Jefferson Cnty. v. Jefferson Cnty. Constables Ass'n

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Debra H. Lehrmann, Justice
• Citation: Jefferson Cnty. v. Jefferson Cnty. Constables Ass'n, 546 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. 2018)
• Decision Date: 13 April 2018
• Docket Number: No. 16–0498,16–0498
• Parties: JEFFERSON COUNTY, Texas, Petitioner, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY CONSTABLES ASSOCIATION, Respondent

546 S.W.3d 661

JEFFERSON COUNTY, Texas, Petitioner,

v.JEFFERSON COUNTY CONSTABLES ASSOCIATION, Respondent

No. 16–0498

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued November 7, 2017

Opinion Delivered: April 13, 2018

Rehearing Denied June 15, 2018

B. Craig Deats, Deats, Durst & Owen, P.L.L.C., 707 W. 34th Street, Austin TX 78705, Matthew Bradley Bachop, Deats Durst & Owen, P.L.L.C., 1204 San Antonio Street, Suite 203, Austin TX 78701, for Amicus Curiae.

Kathleen M. Kennedy, Jefferson County District, Attorney's Office, 1085 Pearl Street, 3rd Floor, Beaumont TX 77701, for Petitioner

Lance P. Bradley, Bradley & Steele LLP, 3120 Central Mall Drive, Port Arthur TX 77642–8039, Andrew Lipton, Hobson & Bradley, 316 N. 13th St., Nederland, TX 77627, for Respondent.

Justice Lehrmann delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Hecht, Justice Green, Justice Guzman, Justice Devine, Justice Brown, and Justice Blacklock joined.

Debra H. Lehrmann, Justice

This case comes to us on a county's petition to vacate an arbitrator's award in a dispute governed by a collective bargaining agreement between the county and its deputy constables. The primary issue presented involves the validity of the underlying agreement; specifically, we are asked whether deputy constables are "police officers" entitled to enter into collective bargaining agreements with their public employers under Local Government Code chapter 174. If they are, we are also asked whether the arbitrator in this case nevertheless exceeded his authority in (1) concluding the county violated the agreement by eliminating several deputy-constable positions without regard to seniority, and (2) ordering the county to reinstate the deputies in order of seniority. The court of appeals held that the deputy constables are "police officers" and that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority. We agree and affirm the court's judgment.

I. Background

The case centers on a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Jefferson County, Texas, and the Jefferson County Constables Association, which the County has recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for the County's deputy constables. The CBA at issue, effective October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2011,¹ established standards governing the deputy constables' wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Pertinent here, Article 8 of the CBA vests exclusively with the County "the right to lay off for lack of work or funds" and "the right to abolish positions," but Article 13 provides that "[s]eniority shall be the sole factor in layoff and recall, with layoff being accomplished beginning with the least senior deputy, and recall beginning with the most senior deputy in the highest job classification." The CBA contained a multi-step procedure to resolve disputes involving alleged violations of the agreement or its proper interpretation, culminating in submission of the dispute to final, binding arbitration.

The County has six constable precincts, each with an elected constable and a number of deputy constables.² In 2010, the County implemented budget cuts and eliminated eight deputy-constable positions across the precincts. The Constables Association alleged that this action violated the CBA's seniority restriction on layoffs. Because the parties were unable to resolve the dispute during the grievance process, the Constables Association submitted the dispute to arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitrator issued written findings, including that the County "violated the CBA by laying off or failing to budget for specific deputy constables without regard to seniority."

The arbitrator awarded the following relief:

1. The parties shall met [sic] and negotiate to agree on the seniority ranking of the deputy constables to determine which constables should be reinstated and in what order.

2. The County shall reinstate those deputy constables laid off and pay the back wages, less the income made by the deputy from other employment, in the order of their seniority.

3. The arbitrator shall retain jurisdiction for thirty (30) days to resolve any dispute over the payment of back wages.

The County filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in district court, alleging four grounds for vacatur: (1) the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to render an award that intruded on "the sovereign governmental responsibilities of the Jefferson County Commissioners Court"; (2) the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by "essentially controlling the budgetary process reserved by law in this instance to the county government"; (3) the award was not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) the "arbitrator violated the law governing the interpretation of contracts" by rendering meaningless the CBA provision reserving to the County the right to abolish positions.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. The Constables Association argued that the arbitrator acted well within his authority in interpreting and applying the CBA. The County argued that the arbitrator (1) superseded the commissioners court's responsibility to determine the need for deputy-constable positions and set the County's budget, and (2) ignored the contractual rights reserved to the County to lay off employees or abolish positions. The trial court granted the County's motion and rendered final judgment in its favor. The Constables Association appealed.

After the parties completed principal briefing in the court of appeals, the County filed a supplemental brief arguing for the first time that the CBA was invalid, depriving the arbitrator of jurisdiction to resolve any dispute arising under it. Specifically, the County argued that the CBA's validity depends on the applicability of Texas Local Government Code chapter 174, also known as the Fire and Police Employee Relations Act (hereinafter, Collective Bargaining Act or Act), which authorizes fire fighters and police officers to collectively bargain with their public employers. Although the parties had agreed in the CBA to their "mutual obligation to bargain in good faith" under the Act, the County took the position in its supplemental briefing that deputy constables are not "police officers" as the Act defines the term; that the CBA is void and unenforceable as a result; and that the deputy constables (and the Constables Association) therefore "lack[ ] standing under Chapter 174."

The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the Constables Association. 512 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016). The court first addressed the newly raised issue of the deputy constables' status as police officers, noting that the issue's resolution implicated the Association's standing to enforce the CBA, which in turn implicated the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 437. Concluding that the deputy constables qualified as police officers under the Collective Bargaining Act, the court went on to hold that (1) the arbitrator's award did not usurp the County's statutory authority concerning the appointment of deputy constables and (2) the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in awarding reinstatement of more senior deputies.

Id. at 440, 443–44. We granted the County's petition for review.

II. Review of Arbitration Awards

We first examine the authority governing our review of the arbitration award. As the court of appeals noted, the Texas General Arbitration Act by its terms does not apply to collective bargaining agreements, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.002(a)(1), and the Collective Bargaining Act's arbitration provisions govern only impasses arising during the collective bargaining process, not disputes arising under an executed agreement, TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 174.153. Thus, we review the arbitrator's award under the common law.

As relevant here, the common law allows vacatur of an arbitration award if the arbitrator exceeds the scope of his authority or the award "clearly violates carefully articulated, fundamental [public] policy." CVN Grp., Inc. v. Delgado , 95 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tex. 2002) ; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Guidry , 160 Tex. 139, 327 S.W.2d 406, 408 (1959) (explaining that "the authority of arbitrators is derived from the arbitration agreement and is limited to a decision of the matters submitted therein either expressly or by necessary implication"). In CVN Group , we reaffirmed our holding in Smith v. Gladney , 128 Tex. 354, 98 S.W.2d 351, 351 (1936), that public policy precludes judicial enforcement of an arbitration award that is based on a legally unenforceable obligation. 95 S.W.3d at 237–38 ("[A]n illegal contract unenforceable by litigation should not gain legitimacy through arbitration.").

III. The CBA's Validity

The County's principal contention is that the CBA violates Texas law and is therefore void and unenforceable. See Woolsey v. Panhandle Ref. Co. , 131 Tex. 449, 116 S.W.2d 675, 678 (1938) ("[A]n agreement which violates a valid statute is illegal and void, and cannot be enforced."). To that end, Texas law generally precludes the State and its political subdivisions from entering into collective bargaining agreements with their employees regarding employment terms and conditions. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 617.002(a), (b) ("A contract entered into in violation of Subsection (a) is void."). However, the Collective Bargaining Act creates an exception applicable to fire fighters and police officers in political subdivisions that have adopted the Act via majority vote in an election. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §§ 174.023, .051, .052. Upon such adoption, "fire fighters, police officers, or both are entitled to organize and bargain collectively with their public employer regarding compensation, hours, and other conditions of employment." Id. § 174.023. The County contends that a deputy constable does not meet the Act's definition of "police officer" and that the CBA therefore violates Government Code section 617.002.

A. Standing

As noted, the County did not raise the CBA's alleged illegality as a ground for...