Jauregi v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 07 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. F032022,F032022
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4428, 1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5603 Jorge Galindo JAUREGI, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Madera County, Respondent; The People, Real Party in Interest.

Page 553

85 Cal.Rptr.2d 553

72 Cal.App.4th 931, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4428,

1999 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5603

Jorge Galindo JAUREGI, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Madera County, Respondent;

The People, Real Party in Interest.

No. F032022.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

June 7, 1999.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

Robert A. Forkner, Modesto, for Petitioner.

No appearance by Respondent.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.

O P I N I O N

DIBIASO, J.

In this civil forfeiture proceeding, petitioner Jorge Galindo Jauregi seeks a writ of mandate directing the Madera County Superior Court to vacate its order denying Jauregi standing to challenge the forfeiture of cash in the amount of $20,040 allegedly connected with drug trafficking (Health & Saf.Code, § 11470) and to enter a new order sanctioning his verified claim opposing such forfeiture. We hold in part that the provisions of the Evidence Code pertaining to hearsay evidence (Evid.Code, § 1200 et seq.) apply in proceedings under Health and Safety Code section 11488.4, subdivision (g). ¹ For this and other reasons, we deny the petition.

FACTS

The Vehicle Stop

Law enforcement officers seized the $20,040 (the money) at issue here from the clothing of the occupants of a 1994 Saturn automobile. On December 2, 1997, Officer Sigler of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) stopped the driver of the Saturn for a violation of Vehicle Code section 21703--following another vehicle too closely. Deputy Spino of the Madera County Sheriff's Department (the department) observed the stop and pulled over at the scene. The driver of the Saturn, Cisneros/Escamilla, did not possess a valid driver's license (a violation of Veh.Code, § 12500, subd. (a)); neither did his passenger, Bravo. Each man disclaimed ownership of the vehicle, and explained they were transporting the car to Modesto for an acquaintance of Escamilla's. After determining the Saturn had not been reported stolen, Sigler decided to impound the vehicle (Veh.Code, § 22651, subd. (p)). He cited Escamilla for various violations (Veh.Code, §§ 21703, 12500, subd. (a)) and obtained written consent from each occupant to search the Saturn. ²

Spino planned to take the occupants to the nearest telephone. Before transporting them, he conducted a patdown search of the men for weapons. The frisk produced large bundles of U.S. currency in both men's pants pockets ($500 on Bravo; $2,560 on Escamilla). Doerak, a CHP drug-detecting canine, thereafter entered the passenger compartment of the Saturn and alerted to a jacket on the rear of the driver's seat. ³ Sigler saw a large bundle of money protruding from one of the pockets of the jacket. Spino removed the jacket and discovered additional cash in the other pocket (for a total of $16,980 in the jacket). ⁴ A further search of the vehicle disclosed a cellular phone in the center console but no obvious contraband.

The officers transported Escamilla and Bravo to the Madera County Narcotic Enforcement Team (MCNET) office for further discussion about the origin of the money. Escamilla maintained that none of the cash belonged to him; he was delivering the money to Modesto for a man he knew only as "Enano." According to Escamilla, Enano had contacted him and asked him to transport the money; Enano allowed Escamilla to drive Enano's Saturn and use a cellular telephone to make contact through a paging number with an individual in Modesto to whom Escamilla was to give the money. While at the MCNET office, Escamilla and Bravo signed forms disclaiming any interest in the money, the cell phone and the car. Ultimately, both were arrested and booked for violation of section 11370.9 (possession of proceeds over $25,000 derived from controlled substance offenses), among other charges (e.g., Escamilla was also arrested for violation of Vehicle Code section 10851). Neither was ever prosecuted on any of the charges.

The Forfeiture Action

On or about January 20, 1998, Jauregi appeared at the department and made a claim to the car and the cash. He signed a department-issued form stating the money was his. The department personally served Jauregi with notice of nonjudicial forfeiture of the money on February 5, 1998, when Jauregi appeared to claim the Saturn. ⁵ Jauregi filed a verified claim opposing forfeiture on March 6, 1998, and the People filed a petition for forfeiture of the money on March 17, 1998. Prior to the hearing, the People filed a motion to compel Jauregi to prove his standing to contest the forfeiture in advance of a trial on the merits of the People's petition.

The Hearing to Determine Standing

When the court calendared the hearing on standing, it stated it anticipated the hearing would be "handled as a law and motion matter with proof by way of declaration, as opposed to oral evidence." Counsel for Jauregi stated he was going to "include the police reports" for the court to read, which counsel felt would be sufficient to establish standing. The People did not comment.

Though subpoenaed, Jauregi did not attend the hearing. His counsel apparently did not submit declarations and instead said he wanted to call two witnesses, the department's Barker and Benard. Before the first of these witness testified, the prosecutor disclosed his intention to object to "the bulk of the [officer's] testimony" as hearsay. It was the prosecutor's position that Jauregi, as the claimant, had the burden to demonstrate standing and anything the officers had to say would be hearsay. Jauregi's counsel countered that the officers' testimony, even if hearsay, would be admissible because this was a "preliminary matter." Presumably counsel intended to refer to Penal Code section 872, subdivision (b), although he never expressly said so or mentioned this statute. ⁶

Under the People's continuing hearsay objection, Barker testified that, when Jauregi came to the department to attempt to recover the car and the money, he had with him a registration certificate (pink slip) in his name, his driver's license, and proof of insurance on the car. Jauregi told Barker he had been in Los Angeles when he learned a family member in Mexico was ill. Jauregi said he did not want to take the money with him to Mexico so he gave the money to a man whose name he did not know to hold for him until he returned. ⁷ Barker also testified that Jauregi said the money came from the sale of his interest in a jewelry store in Modesto and produced a business card showing he was the owner of La Michoacana Jewelers in Modesto. Barker further testified that Jauregi gave her a document of sale, dated June 14, 1997, conveying his half interest in the jewelry store to one Manuel Gil. The sale price was $30,000, with $5,000 down, installments of $5,000 per month, and final payment due on or before November 15, 1997. ⁸

Jauregi had signed a department generated form in which he claimed the money was his. ⁹ Barker initially said this was done in her presence; she later testified she did not know if she in fact was present.

Barker acknowledged she had provided the verified responses to the interrogatories propounded by Jauregi, but she testified she was unaware anything had been attached to the responses, even though they referred repeatedly to "attached" reports. When Jauregi's counsel attempted to have the interrogatory answers admitted, the prosecutor objected on the ground they were not made admissible by the fact that they had been provided by the government in discovery. The court received the interrogatory answers and associated documents and deferred ruling on the admissibility of any aspect of the packet until the prosecutor's hearsay objection was resolved upon the completion of testimony.

Over the People's renewed hearsay objection, Benard testified he spoke briefly to Jauregi on January 20, 1998; Jauregi was then in the company of Santiago Ramirez, who was the registered owner of the cellular phone seized from the Saturn. Ramirez told Benard that Jauregi left his automobile and the $20,000 with him in Los Angeles when Jauregi went to attend to a family emergency in Mexico. Later, Ramirez received a telephone call from Jauregi who asked Ramirez to turn the car and money over to an individual who would transport the items to Modesto. Ramirez allowed the driver to take his cell phone so he could contact the real estate broker in Modesto slated to receive delivery of the car and money.

Following the testimony of Barker and Benard, counsel for Jauregi argued he had established his client's standing. Counsel maintained the testimony of the two officers established Jauregi's cognizable interest in the money sufficient to oppose the forfeiture, in the same manner as the hearsay testimony of a qualified police officer is sufficient to establish probable cause at a preliminary hearing in a criminal action. ¹⁰ Counsel asserted that the discovery documents referred to during the hearing were admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule and also on the theory that the "documents speak for themselves." The People took the position that there was no admissible evidence establishing Jauregi's standing.

Much discussion between court and counsel followed, including references to United States v.1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat (9th Cir.1985) 774 F.2d 1432, 1434, a federal case which dealt with probable cause determinations in forfeiture proceedings under federal law. At one point, the court noted that the arguably pertinent language of former section 11488.4, subdivision (g)(1) concerning probable cause, discussed in this court's opinion in People v. $28,500 United States Currency (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 447, 462-463, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, had been deleted from the statute in 1994. The court pointed out that the new...