Jastram v. McAuslan

• Decision Date: 04 January 1909
• Citation: 71 A. 454,29 R.I. 390
• Parties: JASTRAM v. McAUSLAN et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

71 A. 454

29 R.I. 390

JASTRAM

v. McAUSLAN et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 4, 1909.

Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; William H. Sweetland, Presiding Justice.

Suit by Edward P. Jastram against Amelia B. McAuslan and another. From a decree dismissing the petition, complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Edwards & Angell (Albert Gerald, of counsel), for appellant.

Tillinghast & Tillinghast and Bassett & Raymond (Russell W. Richmond, of counsel), for respondents.

BLODGETT, J. From a decree, entered in the superior court, denying and dismissing the complainant's petition that the respondent trustees be adjudged in contempt for not paying to the complainant the sum of $11,732.80, together with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. on the sum of $3,302.90, from March 13, 1907, to the date of satisfaction of the decree heretofore entered in this cause on April 1, 1908, the complainant has appealed to this court. The respondents have moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies in such case, and, saving their rights under that motion, contend that they are not in contempt of the decree aforesaid.

The motion to dismiss the appeal must be denied. The distinction between criminal contempts and those which are civil in their nature is well settled; and it is well settled, also, that an appeal will lie in the latter class of cases. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 Sup. Ct. 665, 48 L. Ed. 997. Thus, in Romeyn v. Caplis, 17 Mich. 449, 454, 455, it is said of an order adjudging a respondent in contempt for the violation of an injunction: "It has been contended before us that the order in this case was not one from which an appeal could be taken, since the appellee did not claim that an actual loss or injury had been produced to the party by the misconduct alleged, and did not ask for any sum to indemnify him. I think that this position cannot be sustained. * * * The order complained of was final, and not merely a step in the course of proceeding contemplating further action by the court in relation to the same matter; and it belonged to that class of proceedings which are provided to secure obedience to the necessary processes of courts in civil cases. * * * The right of appeal in similar cases has long been recognized and sanctioned elsewhere, and the necessity therefor will not be denied." See, also, City of Newport v. Newport Light Co., 92 Ky. 445, 17 S. W. 435, affirmed in Nienaber et al. v. Tarvin, 104 Ky. 149, 157, 46 S. W. 513; State v. Leftwich, 41 Minn. 42, 42 N. W. 598; Ballston Spa Bank v. Marine Bank of Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 515; People v. Simonson, 9 Mich. 492; Hundhausen v. U. S. Marine Fire Ins. Co. et al., 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 702; In re Day, 34 Wis. 638; In re Milburn, 59 Wis. 24, 17 N. W. 965; Baldwin v. Miles, 58 Conn. 496, 20 Atl. 618; State v. Horner, 16 Mo. App. 191-195 et seq.

That a decree for the payment of money may be enforced in chancery proceedings for contempt has long been settled. Thus, in Re Meggett, 105 Wis. 291, 81 N. W. 419, it is said in a case where a mortgagor after foreclosure had collected rents in violation of an injunction and was ordered to repay them: "The court having exercised its jurisdiction and its discretion upon the facts so presented, and having ordered immediate payment of the money, had it not power to either punish nonpayment or compel payment by commitment for contempt? Such power has always been deemed inherent in courts of equity, as essential to the enforcement of their decisions. Indeed, it was anciently their only weapon for enforcing their commands." And the power thus exercised is held not to be imprisonment for debt, but is thus defined (page 298 of 105 Wis., page 422 of 81 N. W.): "It is the exercise of the contempt power inherent in courts of equity to re-establish a status quo wrongfully disturbed. The punishment inflicted, even in civil contempts, where indemnity to another parly is the dominant purpose, nevertheless rests upon the power of the court to vindicate its own authority, and to punish for...