Jeannie M. v. Kijakazi
| Decision Date | 17 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19 C 2603 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | JEANNIE M., Claimant, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Respondent. |
Claimant Jeannie M.[1] (“Claimant”) seeks review of the final decision of Respondent Kilolo Kijakazi [2] Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying Claimant's application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 73.1, the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. [ECF No. 8]. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), and the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 20, 30] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons discussed below, Claimant's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [ECF No. 20] is denied and the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgement [ECF No. 30] is granted.
On January 13, 2015, Claimant filed a Title II application for DIB alleging disability beginning on October 26, 2014. (R. 140-41). Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. 107-16). On October 10, 2017, Claimant appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Kathleen Kadlec. (R. 31-58). ALJ Kadlec also heard testimony on that date from impartial vocational expert (“VE”) Amy Mauri. (R. 58-73). On February 28, 2018, ALJ Kadlec denied Claimant's claim for DIB. (R. 13-25).
In finding Claimant not disabled, the ALJ followed the five-step evaluation process required by Social Security regulations for individuals over the age of 18. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 26, 2014, her alleged disability onset date, through her date last insured of March 31, 2016. (R. 15). At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant had a severe impairment or combination of impairments as defined by 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c). (R. 15-16). Specifically, Claimant suffered from a reconstruction of a weight bearing joint in her lower left extremity. (R. 15-16). The ALJ also acknowledged several non-severe complaints - hypertension, depression, and anxiety - but concluded that those impairments caused no more than minimal vocationally relevant limitations. (R. 16-17). In so concluding, the ALJ considered whether Claimant's mental impairments created any functional limitations to satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria, ” and opined they did not. (R. 16-17). In understanding, remembering, or applying information, the ALJ found Claimant has no limitation. (R. 16). In interacting with others, the ALJ also concluded Claimant has no limitation. (R. 16). Regarding concentration, persistence, and pace, the ALJ determined Claimant has a mild limitation, citing to Claimant's self-report that she could pay attention for only one to two hours at a time. (R. 16). The ALJ considered the opinion of state agency psychological consultant Dr. Richard Hamersma that Claimant had a moderate limitation in this area, but afforded Dr. Hamersma's opinion only partial weight because it conflicted with the record evidence. (R. 17). Finally, in adapting or managing oneself, the ALJ assessed that Claimant has no limitation. (R. 17).
At step three, the ALJ determined that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 17-18). In particular, the ALJ considered listings 1.02, 1.03, and 1.06. (R. 17). Regarding listing 1.02, the ALJ reviewed the requirements and concluded that Claimant did not meet the requisite involvement of one major peripheral weight bearing joint, resulting in the inability to ambulate effectively as defined in 1.00B2b. (R. 18). According to the ALJ, the medical evidence showed that Claimant did rely on crutches for a short time after her injury and accompanying surgeries; however, she was advised to resume weight-bearing as tolerated in April of 2015. (R. 18). The ALJ also pointed to evidence in the record that as soon as October of 2015, Claimant was able to walk without an assistive device at a normal pace, albeit with a moderately antalgic gait on the left. (R. 18). As for listing 1.03, the ALJ similarly concluded that Claimant did not meet the requirement of being unable to ambulate effectively. (R. 18). Nor was listing 1.06 met, as there was no evidence of a fracture of the femur, tibia, pelvis, or one of more of the tarsal bones with solid union not evident on medical imaging, and the inability to ambulate effectively. (R. 18).
The ALJ then found Claimant had the RFC, [3] through her date last insured, to:
“perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except: foot controls frequently bilaterally; occasional ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no work at unprotected heights; only occasional exposure to moving mechanical parts and operation of a motor vehicle; and only occasional exposure to vibrations.” (R. 18).
Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Claimant had past relevant work as a sales or real estate agent. (R. 22). This past relevant work exceeded Claimant's residual functional capacity, which provided for sedentary work with additional limitations, and so the ALJ opined she could no longer perform it. (R. 22). At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering her age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, Claimant is capable of performing other work within the national economy and that those jobs exist in significant numbers. (R. 23-24). Specifically, the VE's testimony, on which the ALJ relied, identified jobs including a document preparer, final assembler, or ticket counter. (R. 23). The ALJ then found Claimant was not under a disability from October 26, 2014, the alleged onset date, through the date last insured of March 31, 2016. (R. 24). The Appeals Council declined to review the matter on February 22, 2019, (R. 1-6), making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see, e.g., Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1765, 1775 (2019); Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).
When a claimant files an application for disability benefits, he or she bears the burden under the Social Security Act of bringing forth evidence that proves his or her impairments are so severe that they prevent the performance of any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 147-48 (1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A five-step inquiry controls whether an individual is eligible for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, which the Seventh Circuit has summarized as follows:
The ALJ must consider whether: (1) the claimant is presently employed; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant's impairment meets or equals any impairment listed in the regulations as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity (4) the claimant's residual functional capacity leaves him unable to perform his past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy.”
Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). Claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2021); Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2022).
A decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner's final decision if the Appeals Council denies a request for review. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). Judicial review is limited to determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching his or her decision. See Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). The reviewing court may enter a judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence “means - and means only - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotations omitted); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Fowlkes v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 5191346, at *2 (7th Cir. 2021). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial' in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154. But even where there is adequate evidence in the record to support the decision, the findings will not be upheld if the ALJ does not build a “logical bridge” from the evidence to the conclusion. Wilder, 22 F.4th at 651 (citing Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021)). In other words, if the Commissioner's decision lacks evidentiary support or adequate discussion of the issues, it cannot stand. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). Though the standard of review is deferential, a reviewing court must “conduct a...
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