Jefferson County v. Braswell

• Decision Date: 06 November 1981
• Citation: 407 So.2d 115
• Parties: JEFFERSON COUNTY, Alabama, et al. v. Wayne BRASWELL, et al. 79-956.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 115

407 So.2d 115

JEFFERSON COUNTY, Alabama, et al. v. Wayne BRASWELL, et al.

79-956.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 6, 1981.

J. Reese Johnston, Jr., of Barber, Johnston, Holmes & Hughes, Birmingham, for appellants.

Charles E. Clark of Carlton, Boles, Clark, Vann, Stichweh & Caddis, Birmingham, for appellees.

Robert A. Huffaker of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, Montgomery, for amicus curiae The Ass'n of County Commissions of Alabama.

EMBRY, Justice.

This appeal is from a final judgment in favor of plaintiffs, several retail beer licensees of Jefferson County, who challenged the validity of Act 689 of the 1977 Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature under several state and federal constitutional provisions and federal antitrust laws.

Act 689 requires each manufacturer of malt or brewed beverages that markets its products in Jefferson County to designate a sales territory for each of its brands sold in that county and to name an exclusive wholesaler for the territory for each such brand. Additionally, the Act makes it unlawful for any retail beer dealer in Jefferson County to purchase any brand of malt or brewed beverage from anyone other than the designated wholesaler of that brand in the county, under penalty of revocation of the retailer's license for noncompliance.

This action was commenced with the filing of a complaint for declaratory judgment by several retail beer licensees of Jefferson County. Named as defendants were Jefferson County and its three Commissioners, the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and its three members, and the state's Attorney General.

The theories advanced in the numerous counts of plaintiffs' complaint can be summarized as follows:

(1) Act 689 violates Article 4, Section 105, Alabama Constitution of 1901, because it is a local law covering a subject subsumed by an extant general law;

(2) The Act violates guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law afforded by the Alabama and United States Constitutions; and

(3) The Act violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and federal antitrust laws.

At the trial without a jury, the thrust of testimony adduced by plaintiffs was that wholesale beer prices in Jefferson County have risen substantially since passage of the Act, that these prices are parallel among the county's designated wholesalers, and that plaintiffs are no longer able to purchase beer from other counties at competitive prices. Testimony was presented that, but for the Act, plaintiffs could purchase beer from Tuscaloosa County wholesalers, as they had done prior to the Act's passage, at savings in excess of one dollar per case.

Defendants countered with testimony that prior to enactment of the legislation substantial tax revenues from beer sales were being lost because Jefferson County retailers brought into the county beer purchased from wholesalers outside the county without reporting and paying the applicable tax prevailing in Jefferson County. According to evidence offered by defendants the Act was passed to remedy this situation.

After permitting the parties to file briefs in support of their legal arguments, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, the retailers.

The trial court's order does not indicate which ground or grounds of invalidity alleged by plaintiffs the court considered determinative of the issue. Consequently, it is incumbent upon us to consider each of the theories advanced by plaintiffs below in order to determine if the trial court's judgment can be sustained on one or more of those theories.

To aid us in examining these issues, the Association of County Commissioners of Alabama was granted leave to file amicus curiae briefs.

We initially deal with plaintiffs' contentions that Act 689 violates Const.1901, § 105. That section provides that "... (n)o special, private or local law ... shall be enacted in any case which is provided for by a general law...."

The only statutory provisions specifically identified by plaintiffs as being in conflict with Act 689 are Code 1975, §§ 28-3-142 and -167, which concern the licensing of wholesalers and retailers of malted and brewed beverages. Section 28-3-142 authorizes licensed wholesalers to sell or deliver such beverages anywhere within the State of Alabama, while Section 28-3-167 authorizes licensed retailers to purchase from those wholesalers.

Defendants contend section 105 does not operate to invalidate Act 689 in light of the statutes cited by plaintiffs, when 105 is read in conjunction with the preceding section of the constitution. The latter, Const.1901, § 104, contains an extensive list of particular subject matters which the Legislature may not regulate by way of special, private or local laws. However, 104 concludes as follows:

The legislature shall pass general laws for the cases enumerated in this section, provided that nothing in this section or article shall affect the right of the legislature to enact local laws regulating or prohibiting the liquor traffic; but no such local law shall be enacted unless notice shall have been given as required in section 106 of this Constitution.

Plaintiffs respond that the exemption in 104 from restrictions on local legislation has no application to Act 689. Plaintiffs point to the fact that the exemption covers only local laws, not private or special laws, regulating the liquor traffic. Act 689, plaintiffs maintain, is a private or special law.

A local law is defined in Const.1901, § 110, as "a law which applies to any political subdivision or subdivisions of the state less than the whole," while a private or special law is defined as "one which applies to an individual, association, or corporation."

Plaintiffs argue that the Act applies directly and indirectly to individuals or corporations, i.e., the manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of beer sold in Jefferson County, but does not regulate Jefferson County as a political subdivision. As plaintiffs couch their contention, the Act applies "in a political subdivision, but not to a political subdivision."

At this point we note that Amendment No. 375 to the Constitution amended § 110 upon its ratification in 1978 and changed the definition of a local law to "a law which is not a general law or a special or private law." This amendment was not in effect, however, at the time Act 689 was passed. Therefore, the classification of the Act is to be determined under the definitions in the quoted portion of the original 110.

In any case, we do not think resolution of the issue as framed by plaintiffs would be any different as a result of the adoption of Amendment 375 in light of our recent holding that an annexation bill is a local law, within the meaning of the amendment, where it is limited in its application to a single political subdivision of this state. Opinion of the Justices, 381 So.2d 632 (Ala.1980).

In addition to the contention that the Act does not apply to a political subdivision, plaintiffs maintain the Act cannot be local because it confers authority on the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) to revoke retail beer licenses for violation of the Act. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the Act's requirement of the designation of exclusive wholesalers forecloses the right of other wholesalers throughout the state to sell to retailers located in Jefferson County, thereby causing the Act to have statewide rather than local application.

Plaintiffs' contentions regarding the ABC Board are without merit. The Act merely states the ABC Board will be notified of a license revocation by the governing body of the county or municipality which has revoked it, and that upon receipt of that notice the ABC Board will give the retailer notice to appear and show cause why his license should not be revoked. Nothing in that provision confers additional authority on the ABC Board to revoke a retail beer license, nor does it require the Board to revoke such a license.

Regarding plaintiffs' argument that the Act cannot be local because it effectively prohibits wholesalers outside of Jefferson County from selling to retailers within that county; that indirect effect does not change the local nature of the Act. This argument is actually a disguised restatement of their basic premise with respect to section 105, namely, that the Act conflicts with Code 1975, § 28-3-142, the general law authorizing licensed wholesalers to sell to any retailer in the state.

Finally, we are not persuaded by plaintiffs' interpretation or construction of the phrase "to a political subdivision" in section 110's definition of a local law. A local law has been defined as one that applies to a particular locality or particular localities to the exclusion of others, while, in contrast, a private or special law has been defined as one which applies to a particular individual or individuals. 2 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 40.01, at 137 (4th ed. 1973). Also see Connor v. State, 275 Ala. 230, 153 So.2d 787 (1963); Note, Local Legislation in Alabama: The Impact of Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham, 32 Ala.L.Rev. 167 (1980).

We interpret the definitions of a local law and a private or special law in 110 as consistent with this view, as opposed to plaintiffs' implied position that legislation must directly regulate governmental functions of a political subdivision in order to be classified as a local Act.

We also think it clear from the Act's language that the legislative intent was to proscribe certain conduct within a particular locality, Jefferson County, rather than to control the conduct of specific persons. Furthermore, "(i)t has long been recognized that an act which was intended to apply to only one county, which is named, is a local act." Opinion of the Justices, 284 Ala. 626, 227 So. 396 (1969). Accordingly, we conclude that Act 689 is a local law.

Plaintiffs next contend that, even if the Act is a local law, notice of...