Jauhola v. Wis. Cent., Ltd.
| Decision Date | 20 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 14-1433 (RHK/LIB) |
| Parties | Joseph Jauhola, Plaintiff, v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Ashley R. Thronson, Nicholas D. Thompson, Matthew H. Morgan, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Russell A. Ingebritson, Ingebritson & Associates, PA, Edina, Minnesota, for Plaintiff.
Holly M. Robbins, William E. Parker, Susan K. Fitzke, Littler Mendelson P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Joseph Jauhola alleges in this action that Wisconsin Central, Ltd. ("Wisconsin Central") violated the Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA")—specifically, 49 U.S.C. §§ 20109(a) and 20109(b)—by terminating his employment after he reported safety violations. Wisconsin Central now moves for summary judgment, and, for the reasons that follow, its Motion will be granted.
Jauhola started working for the DWP railroad—of which Wisconsin Central is the successor in interest—in 1998. (Thompson Decl., Ex. V, at 10.) He became a machine operator and foreman seven years later. (Id., Ex. U, at 19-20.) In 2010, Jauhola began being supervised by Tony Hardy. (Id., Ex. G.) Jauhola found Hardy's managementskills lacking, and in particular disagreed with his approach to safety. In 2012, Jauhola made numerous statements and complaints about Hardy's safety practices, including the following which he relies upon in his opposing Wisconsin Central's Motion:
First, on June 21, 2012, crews were working to make numerous repairs to the railroad following a flood, and Jauhola complained to Hardy that crews were driving too much and not resting enough. (Id., Ex. U, at 75-77.) Second, on July 21, 2012, Hardy ordered Jauhola to escort a supervisor on company property. Jauhola balked, complaining that doing so would unsafely divert him from helping a coworker on another project, and Hardy yelled at him. (Id., Ex. U, at 84-87.) Third, in July 2012, Jauhola objected when Hardy instructed him to leave a federally mandated safety training. (Id., Ex. U, 88-89.) Fourth, on August 31, 2012, Hardy ordered Jauhola to continue driving a train that was grinding the railroad, but Jauhola refused because the work created sparks that caused grass fires he could not control. (Id., Ex. U, at 90-91.)
At the beginning of September 2012, Jauhola complained to Hardy's supervisor, Daniel Bjork, about Hardy's management style. Jauhola reported that Hardy micromanaged employees, yelled at them, and falsely accused them of not doing their jobs. (Id., Ex. J.) Bjork sent an email summarizing the September 1, 2012, meeting to Chad Anderson, the Chief Engineer; Mark Bauer, the Assistant Chief Engineer; and Duane Spears, a human resources manager. (Parker Decl., Ex. C, at 25; Thompson Decl., Ex. J.)
The next month, on October 4, 2012, in the late afternoon, a crew was working on the tracks. Wisconsin Central kept trains from driving on a track that a crew wasworking on by assigning "track authority." (Thompson Decl., Ex. U, at 147.) Once "track authority" was released, a train could travel through without delay. One could release track authority by using a computer program that had six steps. First, the user selected the "clear authority" option from the Track Authority menu in the program. Second, the user selected the track for which to clear track authority. Third, the user entered his password. Fourth, the user entered his PIN and clicked "verify." Fifth, the user reviewed a confirmation screen to ensure that everything was answered correctly and affirmatively chose "Release/Report Clear" to continue. Sixth, the user affirmatively selected "yes" in response to the question "Are you sure all employees and equipment are clear of limits and all switches lined for main movement." (Parker Decl., Ex. I, at 154-58.)
That day, Jauhola was responsible for releasing track authority. A train was approaching the area where the crew was working and Jauhola was anxious to clear the track so the train could travel through without delay. (Thompson Decl., Ex. V, at 161.) While the crew was still on the tracks, he completed on his computer the first four of the six steps to release track authority. (Id., Ex. V, at 159-167.) He looked up to see if the crew was off the track yet, and when he looked back at the computer, he saw that the track authority had been released. (Id., Ex. V, at 167-68.) The crew, still on the track, risked being hit by the oncoming train. (Id., Ex. V, at 169.) Jauhola immediately contacted the driver of the train by radio, and the train stopped before anyone was injured. (Id., Ex. V, at 168.)
David Chaney, who had temporarily taken over Bjork's position four days earlier when Bjork went on medical leave, began investigating this "track authority incident" that day. He interviewed Jauhola, who claimed that he did not complete the final two steps to release track authority, but rather the computer released the track authority on its own. (Parker Decl., Ex. D, at 15.) Chaney also contacted IT and asked for someone to examine Jauhola's computer. (Id., Ex. D, at 15.) He emailed Chad Anderson, Mark Bauer, and others, informing them of what had happened. (Thompson Decl., Ex. Q.)
Paul Blankenship, who worked for Midwest Computer Services, Inc., examined Jauhola's computer, from which the track authority had been released. He "found nothing out of the ordinary and [believed] the laptop to be operating within normal parameters." (Parker Decl., Ex. 2, at 162.) Jason Berner, a signals and communications RTC support supervisor at Wisconsin Central, tested the track authority release system by running several test scenarios and analyzed the logs from Jauhola's computer, concluding that the track authority was not released on its own. (Id., Ex. 2, at 166.)
Bjork learned about the track authority incident from Chaney on October 5. He responded to an email from Chaney informing him the incident happened, giving his "discipline assessment" that Jauhola should be "terminate[d] if found guilty," saying Jauhola had "too much history." (Thompson Decl., Ex. P.) Later, after reading a summary of the incident, he reiterated in an email to Chaney, "like I said termination!!" (Id., Ex. Q.) Chaney was the only recipient of those emails; neither Anderson nor Bauer saw them. (Id., Exs. P & Q.; Parker Decl., Ex. D, at 59-60; Parker Decl., Ex. B, at 47.)Chaney did not understand what Bjork meant by "too much history" and did not ask; he did not get along with Bjork or care about his opinion. (Parker Decl., Ex. D, at 60-61.)
Wisconsin Central charged Jauhola with a workplace rule violation and held an investigatory hearing on October 10, 2012. (Thompson Decl., Ex. N.) The hearing officer, Larry Wizauer, summarized the hearing. (Id., Ex. O.) He wrote that an independent contractor found nothing wrong with Jauhola's computer. (Id., Ex. O.) A review of the events log from the computer system reflected that track authority was released from Jauhola's computer and showed nothing suggesting a systems failure. (Id., Ex. O.) Wizauer concluded that Jauhola released the track authority by completing steps five and six and therefore violated the rules by having men and equipment on the track without track authority. (Id., Ex. O.)
After the hearing, Anderson, Bauer, and Chaney talked about the appropriate discipline for Jauhola. (Id., Ex. K, at 54-57.) Bauer recommended termination (Parker Decl., Ex. A, at 25 & 77), and Chaney did not make a recommendation (id., Ex. D, at 13). Ultimately, Anderson approved terminating Jauhola's employment. (Id., Ex. A, at 21.) Based on the investigators' determination that Jauhola's computer and the system did not malfunction, Anderson believed Jauhola manually released the track authority prematurely. (Id., Ex. A, at 26-37.) Anderson thought termination was justified because this was a "cardinal rule violation," a matter of life or death for the crew. (Id., Ex. D, at 26-27.)
Jauhola grieved the decision to fire him to an arbitration board. (Thompson Decl., Ex. S.) The board reviewed the transcript of the investigation hearing and found thateven if the alleged violation occurred, termination was too harsh a punishment. (Id., Ex. S.) Specifically, it wrote that "both sides have made relevant points regarding the dangerous nature of the violation and the quick response upon discovery," and the board reinstated Jauhola with backpay for all but forty-five days. (Id., Ex. S.)
Jauhola subsequently filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) on April 17, 2013, alleging he was fired in retaliation for reporting safety violations. (Parker Decl., Ex. I, Ex. 10.) In November 2013, OSHA dismissed the complaint, finding there was no reasonable cause to believe Wisconsin Central violated the FRSA. (Id., Ex. N.) Jauhola then filed this action. Wisconsin Central now moves for summary judgment. The Motion, having been fully briefed and the Court having heard oral argument on July 17, 2015, is now ripe for disposition.
Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009). Wisconsin Central bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The Court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to Jauhola. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529-30 (2006); Weitz Co. v. Lloyd's of London, 574 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2009). Jauhola may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issueof material fact for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(...
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