Jauquet v. Green Bay Area Catholic Educ., Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 20-2803,20-2803
• Citation: 996 F.3d 802
• Parties: Michelle JAUQUET, individually and as legal guardian of "Student A," her minor child, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREEN BAY AREA CATHOLIC EDUCATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

996 F.3d 802

Michelle JAUQUET, individually and as legal guardian of "Student A," her minor child, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.GREEN BAY AREA CATHOLIC EDUCATION, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 20-2803

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued February 12, 2021

Decided May 7, 2021

Brady R. Henderson, Attorney, Cream City Law, LLC, Milwaukee, WI, for Plaintiff - Appellant

Anthony J. Steffek, Attorney, Davis & Kuelthau, Green Bay, WI, for Defendant - Appellee

Before Ripple, Hamilton, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

St. Eve, Circuit Judge.

Before the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, Plaintiff Michelle Jauquet's daughter, "Student A," was already experiencing an exceedingly difficult eighth grade year at Notre Dame of De Pere Catholic Middle School in Wisconsin. One of her classmates, "Student B," repeatedly and inappropriately targeted Student A with sexually suggestive harassment beginning in the fall of 2019 and continuing into the spring of 2020. As a result of this bullying, Jauquet brought this suit on behalf of herself and her daughter, alleging Title IX violations by the operator of the students’ school, Defendant Green Bay Area Catholic Education, Inc. ("GRACE"), as well as breach of contract and negligence claims under Wisconsin state law. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim with prejudice for failing to state a claim and declined to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. This appeal followed.

For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district court's dismissal order.

I. Background

Over the course of several months between 2019 and 2020, Student B subjected Student A to vile and offensive bullying, both in school and online. As described in the complaint, Student B began harassing Student A on a weekend school trip in September 2019. During that trip, Student B repeatedly called Student A a "slut" and a "skinny bitch" and encouraged other classmates to do the same. On other occasions, Student B ridiculed Student A for her weight and appearance, including by telling other classmates in a group chat on Snapchat (an app known for its ability to send disappearing messages¹ ) that Student A "would be hot" if she "weren't 50 pounds."

Student A and her mother did not initially report this harassment to school officials, as Student A feared retaliation from Student B and his friends. Jauquet, however, requested a meeting with the school principal, Molly Mares, when Jauquet discovered sexually suggestive and vulgar posts on Student B's Instagram account, another social networking service.² Though these particular posts were not targeted at her daughter, Jauquet was concerned by the graphic nature of the posts. Jauquet also learned that Student B had texted a picture exposing his naked genitalia to a female student at another school; the photo made its way back to students at Notre Dame, who then widely shared the picture. When Jauquet met with Mares in December 2019, Mares agreed that the posts and shared images were unacceptable.

After Jauquet's meeting with Mares, Student B escalated his cruel and vicious campaign against Student A. Days before their winter vacation, Student B told his classmates that they should "buy [Student A] a rope and teach her to use it," insinuating that the girl should hang herself. These comments caused Student A to experience "serious emotional distress" and she emailed her mother in the middle of the school day for help. Mares met with Jauquet and Student B's parents that same day. The complaint alleges that Mares "coached" Student B into giving a "rote" apology to Student A. Mares also suspended Student B for three days, which fell on the final three days before winter vacation.

Unsatisfied with the lack of "any protective or restorative measures or other victim services" for Student A, Jauquet met with the President of GRACE, Kim Desotell, and the school's police liaison the next day. When the police liaison denied that she had jurisdiction over the matter, Jauquet filed a complaint with the Brown County Sheriff's Office, and the Sheriff's Office issued a juvenile citation to Student B.

Frustrated by what Student A's family saw as an inadequate response from Notre Dame and GRACE, Student A's grandfather sent multiple emails to school and diocese leadership about the situation. Jauquet also threatened to pull Student A and her sister from the school. Desotell responded by forwarding the necessary transfer paperwork to Jauquet.

Ultimately, Student A and her sister remained at Notre Dame, and their mother continued to press Desotell to take stronger measures to protect her daughter from bullying at the school. In response, Desotell sent an email to all eighth-grade boys explaining that the school would not tolerate bullying. Desotell further offered to move Student A's seat away from Student B's. Desotell maintained that GRACE had not offered victim services to Student A, because Student A did not appear to need them—she had said that she was doing "okay for now" during a meeting. So at Jauquet's urging, Desotell met with Student A again, which the complaint acknowledges was "helpful" to some degree. The complaint also alleges, however, that Desotell used the meeting to criticize the Jauquet family and Ms. Jauquet in particular for "coach[ing] her daughter to be more emotional."

Beyond the allegations about the interactions between Student A and Student B, the complaint also explains that this bullying was part of a pattern of behavior for Student B. Two years prior, Student B had bullied another male student using anti-LGBTQ slurs. In another example, Student B referred to a student suffering from cancer as "the hunchback of Notre Dame."

The complaint also describes school policies and practices that Plaintiffs believe foster a "boys will be boys" atmosphere at the school. The complaint accuses GRACE of "cultural tolerance of improper and in some cases illegal male sexual behavior under the traditional mantra ‘boys will be boys.’ " The complaint suggests the school imposes a more restrictive dress code on girls than boys as evidence of the school accommodating "rape culture" whereby "male students are not expected to bear responsibility for controlling sexual arousal or keeping their sexual behaviors within accepted moral or legal boundaries." In addition, the complaint alleges that the school tolerates both poor academic performance and "obscene, disrespectful, and disruptive behaviors" from boys that it does not tolerate from girls. This situation "emboldens students like [Student B] to escalate harassing behaviors, including sexual ones."

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim finding that the complaint "fail[ed] to allege the school was deliberately indifferent to the alleged harassment" and that the "allegations [were] too vague and indefinite to state a claim for sexual discrimination or harassment on the part of the school." On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the district court's dismissal of their complaint for two reasons. First, they argue that the district court improperly narrowed their claim of direct discrimination by Notre Dame. Second, they argue that the district court's ruling on Plaintiffs’ indirect discrimination claim was contrary to the facts pled in the complaint.

II. Discussion

We review a district court's dismissal of a complaint de novo, and the decision to dismiss a claim with prejudice for an abuse of discretion. Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC , 887 F.3d 329, 333, 335 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Id. ; see also Sanders v. Venture Stores, Inc. , 56 F.3d 771, 773 (7th Cir. 1995).

In reviewing a motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court "construe[s] all allegations and any reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC , 978 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). "[W]hile a complaint does not need ‘detailed factual allegations’ to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it must allege sufficient facts ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. at 512–13 (quoting League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago , 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2014) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs must set forth "adequate factual detail to lift [their] claims from mere speculative possibility to plausibility." Schillinger v. Kiley , 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).

A. Whether the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ Title IX claims

Title IX provides that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). "The Supreme Court has interpreted Title IX to provide individual plaintiffs with an implied private right of action to pursue claims of gender discrimination in federal court and has recognized a number of claims that constitute discrimination." Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chicago , 933 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago , 441 U.S. 677, 689, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ).

A plaintiff may allege a "direct" or "institutional" Title IX violation by pleading facts to show that the school itself discriminated against a person on the basis of their sex. See id. A plaintiff may also pursue a theory of "indirect" discrimination by way of student-on-student harassment that is so severe that the harassment functionally excludes a student from school activities on the basis of sex. See Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed. , 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (19...