Jefferson County v. Richards
| Decision Date | 22 June 2001 |
| Citation | 805 So.2d 690 |
| Parties | JEFFERSON COUNTY and Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Center Authority v. Jason RICHARDS et al. Jefferson County v. Phillip A. Triantos, M.D. Jason Richards and Jeffrey Terrell v. Phillip A. Triantos, M.D. Phillip A. Triantos, on behalf of himself and a certified class of persons v. Jefferson County, Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
William M. Slaughter, J. Vernon Patrick, Jr., Matthew T. Franklin, and Jeffrey V. Havercroft of Haskell, Slaughter & Young, L.L.C., Birmingham; and Edwin A. Strickland, Jeffrey M. Sewell, and Charles S. Wagner, Jefferson County's Attorney's Office, Birmingham, for Jefferson County.
E. Clayton Lowe, Jr., Peter A. Grammas, and Wilson F. Green of Burr & Forman, L.L.P., Birmingham, for Phillip A. Triantos, M.D., and the exempted class.
William J. Baxley, Joel E. Dillard, Charles A. Dauphin, and David McKnight of Baxley, Dillard, Dauphin & McKnight, Birmingham, for Jason Richards and the taxpayers.
These appeals arise from, or are related to, a class action filed against Jefferson County by certain county taxpayers, referred to herein as the Richards class. The Richards class members claim that an occupational tax, as currently authorized by Ala. Acts 1967, Act No. 406 (Reg.Session) (not codified), and implemented by Jefferson County Ordinance No. 1120, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The equal-protection claim asserted by the Richards class stems from the fact that another group of taxpayers, referred to herein as the Triantos class, or the "exempt" class, are exempt from payment of the tax, under the mandate of Act No. 406 and under the express language of Ordinance No. 1120.
The overarching issue presented in this group of appeals is whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that all professions and occupations be treated the same by the State of Alabama and by Jefferson County for occupational-tax purposes. Stated more specifically, the primary issue presented is whether the exemptions from Jefferson County's occupational tax, granted to certain professions and occupations by Act 406 and implemented by Ordinance No. 1120, violate the Equal Protection Clause. We hold that the Richards plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proving that the exempt classifications at issue violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The plaintiff class in Richards v. Jefferson County et al. (Case No. 1981680), filed their action in 1992, seeking a judgment declaring Jefferson County's occupational tax unconstitutional. Judge John E. Rochester entered a judgment on November 12, 1998, holding that the exemptions required by § 4 of Act 406 and allowed by Section 1(B) of Ordinance No. 1120 violate the Equal Protection Clause. On June 17, 1999, Judge Rochester entered an order enjoining the County from continuing to collect the occupational tax from the members of the Richards class unless it also collected the tax from the members of the Triantos class. Pursuant to that order, Jefferson County began collecting the tax from the Triantos class members; also pursuant to Judge Rochester's order, the County placed those newly collected funds in a special escrow account. Jefferson County appeals from Judge Rochester's order of June 17, 1999.
Case No. 1990836, an appeal styled Jefferson County v. Phillip Triantos, M.D., arises out of a class action filed by a Birmingham physician, Dr. Phillip Triantos, against Jefferson County after the County had begun collecting the occupational tax from the exempt taxpayers. Triantos sought a judgment declaring that Jefferson County had no authority to impose the occupational tax on the exempt taxpayers and an injunction prohibiting Jefferson County from collecting the occupational tax from the exempt taxpayers; he also sought a refund of all occupational taxes that had been collected from the exempt taxpayers.1 Judge Thomas Woodall (who is now a Justice on this Court) heard the action and issued the requested declaratory judgment and the requested injunction, finding no lawful basis under which the County could impose the occupational tax on the members of the Triantos class because the 1967 Act conferred no such taxing authority on Jefferson County. Jefferson County appeals from the injunction.2
Jefferson County filed a "Motion to Alter, Amend or Stay," seeking a stay of Judge Woodall's injunction pending an appeal. Although Judge Woodall denied the motion, this Court, on March 22, 2000, granted the stay. By virtue of this stay, Jefferson County continues to collect the occupational tax from both the Richards class and the Triantos class of taxpayers.
Case No. 1990923 arises out of a motion to intervene filed by the Richards plaintiffs in the Triantos action. The Richards plaintiffs sought to intervene in order to have the 1967 Act and the Ordinance declared unconstitutional, a position contrary to that being asserted by the exempt taxpayers in the Triantos action. Judge Woodall denied this motion, and the Richards plaintiffs appeal.
Case No. 1990961 arises from Judge Woodall's order in the Triantos action denying Dr. Triantos's request for a refund of all occupational taxes paid by the members of the exempt class. Judge Woodall deferred any ruling on the refund issue pending further orders in the Richards action regarding the escrow account in which the taxes collected from the exempt taxpayers were deposited. Triantos filed a "Motion to Alter or Amend," arguing that the Richards court lacked jurisdiction over the Triantos class and that the Triantos class should not be compelled to seek their refund in the Richards action. Judge Woodall denied this motion; Triantos appeals.
We consider the following issues on appeal:
We summarily dispose of issues 1, 2, and 5. As for the first issue, it cannot be seriously disputed that Judge Rochester's order of June 17, 1999, in which he restrained Jefferson County from collecting an occupational tax from the Richards class members unless it also collected the tax from the Triantos class members, is an appealable order. As correctly argued by Jefferson County, Judge Rochester's order is both a mandatory injunction3 and a prohibitory injunction.4 Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes an appeal from an "interlocutory order granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an injunction, or refusing to dissolve or to modify an injunction." Judge Rochester's June 17, 1999, order is appealable.
We next determine the appropriate standard of appellate review to be applied to Judge Rochester's ruling that the exemptions at issue in this case violate the Equal Protection Clause. Jefferson County asserts that the proper review is a de novo review, with no presumption of correctness, because this appeal raises a federal constitutional issue and because any findings of fact made by Judge Rochester are intimately intertwined with that constitutional issue. The Richards plaintiffs argue that the "clearly-erroneous" standard is the applicable standard because Judge Rochester made findings of fact based on evidence presented to him ore tenus. The Richards plaintiffs assert that, on appeal from a trial court's determination that a statute or ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause, an appellate court must apply the "facts" as determined by that trial court.
Alternatively, Jefferson County asserts that, even if the clearly-erroneous standard is the proper standard to be applied, Judge Rochester applied erroneous legal principles in his orders. The Richards plaintiffs argue that Judge Rochester correctly applied the law to the findings of fact contained in his order.
Judge Rochester's November 12, 1998, order states, in pertinent part:
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