Jefferson County v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 21 May 1936
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 950
• Citation: 168 So. 450,232 Ala. 406
• Parties: JEFFERSON COUNTY v. JOHNSON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

168 So. 450

232 Ala. 406

JEFFERSON COUNTY v. JOHNSON.

6 Div. 950

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 21, 1936

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J.F. Thompson, Judge.

Proceeding by Mack M. Johnson against Jefferson County and others for declaratory relief. From the judgment, named defendant appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

Ernest Matthews, of Birmingham, for appellant.

C.D Comstock, of Birmingham, for appellee.

BROWN Justice.

This is a proceeding under the "Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act" (approved September 7, 1935, Gen.Acts 1935, pp 777, 778), instituted by the appellee, Mack M. Johnson against J.M. Yeilding, as treasurer of Jefferson county, W.D. Bishop, Robert E. Smith, and W.E. Dickson, as members of the county commission, and Jefferson county, alleging: "That he is a bailiff serving in Division 2 of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, and has been since his appointment on, to-wit, the 15th day of January, 1935; that as such bailiff he is called upon from time to time to take juries which are being kept together by order of the Court to meals and lodging; that he is informed and believes that the respondents have in the past refused and will in the future refuse to approve and pay the charges made for petitioner's meals or lodging while in charge of juries as hereinbefore set out." (Italics supplied.)

The prayer of the petition is "that upon a hearing *** the Court will render a judgment or decree declaratory of petitioner's status and rights with reference to the matters hereinabove set out."

The defendants, by their attorney, appeared and filed the following answer:

"1st. That they admit the allegations of fact therein contained.

"2nd. That they join with petitioner in requesting the Court to declare the law of the case." (Italics supplied.)

The wisdom of declaratory judgment acts has been doubted by courts of high authority, because they invoke the courts to give advisory opinions, enlarge the field of controversy, and invite and encourage litigation as to matters which have not ripened into justiciable controversies, some of which are often frivolous.

The courts, however, are not concerned with the wisdom or policy that induced the enactment of these statutes. That is a matter within the province of the law-making body of magistracy--the Legislature.

The courts are concerned, however, with their interpretation and application to accomplish the purpose and remedy the evils at which such legislation is directed--to see that the proceedings invoke judicial power, to the end that their judgments are binding.

The weight of authority is that, to give the court jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment, there must be "a bona fide existing controversy, with subject-matter and parties in interest in court, and a situation where adequate relief is not presently available through medium of other existing forms of action." Union Trust Co. of Rochester v Main & South Streets Holding Corporation, 245 A.D. 369, 282 N.Y.S. 428, 429 [headnote 2]; 33 Corpus Juris, p. 1097, § 57. In the authority last above cited, it is observed: "Upon the ground that such statutes impose nonjudicial functions upon the judiciary, statutes authorizing declaratory judgments in cases where no other relief could be granted have been declared unconstitutional [ Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Co., 211 Mich. 592, 179 N.W. 350, 12 A.L.R. 26], and this is doubtless the correct view if the statute is construed to authorize such judgment in cases where there is no real case or controversy with opposing parties such as can be submitted to judicial...