Jeff D. v. Otter
| Decision Date | 25 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 07–36009.,07–36009. |
| Citation | 643 F.3d 278,79 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1102 |
| Parties | JEFF D., Paula E., John M., and Dusty R., by and though their next friend, Howard A. Belodoff,* individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs–Appellants,v.Clement Leroy OTTER,* individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Idaho; Tom Luna,* individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Idaho State Department of Education; Richard Armstrong,* individually and in his capacity as Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare; and Sharon Harrigfeld,* individually and in her official capacity as Director of the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections, Defendants–Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Howard A. Belodoff, Boise, ID, for the plaintiffs-appellants.Michael S. Gilmore; James D. Carlson; Deputy Attorneys General, Boise, ID, for the defendants-appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV–80–04091–BLW.Before: WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., JOHN T. NOONAN, and MARSHA S. BERZON, Circuit Judges.
The Plaintiffs, a class of indigent children who suffer from severe emotional and mental disabilities, commenced this action against Idaho state officials more than three decades ago, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their constitutional and statutory rights. In the ensuing years, the parties reached agreements intended to remedy deficiencies in care, and those agreements were embodied in three consent decrees entered and monitored by the district court.
After a number of disputes had resulted in no less than four appeals to this court,1 the district court in 2006 held a “final compliance hearing” to determine whether the Defendants were in compliance with the terms of the decrees. The court determined that compliance would be measured by the Defendants' success in addressing Action Items that had been specified in an Implementation Plan that resulted from the third consent decree. Because the court viewed civil contempt as the only effective method of enforcing the consent decrees, it placed the burden on the Plaintiffs of establishing non-compliance by clear and convincing evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found that the Defendants were not in compliance with respect to several of the Action Items, but that they had substantially complied with the majority of the Items. The court ordered the Defendants to take all steps necessary to bring themselves into substantial compliance with the Action Items for which they were in default, after which they could move to vacate the decrees. The Defendants took the steps that they deemed necessary and moved to vacate the decrees. In 2007, the district court found that the Defendants had substantially complied with the remaining Action Items, and it issued an order vacating the consent decrees.
The Plaintiffs appeal the order, asserting that it was error for the district court to apply the standard for civil contempt in determining whether to vacate the decrees. In applying that standard, the court required the Plaintiffs to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendants had violated the terms of the decrees and that they had not done so in good faith or on the basis of a reasonable interpretation of the decrees. To be entitled to an order vacating consent decrees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), however, the Defendants are required to sustain the burden of establishing that they have substantially complied with the decrees or that facts or law have changed so that “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Jeff D. v. Kempthorne (“ Jeff D. IV ”), 365 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir.2004) (). The district court's application of the contempt standard with the imposition of the burden of proof on the Plaintiffs accordingly was error. In addition, we conclude that the district court erred in accepting the Action Items as the entire measure of compliance with the consent decrees. We accordingly reverse the order of the district court.
The Plaintiffs further contend that the district court committed errors of fact and law in issuing protective orders barring them from taking supplemental depositions of Appellee Karl Kurtz and two non-parties. Finding no such errors, we affirm those rulings of the district court.
In August 1980, Appellant Jeff D., on behalf of a class of indigent Idaho children suffering from severe emotional and mental disabilities, commenced this action against the Governor of Idaho and other state officials, alleging that the officials were providing them with inadequate care in violation of their rights under the United States Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, and federal and state statutes.2 The complaint sought only declaratory and injunctive relief.
In 1983, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that offered virtually all of the injunctive relief the class members sought. The agreement provided for continuing jurisdiction by the district court for five years “or until [the district court was] satisfied by stipulation or otherwise that the claims as alleged in the Complaint have been adequately addressed.” The district court entered the agreement as a consent decree in April 1983.
By the late 1980s, after years of inaction on the part of the Defendants, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the decree. The parties again negotiated a settlement and eventually stipulated to a supplemental agreement, which the district court entered as a second consent decree in December 1990. The following seven years witnessed additional charges of non-compliance, admissions of failure, court intervention, outside auditing, compliance reviews, and finally, in March 1998, a motion by the Plaintiffs for a finding of contempt against the Defendants based on the negative findings of the most recent compliance review. The motion, however, resulted not in a formal determination by the district court but in a “compliance agreement” that purported to “reach a full and final settlement of the Motion for Contempt.” In December 1998, the district court entered the agreement as a third consent decree.
For our purposes, the most significant aspect of the compliance agreement was the requirement that the Defendants provide to the Plaintiffs an independently produced “Needs Assessment” and compliance plan. Two years later, after no more headway than a motion to dismiss, another motion for contempt, and an appeal, the district court “determined that it must take a more active role in enforcing the Decrees.”
The first step taken by the district court was to order the parties jointly to develop a new compliance plan providing “a comprehensive blueprint of how the defendants would meet the requirements of the decrees.” The parties submitted a proposed plan in February 2001. After briefing and argument, the court issued a memorandum decision adopting the plan, which became known as the “Implementation Plan.”
The Implementation Plan comprises a foreword expressing the views of the Defendants, an introduction providing an overview of the planning and oversight processes, and a “Recommendations” section with 50 specific recommendations drawn from the Needs Assessment. “Recommendation 1,” for instance, states: “Parents of children with serious emotional disturbances and children old enough to participate must be part of all system planning, decision-making, management, training, and evaluation.” Each recommendation includes three subsections, some quite lengthy but most measuring only a paragraph or two, headed “Background/Framework for Implementation,” “Priority Action Items and Timelines,” and “Desired Results.” In all, the Implementation Plan contains 252 Action Items.
The district court required the Defendants to file regular status reports “documenting their compliance with deadlines, addressing any non-compliance, and listing the measures they are taking to bring any areas of non-compliance into compliance as quickly as possible.” In May 2002, the parties filed a joint report to apprise the court of “the progress of the Implementation Plan” and to “provide an overview of the recommendations by category.” In January 2003, the court directed the parties to create a matrix identifying those Action Items with which the Defendants had complied and those Action Items with which the Defendants, according to the Plaintiffs, had not complied.3
Matrix in hand, the district court scheduled a “final compliance hearing” for September 2006. In preparation for the hearing, the court ordered the parties to file a joint stipulation of undisputed facts, categorizing the facts by Action Item. The parties complied and, following consideration of the stipulation, the briefs, and a bench trial of the disputed facts, the court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law addressing the issues Action Item by Action Item.
The court determined that the Plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of proof or that the Defendants had substantially complied with the majority of Action Items. With respect to 21 of the Action Items, however, the court held that the Plaintiffs had “show[n] by clear and convincing evidence that [the Defendants substantially] violated the consent judgment ..., and that the violation was not based on good faith and reasonable interpretation of the judgment.” The court ordered the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the “DHW”) “to take all steps necessary to substantially comply with [the 21] Action Items ... within 120 days,” adding that “[o...
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