Jason v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-7873 |
| Parties | MARIANNE JASON and MICHAEL JASON, Plaintiffs, v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Not for Publication
This case concerns allegations that the negligent actions of Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation's ("Amtrak") resulted in injuries to Plaintiff Marianne Jason when she fell while traveling on a passenger train. The matter is presently before the Court by way of the parties' motions for summary judgment as to which state's law applies in this diversity action. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that Virginia or North Carolina law applies. D.E. 40. Plaintiffs oppose the motion and filed a cross-motion seeking a declaration that New Jersey law applies. D.E. 41. The Court reviewed all submissions1 made in support and in opposition to the motions and considered the motions without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs' cross-motion is DENIED.
On December 21, 2015, Plaintiffs Marianne and Michael Jason boarded Amtrak's Auto Train in Lorton, Virginia, which was headed non-stop to Sanford, Florida. DSOMF ¶¶ 1, 13-14. While traveling through North Carolina, Mrs. Jason fell down a set of internal stairs in the lounge car and fractured her humerus, the bone in her upper arm. Id. ¶ 19. After the fall, the Auto Train made an unscheduled stop in South Weldon, North Carolina. Mrs. Jason was taken off the train and brought to a medical center in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina via ambulance. Id. ¶ 20. Mrs. Jason flew from North Carolina to Florida the next day, where she had surgery to repair her arm. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Mrs. Jason later received additional medical treatment for her injuries in Alexandria, Virginia. Id. ¶ 26.
Plaintiffs initially filed suit in New Jersey state court, asserting claims for negligence against Amtrak. D.E. 1-3. Amtrak removed the matter to this Court. D.E. 1. On October 7, 2019, Amtrak requested leave to file a motion regarding the choice of law in this matter as it "will have a significant impact on this litigation." D.E. 34. Amtrak seeks a declaration stating that Virginia or North Carolina law applies. Id. Plaintiffs argue that New Jersey law should apply. D.E. 35. The parties were granted leave to file motions regarding the choice of law, D.E. 36, which they did, D.E. 40, 41.
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact in dispute is material when it "might affect the outcome of the suitunder the governing law" and is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude granting a motion for summary judgment. Id. "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence 'is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255)). A court's role in deciding a motion for summary judgment is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter but rather "to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
A party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the basis for its motion and must demonstrate that there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). After the moving party adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). To withstand a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. "[I]f the non-movant's evidence is merely 'colorable' or is 'not significantly probative,' the court may grant summary judgment." Messa v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50)).
Ultimately, there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" if a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." CelotexCorp., 477 U.S. at 322. "If reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.
As discussed, the sole issue presently before the Court is whether New Jersey, or North Carolina or Virginia negligence law applies in this diversity action. The Court determines the applicable choice of law for a case that it has diversity jurisdiction over based on the forum state's choice of law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stenton Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941); Shields v. Consol. Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1987). New Jersey, the forum state here, utilizes the "most significant relationship" test to determine the applicable substantive law. See, e.g., Maniscalco v. Brother Int'l Corp., 793 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704 (D.N.J. 2011); Mills v. Ethicon, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 3d 363, 373 (D.N.J. 2019). The test consists of two prongs. The first prong requires that a court assess the potentially applicable laws to determine if there is a conflict between the laws at issue. Maniscalco, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 704. Where no conflict exists, the Court applies the forum state's law. Id. If there is a conflict, the second prong requires the Court to "determine which state has the 'most significant relationship' to the claim by weighing the factors set forth in the Restatement [(Second) Conflict of Laws] section that corresponds to Plaintiff's cause of action." Id. at 705.
Amtrak contends that there is an actual conflict between the applicable negligence laws of New Jersey, on the one hand, and Virginia or North Carolina, on the other. Def. Br. at 10. Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute this fact, and the Court agrees that there is an actual conflict.
An actual conflict exists "if there is a distinction between" the relevant laws at issue. Buccilli v. Nat'l Ry. Passenger Corp., No. 08-4214, 2010 WL 624113, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2010)(internal quotation omitted). The New Jersey Comparative Negligence Act permits a plaintiff to recover if her "negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought," though her recovery is diminished by her own negligence. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1. Virginia and North Carolina, however, both apply common law contributory negligence standards, under which a plaintiff's contributory negligence acts as a complete bar to recovery. Litchford v. Hancock, 232 Va. 496, 499 (Va. 1987); Sawyer v. Food Lion, Inc., 144 N.C. App. 398, 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). In this instance, Amtrak contends that Mrs. Jason's conduct contributed to her injury. See, e.g., DSOMF ¶ 16 (). Accordingly, if Amtrak establishes that Mrs. Jason's negligence contributed to her injuries, Plaintiffs would be barred from any recovery under Virginia or North Carolina law. But if New Jersey law applies, Plaintiffs may still be entitled to some recovery even if Amtrak establishes that Mrs. Jason was negligent. This difference constitutes an actual conflict.
Because a conflict exists, the Court must evaluate the second prong of the choice of law analysis. Thus, the Court must weigh the factors in the applicable section of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine which state has the most significant relationship to Plaintiffs' claims. Section 146 of the Restatement, which governs personal-injury actions, presumes that the substantive law aligns with the state where the injury occurred unless "some other state has a more significant relationship." P.V. ex rel. T.V. v. Camp Jaycee, 197 N.J. 132, 145-46 (2008). To determine whether another state has a more significant relationship, a court must consider the principles set forth in Section 145 and the general principles of Section 6.3 Id.A finding that another state has a more significant relationship under Section 145 overcomes the presumptive rule of Section 146. Id.
The parties do not dispute that Mrs. Jason was injured while the Auto Train was traveling through North Carolina. See Plfs. Response to DSOMF ¶ 19. Consequently, under Section 146, the Court presumes that North Carolina's law applies; the presumption can be overcome if another state has a more significant relationship to the matter. The Court, therefore, turns to Sections 145 and 6 to determine whether New Jersey or Virginia have a more significant relationship to the incident and the parties. Pursuant to Section 145, the Court must consider the following contacts: "(1) the location of the injury; (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Mills, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 375-76 (citing Restatement § 145). After considering the...
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