Jawad v. Barnhart

• Decision Date: 13 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04CV0246BTMBLM.,04CV0246BTMBLM.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: Kais H. Al JAWAD, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

370 F.Supp.2d 1077

Kais H. Al JAWAD, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 04CV0246BTMBLM.

United States District Court, S.D. California.

May 13, 2005.

Alexandra T. Manbeck, Law Offices of Alexandra Manbeck, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

Carol C. Lam, United States Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Defendant.

Thomas C. Stahl, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

MOSKOWITZ, District Judge.

On November 23, 2004, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and found that Plaintiff is disabled and entitled to social security benefits. The Court concluded that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), upholding the Commissioner's denial of benefits, was erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence in the record. On February 15, 2005, Plaintiff timely filed a motion for attorney's fees.¹ The government contends that the amount of attorney's fees requested should be reduced.

I. DISCUSSION

Under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), the prevailing party, other than the United States, is entitled to attorney's fees unless the government's position was substantially justified or special circumstances exist that render the award of fees unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Plaintiff satisfies the statutory criteria and is therefore entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

A. PREVAILING PARTY

As a threshold issue, the Court finds that Plaintiff is a "party" within the meaning of § 2412 because his net worth did not exceed $2,000,000.00 at the time the action was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B). Indeed, the Court granted Plaintiff in forma pauperis status at the outset of this action.

Furthermore, Plaintiff is clearly the "prevailing party" in this case. The Court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, found him disabled, and ordered the award of social security benefits. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-112, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) ("[A] plaintiff `prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff."). See also id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. 566 (finding that a "material alteration" of the parties occurs when the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment).

B. SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

The government bears the burden of demonstrating that its position was substantially justified or that special circumstances exist that make the award unjust. See Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir.1994) (citations omitted); Grason Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir.1991). The government does not urge upon the Court that its position was substantially justified or that special circumstances exist here. In any case, these exceptions do not apply in this action because the Court held that the ALJ's decision was erroneous and not based on substantial evidence in the record. (See Order dated November 23, 2004 at 12.) Cf. Yang, 22 F.3d at 217 (to demonstrate "substantial justification" the government "must prove that [its] position had a reasonable basis in both law and fact") (citations omitted); Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Carlucci, 867 F.2d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir.1989) (finding no special circumstances because "[t]he litigation on the merits did not involve a close or novel question"); United States v. Gavilan Joint Comty. Coll. Dist., 849 F.2d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir.1988).

C. REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES

The award of attorney's fees under the EAJA must be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The EAJA specifically provides that "attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor ... justifies a higher fee." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary should be excluded from an award of fees. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933.

1. REASONABLE HOURS EXPENDED

Plaintiff has submitted a detailed declaration from his attorney, Alexandra Manbeck, delineating the hours she spent on this case. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ("The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed."). Ms. Manbeck's declaration states that she spent a total of 50.25 hours on this case. (See Manbeck's Decl. at 5.) Ms. Manbeck additionally claims another 2.75 hours for researching and drafting her reply in support of Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. (See Reply at 10.) Thus, she claims a total of 53 hours billed on this case.

The government contends that Ms. Manbeck's hours are excessive and should be reduced by approximately one-half. Specifically, the government argues that the hours billed should be reduced because this case did not involve complex issues and Ms. Manbeck was already familiar with the facts and administrative record. The Court is unpersuaded.

To begin with, the Court finds Ms. Manbeck's itemized statement of billable hours adequate and declines to reduce the hours on this ground. Cf. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ("Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly."). Furthermore, the Court finds the 53 hours billed reasonable in light of the relative complexity of this social security appeal and the level of success Ms. Manbeck achieved for Plaintiff. Indeed, the Court notes that Ms. Manbeck achieved a complete success for Plaintiff in this action. See id. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ("[T]he extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper amount of an award of attorney's fees."). This Court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, found Plaintiff disabled and reversed the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits. Thus, Plaintiff, through this action, secured his ultimate goal — social security benefits. See id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ("Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award may be justified.") (emphasis added); Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir.2001). The 53 billable hours were reasonably expended in this case and the Court will award attorney's fees based on that amount.

2. COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENT

Ms. Manbeck contends that her hourly rate should be enhanced due to an increase in the local San Diego cost-of-living. The government does not oppose an upward adjustment; however, it argues that Ms. Manbeck incorrectly used the March 1996 national consumer price index for urban consumers ("CPI-U") as the baseline instead of the CPI-U for the San Diego area in calculating the cost-of-living adjustment.

The Court may, in its discretion, adjust the $125.00 statutory cap to compensate for an increase in the cost-of-living for the year in which the attorney's fees were earned. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Sorenson, 239 F.3d at 1148-49. In Sorenson, the Ninth Circuit clearly laid out the formula to determine the hourly enhancement due to an increase in the cost-of-living: multiply the EAJA rate cap by the current CPI-U for the year in which the fees were earned, then divide the product by the CPI-U in the month the cap was imposed (March 1996). The quotient is the enhanced hourly rate.² See id. at 1149 (citing Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 863 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir.1988)). The United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") compiles and publishes the CPI-U data.³

In order to properly calculate the award of attorney's fees under the EAJA, the Court must first examine two separate but related issues that have not been squarely addressed in the Ninth Circuit: (1) whether a single CPI-U source must be uniformly applied throughout the formula for both the baseline CPI-U and the present CPI-U variable (for the year in which the fees were earned); and (2) which index source, the national, regional or local CPI-U, should be used to calculate the cost-of-living adjustment.

a. UNIFORM APPLICATION OF A SINGLE CPI-U SOURCE

Ms. Manbeck purports to use the March 1996 national CPI-U as her baseline against the present San Diego CPI-U to account for the increased cost-of-living. Under this application, Ms. Manbeck would receive a glaring windfall. The March 1996 national CPI-U (155.7) is lower than the San Diego CPI-U for the same time period (159.8).⁴ Furthermore, the present San Diego CPI-U for 2004 (212.8) is much higher than the national CPI-U for 2004 (188.9).⁵ Thus, under Ms. Manbeck's computation, she would receive the benefit of a reduced baseline amplified by a greater San Diego CPI-U for 2004. By switching from the national CPI-U to the local CPI-U within the same equation, Ms. Manbeck artificially inflates the cost-of-living adjustment for the given time period. Indeed, applying inconsistent sources for the CPI-U variables necessarily distorts the actual pro rata increase in the cost-of-living. In essence, Ms. Manbeck's application compares apples to oranges. This is unacceptable when a consistent, uniform source is available for both the baseline CPI-U and the present CPI-U variables in the formula.

The Court acknowledges that other courts in the past have applied inconsistent sources for the CPI-U variables under the formula. See. e.g., Hai Huynh v. Barnhart, No. 03CV0340-K (LSP) at 8 (S.D.Cal. Mar. 3,...