Jay v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union-United Health Care Workers W.

• Decision Date: 19 August 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 16-cv-01340-EMC
• Parties: Sheila E. JAY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION-UNITED HEALTH CARE WORKERS WEST, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

203 F.Supp.3d 1024

Sheila E. JAY, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION-UNITED HEALTH CARE WORKERS WEST, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01340-EMC

United States District Court, N.D. California.

Signed August 19, 2016

Marylon M. Boyd, Law Offices of Marylon M. Boyd, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Bruce A. Harland, Xochitl Alicia Lopez, Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld a Professional Corporation, Alameda, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

EDWARD M. CHEN, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs Sheila Jay and Robin Bongon (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed the instant action against two unions, International Union of Operating Engineers ("IUOE") and Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") (collectively, "Defendants"). Docket No. 1 ("Compl."). Plaintiffs allege four causes of action: (1) Breach of Duty of Fair Representation (Plaintiff Jay), (2) Breach of Duty of Fair Representation (Plaintiff Bongon), (3) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Both Plaintiffs), and (4) Unfair Business Practices (Both Plaintiffs). Id. On May 23, 2016, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint. Docket No. 9 ("IUOE Mot."); Docket No. 12. ("SEIU Mot.").

The Court heard argument on the motions on July 21, 2016. Having considered the parties' briefs and the arguments presented at the hearing, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff Sheila Jay

Plaintiff Jay is a former employee of Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. ("Kaiser"). Compl. at ¶ 21. She began working at Kaiser in 1990 as a Radiological Film Processor in the Clinical Technology Department and became a member of the SEIU under the collective bargaining agreements ("CBA-1"). Id. at ¶ 10. In January 2013, Kaiser eliminated Jay's position, and IUOE became Jay's exclusive bargaining agent. Id. at ¶ 14. Under a new collective bargaining agreement ("CBA-2") between Kaiser and IUOE, Jay was given the option to transfer into a Biomedical Engineer Technician ("BET") position if she met additional educational requirements. Id. at ¶ 15. However, she did not meet her requirements within 30 months, and on October 16, 2015, Kaiser terminated her employment. Id. at ¶ 21. Jay alleges that her employment was wrongfully terminated because SEIU and IUOE conspired with Kaiser and failed to protect her rights in three different incidents. Id. at ¶ 1.

First, SEIU failed to take action on her grievances in 2005 when Kaiser initiated the BET program. Id. at ¶ 11. The program required employees in the Clinical Technology Department to meet new educational and experiential requirements to maintain employment with Kaiser. Id. Kaiser granted waivers for a number of Jay's co-workers who were primarily male, not African-American, and not Filipino-American. However, Kaiser did not grant an exemption for Jay, who is an African-American female. Id. Jay lodged complaints to Kaiser and filed grievances to SEIU for a number of years but SEIU did not take any actions on her grievances. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12.

Second, SEIU failed to represent her interests in 2012 when Kaiser reorganized the Clinical Technology Department. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 14. Kaiser took steps towards transitioning to a digital imaging environment and told Jay that her position would be eliminated. Id. at ¶ 13. Jay filed another grievance with SEIU during 2012. Id.

Last, SEIU and IUOE failed to represent her interests in 2013 when Jay's position was eliminated. Id. at ¶¶ 15-21. In January 2013, Kaiser and SEIU reached an agreement regarding the transition for Jay and three other employees in the Clinical Technology Department. Id. at ¶ 15. The parties formulated a Letter of Agreement ("LOA"), and the unions told Jay that she would lose her job with Kaiser unless she executed the LOA. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15. According to the agreement, Jay and three other employees in the Clinical Technology Department were given the option to transfer to either a BET or Biomedical Assistant ("BA") position. Id. at ¶ 14. To qualify for the BET position, Jay was required to meet additional experiential and educational requirements within 30 months. Compl. at ¶ 15. However, the LOA stated that the time period could be extended at Kaiser's discretion, and representatives from Kaiser and SEIU assured Jay that the time period would be extended for her if necessary. Id. Nonetheless, when Jay requested additional time in July 2015, Kaiser denied her request and IUOE made no effort to represent her in this controversy. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 19.

Jay also alleges that Kaiser did not enforce the requirements in the same manner against other employees who were not female or African-American. Id. at ¶ 18. Jay disputed the manner Kaiser implemented the education requirements with Kaiser, SEIU, and IUOE, but the unions failed to enforce her rights under the CBA-1 and CBA-2. Id. Furthermore, IUOE entered into a new collective bargaining agreement with Kaiser ("CBA-3") some point after July 2015, which no longer requires employees to complete the BET program to qualify as a biomedical engineer. Id. at ¶ 20. CBA-3 became effective on September 18, 2015; Jay was terminated on October 15, 2015. Gong Decl. Ex. C (CBA-3); Gong Decl., Ex. H (termination letter).

Finally, Jay asserts that the LOA was legally ineffective. Compl. at ¶ 34. She alleges that Kaiser and the unions knew "Jay was not an authorized representative of SEIU." Id. Therefore, she argues that their signatures to the LOA were legally ineffective and the LOA was void and without force and effect. Id. Nonetheless, Kaiser, SEIU, and IUOE conspired to instruct Jay and others to execute the LOA. Id.

B. Plaintiff Robin Bongon

Plaintiff Bongon is a current employee of Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. ("Kaiser"). Compl. at ¶ 22. She began working at Kaiser as a file clerk in 1989 and became a biomedical engineer in 2007. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 24. She has been a member of IUOE under the collective bargaining agreement between Kaiser and IUOE ("CBA-2"). Id. at ¶ 24.

Bongon alleges that IUOE failed to represent her interests when she was wrongfully denied a promotion. Id. at ¶ 25. In 2015, Bongon applied for the Lead Biomedical Engineer. Id. As the biomedical engineer with seniority in her office, she was qualified for the position. Id. However, Kaiser refused to promote her and instead promoted a male BET from a different facility. Id. Bongon is a Filipino-American female, and she alleges that she was denied the promotion because of her gender and race, and because she had previously filed a civil lawsuit against Kaiser regarding unrelated workplace violations and inequities. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 26. Bongon complained to Kaiser and filed grievances with IUOE, but the union did not represent Bongon's interests. Id. at ¶ 26. Although IUOE representative, Mark Gong, assured her that he would process the grievances, she alleges that Gong "to this date still continues to make excuses for the fact that thus far he had failed to take any direct action on Bongon's behalf." Id. at ¶ 27.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Motion to Dismiss

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Such a motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. Of Bus., Inc. v. Symington , 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.1995). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must take all allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, although "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal." Cousins v. Lockyer , 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.2009). While a complaint need not allege detailed factual allegations, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The plausibility standard is not "a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

2. Evidence Introduced Outside the Complaint

Although the unions are moving to dismiss each claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), they have asked the Court to take into consideration evidence outside of the complaint, including a collective bargaining agreement (CBA-3), letter of agreement (LOA) that Jay executed in January 2013, and emails and letters sent to Jay and Bongon. IUOE Reply at 7. They contend that the additional evidence attached in their declarations should be considered because they were referenced by the complaint. IUOE Reply at 7. In response, Plaintiffs submitted their own declarations with new evidence, including excerpts of collective bargaining agreements (CBA-2, CBA-3). Docket No. 27, 29. Plaintiffs also request additional time to respond to Defendants' motions or permission to file an amended complaint. IUOE Opp. at 2.

"When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a district court considers evidence outside of the pleadings, it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and it must give the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond." United States v. Ritchie , 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir.2003). "A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id.

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