEA differs from that governing the typical review of summary judgment. Heather S. v. State of Wisconsin , 125 F.3d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir.1997). The IDEA provides that in reviewing the outcome of a due process hearing, this Court shall: (1) receive the Administrative Record; (2) hear additional evidence as requested; and (3) basing its decision upon the preponderance of the evidence, grant such relief as this Court determines is appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(c). The party challenging the outcome of the administrative proceedings (here, Plaintiffs) bears the burden of proof. Alex R. , 375 F.3d at 611–12. On issues of law, the hearing officer is not entitled to any deference at all. Id. On issues of fact, this Court accords the hearing officer's decision “due weight”—a flexible standard that “varies from case to case.” Id.
The “due weight” that this Court must give to the hearing below, however, is not to the testimony of witnesses or to the evidence itself (both of which this Court must independently evaluate), but rather to the resulting decision of the hearing officer. Heather S. , 125 F.3d at 1053.
Thus, because educational professionals and other members of the IEP team are generally better suited than are federal judges to determine educational policy for each child, this Court is required, in its independent evaluation of the evidence, to give due deference to the results of the administrative proceedings. Beth B. v. Van Clay , 282 F.3d 493, 496 (7th Cir.2002).
The degree of deference depends on the amount of new evidence relied upon by the reviewing court. See Alex R. , 375 F.3d at 612. When this Court does not consider any new evidence and relies solely on the Administrative Record, it owes considerable deference to the hearing officer, but may still set aside the hearing officer's decision if “strongly convinced” that the decision is erroneous. Id. This level of review is akin to the clear error or substantial evidence standard. Id. If, however, this Court considers evidence that is not part of the Administrative Record, its level of deference to the hearing officer decreases. Id. In such circumstances, even though the Administrative Record is still part of the case, it is entitled to less weight or deference. Id.
Here, although Plaintiffs have supplemented the Administrative Record on certain issues (e.g. , [51-3], [88] and [114] ), this Court has relied almost exclusively upon on the Administrative Record itself, rather than such supplemental materials. Accordingly, under the “due weight” standard, this Court has given considerable deference to the hearing officer's decision.
II. Facts1
Jacob resides with his parents (Plaintiffs) in the school district encompassed by Manhattan School District No. 114. DSOF ¶ 1; PSOF ¶ 1. Jacob has been diagnosed with Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. DSOF ¶ 6(a) and (b). The result of these impairments is that Jacob has trouble with self-management, behavior regulation and social skills. DSOF ¶ 6(c). As a result, Jacob requires, and has received, an IEP under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).
In reciting the case background, this Court first sets out Jacob's relevant educational history, from preschool to first grade (Subsection A); and then summarizes the procedural history underlying this administrative review action (Subsection B).
The relevant background begins during the 2011 to 2012 school year, when Jacob was four-years-old and attending preschool. DSOF ¶ 14; PSOF ¶ 2. Plaintiffs placed Jacob at the private preschool Kid Country Childcare (“Kid Country”). DSOF ¶ 14. While attending Kid Country, Jacob underwent a preschool screening to determine his eligibility for speech therapy due to articulation errors. PSOF ¶ 3. Jacob was referred to the local school district, namely, Manhattan School District No. 114. PSOF ¶¶ 3-4.
The School District held an October 27, 2011 meeting with Plaintiffs to devise an IEP for Jacob, as required by the IDEA. DSOF ¶ 14; PSOF ¶ 6. The team, that is, Plaintiffs and the School District, classified Jacob with a “Speech or Language Impairment” and determined that Jacob was eligible to receive speech and language services to address his impairment. AR 4394, 4401; DSOF ¶ 14; PSOF ¶ 6. So beginning November 4, 2011, Jacob, as reflected by the October 2011 IEP Conference Report, started seeing the District's speech therapist, Cathy Muckian, for half-hour weekly sessions at Wilson Creek Elementary School (“Wilson Creek”) while also attending Kid Country. AR 4399; DSOF ¶¶ 14-15; see also PSOF ¶ 6. No transportation between the two schools was provided: the October 2011 IEP Conference Report includes a field for “Transportation,” and the option “Student does not require transportation” was checked. AR 2603 (cited at PSOF ¶ 9).
Although the School District found Jacob eligible to receive speech and language services, Plaintiffs also wanted Jacob to be tested for certain other disabilities during the 2011 to 2012 school year. DSOF ¶ 20. Plaintiffs were concerned about Jacob's emotional functioning and his interactions with peers. DSOF ¶ 20.
Here, the administrative hearing officer found a factual dispute as to exactly when Plaintiffs first made a request for further testing to the School District. AR 0019-20. It is not disputed, however, that Plaintiffs at least made a formal written request on March 29, 2012, through a letter from Jacob's mother to the Principal of Wilson Creek, Barbara Hogan. DSOF ¶ 20 (citing AR 4215). Either attached to the same letter or at another time (and the Administrative Record is not exact here, see AR 0019-20), Jacob's mother also forwarded to Principal Hogan a December 14, 2011 memo from the Director of Kid Country, Donna Phelan, that recorded Kid Country's observations and recommendations for Jacob's educational care. DSOF ¶ 22; PSOF ¶ 17. Director Phelan explained that, according to Jacob's teachers at Kid Country, Jacob had anger issues that required constant monitoring, and Director Phelan recommended that Jacob see a social worker before transitioning to public school for kindergarten. AR 4213-14 (cited at DSOF ¶ 22). Jacob's mother testified that she also sent the December 14, 2011 memo to Principal Hogan months earlier, in December 2011. PSOF ¶¶ 12-14. Principal Hogan did not recall exactly when she received the letter, but, at the very least, she was aware of the parents'...
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