Jedson Eng'g Inc. v. Spirit Constr. Serv. Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 June 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:08cv413.
• Citation: 720 F.Supp.2d 904
• Parties: JEDSON ENGINEERING, INC., Plaintiff, v. SPIRIT CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

720 F.Supp.2d 904

JEDSON ENGINEERING, INC., Plaintiff,

v.SPIRIT CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:08cv413.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio,Western Division.

June 18, 2010.

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Christopher R. Carville, Leonard Adriel Weakley, Jr., Sky W. Smith, Rendigs Fry Kiely & Dennis LLP, John Paul Davis, Wood Herron & Evans, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff.

Mark T. Hayden, Brandon McGrath, Shanda Lataushia Spurlock, Greenebaum Doll & McDonald, Benjamin K. McComas, Thompson, Hine, Cincinnati, OH, Jennifer S. Roach, Robert F. Ware, Thompson Hine LLP, Cleveland, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

MICHAEL R. BARRETT, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon the following motions:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 75.)

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Trespass and Civil Conspiracy Claims (Doc. 76.)

3. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage Claim (Doc. 78.)

4. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff Jedson Engineering, Inc.'s Copyright Infringement Claims (Counts 1-6) (Doc. 89.)

5. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Copyright Counts I-IV (Doc. 90.)

6. Defendant Spirit Construction Services' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Civil Conspiracy and Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claims (Counts 17-20) (Doc. 92.)

7. Defendant Baisch Engineering's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claim for Violation of 17 U.S.C. 1202 (Count 21) (Doc. 97.)

8. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Non-Copyright Claims (Counts 8-16) (Doc. 102.)

9. Baisch Engineering's Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts 1-6 (Doc. 104.) ¹

All of the above motions have been fully briefed.

I. BACKGROUND

Jedson's claims arise out of three projects involving the design and construction of tissue manufacturing plants. The facts are largely not in dispute.

The first project was a tissue manufacturing plant for the Cellynne Corporation in Haines City, Florida (“Cellynne Project”). The second project was a tissue plant for the Lincoln Paper and Tissue company in Lincoln, Maine (“Lincoln Project”). The design for the Lincoln Project was similar to and used many of the same drawings as the Cellynne Project. (Doc. 76-1, David Ritchie Aff. ¶ 2.) Drawings for the project were maintained on a worksite server controlled and leased by Jedson. ( Id.)

A third tissue plant for Royal Paper Product in Gila Bend, Arizona became available for bid. Rather than working with Jedson, Spirit worked with Baisch to submit a bid for this project (“Doubletree Project”). Baisch's president, Kurt Kloehn, traveled to Arizona with representatives from Spirit to meet with Royal Paper. (Kloehn Dep. at 18-19.) Baisch created block flow diagrams and general layouts for a tissue plant encompassing a 200-inch machine. (Bosar Dep. at 13-16.) Spirit made a proposal to Royal Paper, which included Baisch's designs. (Barone Dep. at 24-26.)

Spirit later learned that Royal Paper wanted to consider a less expensive project using a 100-inch tissue machine, instead of the 200-inch tissue machine Spirit had originally proposed. (Barone Dep. at 33-35.) Spirit issued a purchase order to Jedson for the preparation of some “concept” drawings using a 100-inch tissue machine. (Barone Dep. at 53, 57; Simmons Dep. at 56-57; Dep. Ex. 70; Dep. Ex. 134.) Royal Paper accepted the new proposal and Spirit entered into a contract with Royal Paper on July 19, 2006. Soon after finalizing the contract with Royal Paper, on July 26, 2006, Spirit began negotiations with Jedson to finalize Jedson's contract scope and pricing. However, Spirit concluded that Jedson's price was too high. (Barone Dep. at 64-65; Deposition of Steven Van Den Heuvel at 97-98; Dep. Exs. 2, 73, 74.) Spirit contacted Baisch about submitting a bid, and informed Baisch that if it could perform the work for $1.1 million, Baisch would be awarded the subcontract. (Dep. Ex. 2.) Spirit told Baisch that it would have access to the drawings from the Lincoln and Cellynne Projects. In an email summarizing the discussions between the parties, Gary Bosar of Baisch wrote:

[Baisch] will have access to all the engineering documents from the previous two projects. I was given the project website information and password for the Lincoln project and we will be given a CD of the Cellynne Project. All drawings will be available to Baisch in .dwg format.

(Dep. Ex. 2.) Baisch agreed to perform the project on August 4 for the $1.1 million amount. (Bosar Dep. at 20; Kloehn Dep. at 50-51, 64-65; Dep. Ex. 2.)

In its Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 82), Jedson brings claims against Spirit for: (1) copyright infringement based upon the drawings for the Cellynne Project (Count I); (2) copyright infringement based upon the drawings for the Lincoln Project (Count II); (3) copyright infringement based upon the drawings for the Doubletree Project (Count V); (4) breach of contract based upon the Subcontract for the Lincoln Project (Count VII); ² (5) violation of Ohio's Trade Secrets Act based upon the drawings for the Cellynne Project (Count VIII); (6) violation of Ohio's Trade Secrets Act based upon the drawings for the Lincoln Project (Count IX); (7) violation of Ohio's Trade Secrets Act based upon the drawings for the Doubletree Project (Count XII); (8) civil conspiracy (Count XVII); (9) breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing based upon the Lincoln Project (Count XVIII); (10) breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing based upon the Cellynne Project (Count XIX); breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing based upon the Doubletree Project (Count XX); and (11) violation of 17 U.S.C. 1202 for removal or alteration of copyright management information (Count XXI).

Jedson brings claims against Baisch for: (1) copyright infringement based upon the Cellynne Project (Count III); (2) copyright infringement based upon the drawings for the Lincoln Project (Count IV); (3) copyright infringement based upon the drawings for the Doubletree Project (Count VI); (4) violation of Ohio's Trade Secrets Act based upon the drawings for the Cellynne Project (Count X); (5) violation of Ohio's Trade Secrets Act based upon the drawings for the Lincoln Project (Count XI); (6) violation of Ohio's Trade Secrets Act based upon the drawings for the Doubletree Project (Count XII I); (7) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (Count XIV); (8) trespass to chattels (Count XV); (9) violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Count XVII); and (10) violation of 17 U.S.C. 1202 for removal or alteration of copyright management information (Count XXI).

II. ANALYSIS A. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the non-moving party cannot rest on his pleadings, but must present significant probative evidence in support of his complaint to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support the non-moving party's position will be insufficient; the evidence must be sufficient for a jury to reasonably find in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Copyright Act (Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI)

Jedson argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on its copyright claims against Spirit and Baisch. (Docs. 75, 90.) Defendants argue that instead, they are entitled to summary judgment on these claims. (Docs. 89, 104.)

To sustain a case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove “(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying [by the defendants] of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Hi-Tech Video Productions, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 58 F.3d 1093, 1095 (6th Cir.1995), quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991).

1. Ownership of valid copyright

Jedson claims it is the owner of valid copyrights in the Cellynne, Lincoln and Doubletree drawings. ³ On November 17, 2007, the Copyright Office issued Certificates of Registration for the Cellynne Drawings: (1) Registration No. VA0001632527 for Tissue Machine Facility 1 (Cellynne) (Architectural Work); and (2) Registration No. VA0001632529 for Tissue Machine Facility 1 (Cellynne) (Technical Drawing). (Doc. 75-3.) The Copyright Office issued Certificates of Registration for the Lincoln Drawings: (1) Registration No. VA0001632532 for Tissue Machine Facility 2 (Lincoln) (Technical Drawing); and (2) Registration No. VA0001632535 for Tissue Machine Facility 1 (Lincoln) (Architectural Work). ( Id.) The Copyright Office issued Certificate of Registration No. VA0001632538.26 for the Doubletree Concept Drawings. ( Id.)

A certificate of copyright registration constitutes “ prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Defendants have attempted to rebut this presumption. S...