Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R–1 v. Elizabeth E.

Decision Date29 June 2011
Docket NumberCivil Case No. 10–cv–00741–WJM–KMT.
Citation274 Ed. Law Rep. 118,798 F.Supp.2d 1177
PartiesJEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT R–1, Plaintiff, v. ELIZABETH E., by and through her parents, ROXANNE B. and David E., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Alyssa C. Burghardt, W. Stuart Stuller, Caplan and Earnest, LLC, Boulder, CO, for Plaintiff.

Eloise Henderson Bouzari, Katherine G. Gerland, Louise Bouzari LLC, Law Offices, Englewood, CO, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM J. MARTÍNEZ, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jefferson County School District R–1's (“District's”) appeal seeking judicial review of an administrative law judge's (“ALJ's”) decision under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The ALJ ruled that the District was required to reimburse Defendant Elizabeth E. (Elizabeth), by and through her parents Roxanne B. and David E., for Elizabeth's tuition and other services at a private residential treatment facility. The matter has been fully briefed (ECF No. 19, 23, 24), and the Court has the administrative record (ECF No. 18). After carefully analyzing the briefs and the administrative record, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the ALJ.

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) because the action is brought under the IDEA. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A) (providing that U.S. district courts have jurisdiction over administrative appeals under the IDEA).

II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework

The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., “imposes obligations on the states to provide certain [educational] benefits [to disabled children] in exchange for federal funds.” Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 478 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir.2007); see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). The main purpose of the statute is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [a “FAPE”] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); see Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 520 F.3d 1116, 1129 (10th Cir.2008) (identifying this as the main purpose of the statute).

“The FAPE concept is the central pillar of the IDEA statutory structure.” Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir.2008). A FAPE consists of both “special education” and “related services.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). The statute defines “special education” as “specially designed instruction ... to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29). The statute defines “related services” to include “transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services (including ... psychological services, ... social work services, ... counseling services, ... and medical services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education....” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A). A school district satisfies its obligation to provide a FAPE to a disabled child “by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). “The primary tool in assuring that a [FAPE] is provided to all eligible children with disabilities is the requirement that the state create an individualized education plan (“IEP”) for each disabled child.” Miller v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 565 F.3d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir.2009). “The IEP is a written statement that sets forth the child's present performance level, goals and objectives, specific services that will enable the child to meet those goals, and evaluation criteria and procedures to determine whether the child has met the goals.” Ass'n for Cmty. Living in Colo. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1043 (10th Cir.1993); see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A).

B. Factual Background

The following are either findings of fact made below by Impartial Hearing Officer Marshall A. Snider (“IHO”) in his September 15, 2009 Findings of Fact and Decision (“IHO Decision”),1 or facts evidenced by the administrative record. They also do not appear to be in dispute between the parties.

Elizabeth was born in 1991, and was substantially neglected by her birth parents. (IHO Decision, at 2.) Roxanne B. and David E. (Parents) became her foster parents when she was 16 months old, and they adopted her when she was three-and-a-half years old. ( Id.) In March 2000, she and her Parents moved to Colorado, and she began attending schools within the District. ( Id.) The District identified her as a student with disabilities eligible for special education and related services under the IDEA, and created an IEP for her. ( Id.) As early as December 2000, Elizabeth was diagnosed with Oppositional Defiant Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Reactive Attachment Disorder, and Bipolar I Disorder. (Jt. Ex. LL, at 64; see also id. at 28, 35, 63.) 2

During Elizabeth's eighth grade year (the 2005–06 school year), a dispute arose between her Parents and the District regarding whether the District was providing Elizabeth with a FAPE. (IHO Decision, at 2–3.) They reached a mediated settlement whereby the District would pay half of her tuition to attend a private school in Colorado, Humanex Academy,3 for the ninth grade (2006–07). ( Id. at 3; Jt. Ex. A at 13–17.) 4 They reached another such agreement for Elizabeth to attend Humanex for the tenth grade (2007–08). (IHO Decision, at 4; Jt. Ex. A at 7–12.) During both of these school years at Humanex, Elizabeth started the school years well, but by the spring she would decline academically, have anger outbursts, go through alternative periods of reality, and have problems staying in the classroom. (IHO Decision, at 3–4.) By the end of the 2007–08 school year, she had not earned enough credits to advance to the eleventh grade. ( Id.)

On August 11, 2008, the Parents and the District entered into another settlement agreement whereby the District agreed to pay tuition at Humanex during the 2008–09 school year subject to certain conditions, including that an IEP team meeting would be convened by August 29, 2008 and the team would conduct an evaluation of Elizabeth. ( Id. at 5–6; Jt. Ex. A, at 1–6.) A day or two before this, the Parents had already begun looking into a potential temporary psychiatric hospitalization for Elizabeth to better evaluate and diagnose her condition. (ECF No. 19, at 9 ¶ 32; ECF No. 23, at 8 ¶ 32; Due Process Hearing Transcript (“Transcript”), at 850:9–25, 872:10–24.) This was prompted by Elizabeth's deteriorating behavior. At home, she engaged in outbursts of screaming and rage, including hitting family members; stopped engaging in activities she enjoyed; and would stay in her room. (IHO Decision, at 5–6.) At the beginning of the new school year (which began August 12), she was absent two of the first six days, and overall was not productive. (IHO Decision, at 4; ECF No. 19, at 9 ¶ 34; ECF No. 23, at 9 ¶ 34.) On August 15, 2008, the Parents met with members of the District, at which time the Parents informed the District that they were considering a temporary psychiatric hospitalization of Elizabeth. ( Id. at 6.) At this meeting, the Parents signed the necessary forms for the District to conduct an IEP evaluation of Elizabeth. ( Id. at 7.)

On August 20, 2008, the Parents placed Elizabeth at the Aspen Institute for Behavior Assessment (“Aspen”) in Utah. ( Id.) On August 26, 2008, the Parents first provided the District written notice of the hospitalization, informing it that

Elizabeth was admitted last Wednesday, August 20 into Aspen Institute. This is a lock down facility that works exclusively on assessment and then where is the next best place for her to go: home, day treatment, residential, etc. Elizabeth will be there for about 6 to 8 weeks depending on how long it takes to figure out [this] puzzle.

(Jt. Ex. C, at 22.)

The next communication between the Parents and the District appears to have been one month later, on September 24, 2008, when the District informed the Parents that it [is] withdrawing Elizabeth from Humanex. [It is] not willing to incur the cost of having her enrolled even with the option of receiving a tuition refund for the months she won't attend.” ( Id. at 19.) This e-mail mentioned the possibility of re-enrolling Elizabeth at Humanex following her hospitalization. ( Id.) Two days later, the Parents' attorney (who is representing them in this action) informed the District that the Parents viewed this disenrollment as a breach of the settlement agreement. ( Id. at 14–15.) On October 3, 2008, the Parents provided the District with an update on Elizabeth's progress, saying that she would be at Aspen another 2 to 4 weeks. ( Id. at 17–18.)

On October 7, 2008, the District responded through its counsel (who is representing it in this action), stating, [I]t appears that at this point, the settlement agreement is moot, as parents have unilaterally placed Elizabeth at the Aspen Center in Utah. As such, Elizabeth is not a District student, and the District has no on-going responsibility to Elizabeth under the IDEA.” ( Id. at 14.)

On November 10, 2008, the Parents' attorney notified the District that, following her placement at Aspen, the Parents would be enrolling Elizabeth at Innercept, LLC in Idaho, a residential treatment center, and that the Parents would seek reimbursement from the District for this placement. ( Id. at 6.) The Parents also provided the District with Aspen's final report on Elizabeth. ( Id. at 5.) On November 20, 2008, the District responded, through counsel, informing the...

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