Jefferson County v. City of Leeds
Decision Date | 03 November 1995 |
Citation | 675 So.2d 353 |
Parties | JEFFERSON COUNTY v. CITY OF LEEDS, et al. 1940255. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Charles S. Wagner, Asst. County Atty., Birmingham, for Appellant.
Billy R. Weathington, Jr. of Weathington & Associates, P.C., Leeds, for Appellees.
This case broadly involves a contract claim by the appellee, City of Leeds, Alabama, and others (collectively "Leeds"), in regard to an agreement to transfer the Leeds Waste Water Treatment Plant ("plant"), to the appellant, Jefferson County ("the County"). Leeds sued the County for, among other things, a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and other equitable relief. The evidence indicates that the County charges residents of the City of Leeds who live outside Jefferson County double the standard sewage rate charged Leeds residents who live inside Jefferson County. The Leeds city limits extend beyond Jefferson County into St. Clair and Shelby Counties. The County appeals the ruling of the trial court in favor of Leeds. After negotiations for the transfer of the plant between the County and Leeds in 1973, Jefferson County Commissioner Tom Gloor sent a letter to the mayor of Leeds confirming the parties' decision to enter into an agreement. The trial court found that this letter formed an agreement that legally bound each party to certain commitments. The letter stated that sewer service would be provided at "an equitable rate to all users." After the letter from Gloor in 1973, Leeds conveyed the plant by deed to the County for $1.00. By attaining ownership of the plant, the County became eligible for, and received, Federal grant money for repairs to, and further development of, its sewer system. In 1982, the County adopted a new resolution whereby the County would increase the sewage rate charged to non-Jefferson County residents of Leeds to an amount double the rate charged Jefferson County residents.
The trial court determined that Leeds met all necessary obligations required by the agreement when it conveyed the plant to the County. Leeds argued that the County was in fact in breach when it increased the rate charged to out-of-County customers to an amount double that charged to County customers. The trial court ruled that after receiving the benefit of the bargain, the County attempted to avoid the commitments made by the Jefferson County Commission in 1973 and raised fees as mentioned above.
We note that our review of the trial court's judgment in this matter is governed by the ore tenus rule. Under the ore tenus rule of review, a judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed unless it is based on findings of fact that are plainly and palpably wrong or manifestly unjust. Silverman v. Charmac, Inc., 414 So.2d 892 (Ala.1982). It is the duty of the trial court to resolve any conflicting testimony and to render a judgment accordingly. Gaston v. Ames, 514 So.2d 877 (Ala.1987). Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts established by the evidence, and we, therefore, adopt the court's findings, as set out below:
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