Jefferson County, Bd. of Health v. City of Bessemer
| Decision Date | 03 October 1974 |
| Citation | 293 Ala. 237,301 So.2d 551 |
| Parties | JEFFERSON COUNTY, Alabama, BOARD OF HEALTH and Dr. George Hardy, as Health Officer of Jefferson County v. CITY OF BESSEMER, a municipal corp., etc. SC 768. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Sadler, Sadler, Sullivan & Sharp, Birmingham, Stone, Patton & Kierce, Bessemer, William A. Thompson, Birmingham, for appellants.
J. Howard McEniry, Jr., Bessemer, for City of Bessemer.
James H. Weaver, Jr., Birmingham, for City of Hueytown.
David H. Hood, Jr., Bessemer, for City of Roosevelt City.
Thomas R. Elliott, Jr., Birmingham, for City of Midfield.
Charles L. Kerr, Leeds, for City of Leeds.
J. Clewis Trucks, Fairfield, for City of Fairfield.
Powell Lipscomb, Bessemer, for City of Brownsville.
J. Thomas King Birmingham, for City of Adamsville.
Robert E. Paden, Bessemer, for City of Lipscomb.
Thomas N. Crawford Jr., Birmingham, for City of Pleasant Grove.
James M. Tingle, Birmingham, for Cities of Gardendale and Tarrant City.
Robert S. Vance, Birmingham, for City of Vestavia Hills.
This appeal is from a final decree of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Bessemer Division, declaring Act No. 546, Acts of Alabama 1973, unconstitutional. The Bill for Declaratory Judgment was filed by five Jefferson County municipalities (later joined by the intervention of twenty-two others) against the Jefferson County Board of Health, Dr. George Hardy, as Health Officer of Jefferson County, and J. D. Smith, as Tax Collector of Jefferson (whose answer was by way of interpleader).
This case is to be decided upon a determination of three basic issues which may be simply stated as follows:
Did Act No. 546:
1. Constitute a local law so as to be void for want of a publication as required under § 106 of the 1901 Constitution of Alabama?
2. Provide for an unconstitutional diversion or appropriation of tax funds, inasmuch as (a) the classifications therein fixed for such diversion or appropriation are arbitrary, or a subterfuge to shield one class and unduly burden another, or to oppress unlawfully in its administration?
(b) such tax funds as are to be diverted or appropriated have all been collected from taxes levied solely upon the citizens of certain localities and therein directed to be expended for the benefit of citizens of another locality?
3. Embrace a material subject in § 5 which was not described in its title, which rendered the same void under § 45 of the 1901 Constitution of Alabama?
Under our rules of review, if the lower Court's declaration of unconstitutionality of Act No. 546 on any one or more of the foregoing grounds is supported by competent evidence and is in accordance with applicable legal principles, this cause is due to be affirmed; otherwise, it is due to be reversed. Since we find, after a careful review thereof, that the lower Court's holding as to ground No. 1--local versus general act--is correct, we confine our consideration to the issue of the double classification aspect of the Act and affirm.
While the record before us is voluminous, we feel that a summary of the defendants' responses to plaintiffs' request for admission of facts will suffice to set the factual context in which this controversy arose.
1. Act No. 546 was not published as if it were a local act;
2. The census figures for each city as shown in Appendix A of the Tax Collector's interpleader are correct (11 municipalities have a population of more than 5,000 and 16 have less);
3. Seven municipalities have not exercised their right to levy ad valorem taxes;
4. The same type of public health services is furnished by the defendants to residents of municipalities as to residents of the county;
5. The defendants have not kept records showing a comparison or a segregation of the cost of services to residents of incorported and unincorporated areas;
6. The classification by population of more than 500,000 applies only to Jefferson County, Alabama.
Act No. 546 reads:
'Be It Enacted by the Legislature of Alabama:
'Section 1. This Act shall apply to every county of the State of Alabama having a population of more than 500,000 according to the last or any subsequent federal census, and to no other county.
'Section 2. (Herein is contained a definition of the terms 'Board Treasurer', 'County', 'County Board of Health', and 'Tax Collector'.)
'Section 3. In order further to provide for the financing of county boards of health in counties in the State of Alabama having populations in excess of 500,000, and subject to the provision of Section 4 hereof, there is hereby appropriated, allocated and otherwise ordered and directed to be set aside and paid over annually to the County Board of Health out of the ad valorem taxes collected by the Tax Collector for the several municipalities located wholly or partially in the County, the following:
(a) For each municipality having a population of more than 5,000 according to the last federal census, an amount equal to $3.00 times the population of each said municipality according to the last federal census; and
(b) For each municipality having a population of 5,000 or less an amount equal to $1.50 times the population of each said municipality according to the last federal census.
'In the case of any municipality located partially within and partially without the boundaries of the County, the amounts provided herein to be paid over to the County, Board of Health shall be calculated on the basis of the number of persons who are residents of that portion of the municipality that is within the boundaries of the County.
'Approved August 27, 1973.
'Time: 5:15 P.M.'
As a preface to our consideration of the constitutional issues, we point out that this Court is fully cognizant of, and in complete agreement with, the numerous longstanding and well-reasoned opinions dealing with the importance of upholding legislative acts as constitutional whenever possible. These propositions may be summarized as follows:
(1) A Statute is presumed to be valid and the party challenging its constitutionality has the burden of establishing such invalidity. Mobile Housing Board v. Cross et al., 285 Ala. 94, 229 So.2d 485 (1969); Rogers et al. v. City of Mobile et al., 277 Ala. 261, 169 So.2d 282 (1964); Alabama State Federation of Labor et al. v. McAdory et al., 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 810 (1944), County Board of Education of Jefferson County v. State ex rel. Carmichael, 237 Ala. 434, 187 So. 414 (1939).
(2) A court should not strike down a statute as unconstitutional unless it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that such statute is unconstitutional. Brittain v. Weatherly, 281 Ala. 683, 207 So.2d 667 (1968); State v. Mills, 278 Ala. 188, 176 So.2d 884 (1965); Al Means, Inc., et al. v. City of Montgomery et al., 268 Ala. 31, 104 So.2d 816 (1958); Taylor v. Johnson, 265 Ala. 541, 93 So.2d 143 (1957); James et al. v. Todd, 267 Ala. 495, 103 So.2d 19 (1957); Riley et al. v. Bradley, 252 Ala. 282, 41 So.2d 641 (1948); State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Murphy, 237 Ala. 332, 186 So. 487 (1939).
These presumptions favoring validity, being fully indulged, must nonetheless give way where the legislative flaws make it judicially impossible for the act to conform to the requirements of our most revered polestar: constitutionality. See Jefferson County v. Busby, 226 Ala. 293, 148 So. 411 (1933); Ward v. State ex rel. Lea, 224 Ala. 242, 139 So. 416 (1932); Henry, County Treasurer v. Wilson, 224 Ala. 261, 139 So. 259 (1931).
The first issue with which we are confronted is whether the Act before us can be categorized as one of general or local application, as defined in § 110, Article 4, Constitution of Alabama 1901.
'A general law within the meaning of this article is a law which applies to the whole state; a local law is a law which applies to any political subdivision or subdivisions of the state less than the whole; a special or private law within the meaning of this article is one which applies to an individual, association, or corporation.'
On an initial reading, the distinction between these two types of legislation seems quite lucid. As we shall presently see, however, any presupposed degree of clarity becomes only superficial in the light of our case law, which is perplexing at times in its ratio decidendi. Nevertheless, this distinction is a critical one since a local law can only become valid through...
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