Jefferson County Health Services Ass'n, Inc. v. Feeney

• Decision Date: 14 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97SC667,97SC667
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 4757, 98 CJ C.A.R. 4986 JEFFERSON COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES ASSOCIATION, INC.; Jefferson County Department of Health and Environment; and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Jefferson, Petitioners, v. Barbara J. FEENEY, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1001

974 P.2d 1001

98 CJ C.A.R. 4757, 98 CJ C.A.R. 4986

JEFFERSON COUNTY HEALTH SERVICES ASSOCIATION, INC.;

Jefferson County Department of Health and

Environment; and the Board of County

Commissioners of the County of

Jefferson, Petitioners, v. Barbara J. FEENEY, Respondent.

No. 97SC667.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Sept. 14, 1998.

Beem & Mann, P.C., Clifford L. Beem, A. Mark Isley, Denver, for Respondent.

Gary E. Hanisch, Walsenburg, for Amicus Curiae Las Animas-Huerfano Counties Health Department.

Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' conclusion in Feeney v. Jefferson County Health Services Ass'n, Inc., 949 P.2d 103 (Colo.App.1997) that the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA), section 24-10-109, 7 C.R.S. (1998), are satisfied when a claimant sends notice of a claim against a county health department to the board of county commissioners and not to the county board of health. We conclude that the county board of health, not the board of county commissioners, is the governing body of a county health department and is therefore entitled to notice under the Governmental Immunity Act. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the court of appeals for consideration of the remaining issues in light of this ruling.

I.

On February 8, 1994, Respondent Barbara Feeney slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside of a medical clinic in Lakewood, Colorado. The clinic was operated by the Jefferson County Department of Health and Environment (the Health Department). Feeney filed claims of negligence against three defendants: Jefferson County, the Health Department, and the Jefferson County Health Services Association.

On March 29, 1994, Feeney sent notice of her claim by registered mail to the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners (the County Commissioners) and the Jefferson County Attorney. She also sent notice to various officials of the City of Lakewood. Feeney did not send notice to any entity, other than the County Commissioners, of her claim against the Health Department. ¹

The Health Department filed a motion to dismiss claiming that its governing body was the Jefferson County Board of Health, and that Feeney had failed to submit notice of the claim to that body within 180 days of the injury. The district court denied the motion, and held that the County Commissioners "could fairly be said to be a 'governing body' for the County Health Department" under the GIA.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court and held that the Health Department, established by resolution of the County Commissioners, was not an independent legal entity separate and distinct from the county. See Feeney, 949 P.2d at 106. Accordingly, the court held that the Health Department was not entitled to a separate notice of the claim, and that notice to the County Commissioners satisfied the GIA. See id.

We now hold that the Jefferson County Board of Health, not the County Commissioners, is the governing body of the Health Department and that notice to the County Commissioners did not suffice to notify the Health Department of the pendency of the claim.

II.

As a matter of public policy and in order to encourage the provision of essential public services, the General Assembly has limited the circumstances in which a public entity may be liable for injuries to a member of the public. See § 24-10-102, 7 C.R.S. (1998). Among the constraints of the GIA are the notice requirements imposed upon a potential claimant. Specifically, when an individual suffers an injury caused by a public entity or public employee, that individual must notify the entity of the existence of the claim within 180 days of discovery of the injury. See § 24-10-109(1), 7 C.R.S. (1998). Compliance with this provision is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction. See id.; Trinity Broad. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 923 (Colo.1993). Subsection (3) of this statute provides:

If the claim is against the state or an employee thereof, the notice shall be filed with the attorney general. If the claim is against any other public entity or an employee thereof, the notice shall be filed with the governing body of the public entity or the attorney representing the public entity. Such notice shall be effective upon mailing by registered mail or upon personal service.

§ 24-10-109(3), 7 C.R.S. (1998).

The purpose of the notice is not to set a trap for the unwary, but rather to allow a public entity to promptly investigate and remedy dangerous conditions, to foster prompt settlement of meritorious claims, to make necessary fiscal arrangements to cover potential liability, and to prepare for defense of claims. See, e.g., Woodsmall v. Regional Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63, 68 (Colo.1990); Antonopoulos v. Town of Telluride, 187 Colo. 392, 398, 532 P.2d 346, 349 (1975).

We have previously observed that the statute plainly requires litigants to file the notice with one of two persons: the governing body of the public entity or the entity's attorney. See Brock v. Nyland, 955 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Colo.1998). The statute thus insures that the " 'governing body' or its 'attorney' be directly involved, advised, and notified of potential litigation." Id. at 1041. Notification to any other person is insufficient under the clear language of the GIA. See id. at 1040-41.

III.

The question before us then is not what the statute mandates, but rather what body governs the Health Department. To answer that question, we begin with an overview of the structure of our state public health system.

Article 1 of title 25 creates a three-tiered public health system in Colorado. See §§ 25-1-101 to -1112, 8 C.R.S. (1998). The first and overarching tier is the State Department of Public Health and Environment. See §§ 25-1-101 to -125, 8 C.R.S. (1998). The state health department is responsible for, among other things, investigating statewide epidemics, compiling statewide vital statistics, establishing state health standards, licensing and inspecting hospitals, and monitoring and controlling other state health issues. See § 25-1-107, 8 C.R.S. (1998). This part 1 of article 1 also creates a state board of health charged with overseeing the day-to-day operations of the state health department and setting its policies, rules, regulations, and standards. See §§ 25-1-103 and -108, 8 C.R.S. (1998).

Part 5 of article 1 sets out the next tier of the system in the form of county and district departments of health. See §§ 25-1-501 to -516, 8 C.R.S. (1998). The Jefferson County Department of Health and Environment was established pursuant to part 5. The duties of the part 5 health departments are similar to those of the state health department, and these entities work with the state in implementing statewide health policies and procedures. See § 25-1-506, 8 C.R.S. (1998). A part 5 health department may cover a single county or it may overlap into two or more adjacent counties comprising a district. See § 25-1-501, 8 C.R.S. (1998). Part 5 also creates a board of health for county or district health departments with powers and duties similar to the state board for overseeing the operation of county or district health departments. See § 25-1-507, 8 C.R.S. (1998). A part 5 health department may bring its own civil or criminal action to enforce public health laws. See § 25-1-512, 8 C.R.S. (1998). Its board of health may, as Jefferson County's board has, employ its own attorney to defend actions brought against it. See § 25-1-512, 8 C.R.S. (1998).

The final tier of the system is created by part 6 of article 1, which decrees that boards of county commissioners shall act as local boards of health for their respective counties and shall attend to various health issues of local concern, such as home health care services, fees for county health services, and the abatement of certain nuisances such as dead animals. See §§ 25-1-601 to -667, 8 C.R.S. (1998). Should the county commissioners of a particular county decline to establish a part 5 department, then the part 6 board itself must implement the state health department's objectives.

Part 5 health departments are aligned with the state health department and have more responsibility than a part 6 board. A part 5 department's alignment with the state is apparent not only in the department's duties and responsibilities but also in the method of appointing health officers. The state health department dictates the necessary qualifications for a public health administrator appointed by a part 5 department. See § 25-1-505(1), 8 C.R.S. (1998). The state is not involved, however, in establishing qualifications for health officers appointed by a part 6 board. See § 25-1-610, 8 C .R.S. (1998).

Thus, part 1 and part 5 health departments together carry out statewide health mandates and policies. Part 6 boards, comprised of a board of county commissioners, are separate from the state and handle situations of more local concern. ²

Our case law has already addressed one aspect of the division between a part 5 health department and the county in which it operates. In Johnson v. Jefferson County Board of Health, 662 P.2d 463 (Colo.1983), we considered the position of a part 5 health department relative to both the state and the county. By statute, a part 5 health department's board is to appoint a public health administrator to "serve at the pleasure of the board." § 25-1-501(1), 8 C.R.S. (1998); see also Johnson, 662 P.2d at 471 (interpreting this phrase to allow discharge "at any time without cause or formal procedure"). The question in Johnson was whether county personnel rules, requiring notice and a hearing prior to termination of a county employee, superseded the board of health's right to discharge the public administrator at will. In analyzing the statutory scheme, we concluded that both the county and the county health department are separate political ...