Jefferson Cnty. Vision, Inc. v. City of Ranson
| Decision Date | 06 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-0789 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jefferson County Vision, Inc., a West Virginia Non-Profit Corporation, Donald Sutherland, and William Howard Adams, Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners v. City of Ranson, a Public Corporation of the State of West Virginia, Defendant Below, Respondent, and Roxul USA, Inc., d/b/a Rockwool, Intervening Defendant Below, Respondent. |
Petitioners Jefferson County Vision, Inc., Donald Sutherland, and William Howard Adams, by counsel Christopher P. Stroech, appeal the Circuit Court of Jefferson County's September 11, 2020 order denying their motion to amend. Respondent City of Ranson ("Ranson"), by counsel Keith C. Gamble, and Roxul USA, Inc., d/b/a Rockwool ("Rockwool"), by counsel James A. Walls, Joseph V. Schaeffer, and James E Simon, filed a response in support of the circuit court's order.
This Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the order of the circuit court is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Petitioner Jefferson County Vision, Inc. is a West Virginia non-profit which was formed for the purpose of preserving and protecting the quality of life for Jefferson County residents. Respondent Rockwool produces stone wool insulation and at all times relevant was in the process of building an industrial manufacturing facility in Ranson, West Virginia, on a property commonly referred to as Jefferson Orchards.[1] Petitioners Sutherland and Adams are West Virginia residents who own real property near the subject property.
In 2017, the Ranson City Council revised the Ranson City Code. Per Ordinance #2017-301 ("Stack Ordinance"), any height limitations would not apply to industrial smokestacks. Prior to adopting the Stack Ordinance, Ranson published a legal notice in the Spirit of Jefferson and Farmer's Advocate newspaper on June 16, 2017. In September 2017, the Ranson City Council approved a zoning map classification change for the Jefferson Orchards property. Ordinance #2017-302 ("Industrial District Ordinance") created a new Special Industrial District and modified the permitted use for the property from mixed residential and commercial to heavy industrial.
Petitioners filed a complaint for declaratory relief on December 13, 2018. Petitioners' complaint against Ranson asserted two causes of action: a procedural violation of state law as to the Stack Ordinance and a procedural violation as to the Industrial District Ordinance. In the complaint, petitioners did not address the contents, basis, or substance of these ordinances, but instead raised only procedural violations. Respondent Rockwool moved to intervene in the action and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment. In March of 2019, petitioners first moved to amend their complaint and were granted leave to file an amended complaint. Petitioners' amended complaint corrected a misnomer as to how the defendants were named in the original complaint.
Respondent Ranson filed a motion to dismiss. Respondent Rockwool filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings which Respondent Ranson joined in. The motions were fully briefed and argued. On May 5, 2020, the circuit court issued its ruling on the initial dispositive motions granting respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to petitioners' Stack Ordinance claim. The circuit court denied respondents' motion as to the Industrial District Ordinance, noting that "it appears the Industrial District Ordinance was enacted without the required notice under W.Va. Code § 8A-7-8 being provided" but further noted that the "matter may also be rendered moot if Ranson were to simply re-enact the ordinance" with proper notice.
On June 30, 2020, Ranson re-enacted the Industrial District Ordinance and informed the court and counsel that it had followed the additional notice procedures referenced in the court's May 5, 2020, order. Notably, no substantive changes were made to this ordinance prior to its re-adoption. On July 1, 2020, the court ordered petitioners to show cause why their case should not be dismissed as moot.
On July 15, 2020, petitioners moved the court for leave to file a second amended complaint to add substantive spot-zoning, contract-zoning, and comprehensive-plan claims as to the Stack and Industrial District Ordinances. The substantive challenges raised in the second amended complaint targeted not only the Rockwool facility, as the first improper industrial use, but also sought to prevent any further heavy industrial uses on the Jefferson Orchards parcel.
Respondents objected to the proposed second amended complaint, arguing that petitioners knew of the potential substantive claims and had strategically chosen not to bring them earlier in the litigation. Respondents also identified several ways that they were prejudiced by the second amended complaint. Namely, respondents argued that petitioners filed this civil action approximately fourteen months after the ordinances were adopted and noted that the litigation had been ongoing for another twenty months by the time petitioners filed the motion for leave to amend. Additionally, respondents claimed that the parties had engaged in significant dispositive motion practice on petitioners' claims that would have to be repeated if the court allowed petitioners to raise the new substantive claims. Respondent Rockwool noted that it had incurred significant costs in an effort to compel responses to discovery that petitioners had opposed when taking a narrow, procedural view of the case but which would now be relevant considering its new, substantive claims. Further, respondents noted that the passage of time increased the risk that memories would have faded and documents would have been destroyed. Respondent Ranson argued that its good faith efforts to avoid further litigation by re-enacting the Industrial District Orders would have been rendered meaningless if the court allowed petitioners to raise the new claims. Finally, Rockwool noted that it would have dramatically changed Rockwool's stakes and its decision to invest an additional $128 million in constructing its facility had petitioners timely raised any substantive challenges.
By order entered on September 11, 2020, the circuit court denied petitioners' motion to amend citing multiple grounds: prejudice to the respondents, lack of diligence on the part of the movants, and judicial estoppel. Additionally, the circuit court found that the proposed amendments would be futile because petitioners' proposed second amended complaint failed to state claims that could survive summary judgment.
Petitioners now appeal the September 11, 2020, order. Concerning our review of a circuit court's decision on a motion for leave to amend, we have held:
A trial court is vested with a sound discretion in granting or refusing leave to amend pleadings in civil actions. Leave to amend should be freely given when justice so requires, but the action of a trial court in refusing to grant leave to amend a pleading will not be regarded as reversible error in the absence of a showing of an abuse of the trial court's discretion in ruling upon a motion for leave to amend.
Syl. Pt. 6, Perdue v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 152 W.Va. 222, 161 S.E.2d 250 (1968).
The liberality allowed in the amendment of pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure does not entitle a party to be dilatory in asserting claims or to neglect his or her case for a long period of time. Lack of diligence is justification...
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