Jefferson County v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Com'n

• Decision Date: 22 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-2778,93-2778
• Parties: , 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2829 JEFFERSON COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION, AFSCME District Council 40, Respondents-Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 172

523 N.W.2d 172

187 Wis.2d 647, 147 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2829

JEFFERSON COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION, AFSCME District

Council 40, Respondents-Respondents.

No. 93-2778.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs July 14, 1994.

Opinion Released Sept. 22, 1994.

Opinion Filed Sept. 22, 1994.

Before EICH, C.J., GARTZKE, P.J., and SUNDBY, J.

EICH, Chief Judge.

Jefferson County appeals from a judgment affirming a decision of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. The commission ruled that the County committed a prohibited practice under the Municipal Employment Relations Act (MERA) when it refused to apply the "contingency pay" provisions of its existing pay plan applicable to nonrepresented employees during initial contract negotiations with several recently created bargaining units. The issue is whether the commission erred in holding that, by so doing, the County impermissibly altered the status quo with respect to employee wages, hours and working conditions during the negotiations. The parties also dispute the standard of review applicable to the commission's decision.

We conclude that the appropriate standard of review in this case is deferential: whether the commission could reasonably conclude that the County's actions violated its duty to bargain with the union representing the affected employees. We answer the question in the affirmative and affirm the judgment.

The facts are not in dispute. Several years ago, Jefferson County adopted a pay plan that contained provisions for "contingency pay" applicable solely to its nonrepresented employees. Contingency pay is initially granted to an employee with ten years in a position and is increased after the fifteenth year, based on years of service and "on the basis of merit as established by the employee's work performance and after written recommendation by the department head and approval of the [County] Personnel Committee." Under the plan, the increases do not automatically go into effect when the employee achieves a certain longevity in the position but are contingent upon satisfactory work performance.

In 1990, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees became the certified bargaining representative of the County's courthouse and health agency professional employees and began negotiations with the County on behalf of the new bargaining units. While the negotiations were proceeding, two employees who were members of the new bargaining units attained ten years in county service and a third reached the fifteen-year level, so as to become eligible for either an initial award or an increase in contingency pay. Because the three employees were now represented by the union in the initial contract negotiations, the County declined to apply the contingency pay provisions of the pay plan to them, believing that it was required to do so in order to maintain the status quo during the contract negotiations.

The union filed a prohibited practices complaint against the County and the commission ruled that the County's actions with respect to the three employees disturbed the status quo during bargaining and thus constituted a prohibited practice under the act. The County sought judicial review and the circuit court affirmed the commission's decision.

I. Scope of Review

We, of course, review the commission's decision, not the circuit court's. Lewandowski v. State, 140 Wis.2d 405, 409, 411 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Ct.App.1987). The County argues that our review should be de novo, while the commission maintains that its decision is entitled to deference.

Both parties acknowledge that the issue before us involves the interpretation and application of a statute and is thus one of law. See Lewandowski, 140 Wis.2d at 409, 411 N.W.2d at 148. As a general rule, we review legal issues independently; however, certain legal determinations of administrative agencies are entitled to deferential review. And while the supreme court and this court have, over time, described the extent of that deference in varying terms, we agree with the commission that, where deference is appropriate, the question is one of the reasonableness of the agency's decision.

In Carrion Corp. v. DOR, 179 Wis.2d 254, 264-65, 507 N.W.2d 356, 359 (Ct.App.1993), we discussed the appropriate level of deference to be applied to an administrative agency's legal conclusions:

The appeal ... involves review of the [Tax Appeals C]ommission's interpretation and application of statutes--issues of law which we generally review de novo. We do, however, accord varying degrees of deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute it has been legislatively charged to administer. West Bend Educ. Ass'n v. WERC, 121 Wis.2d 1, 11-12, 357 N.W.2d 534, 539 (1984). Thus, we will defer to the agency's interpretation of such a statute when that interpretation "is of long standing" or "entails its expertise, technical competence and specialized knowledge," or when "through interpretation and application of the statute, the agency can provide uniformity and consistency in the field of its specialized knowledge." Id. The supreme court also has held that "[w]here a legal question is intertwined with factual determinations or with value or policy determinations ... [we] should defer to the agency which has primary responsibility for determination of fact and policy." West Bend, 121 Wis.2d at 12, 357 N.W.2d at 539-40.

(Citation omitted.) ¹

In regard to the different ways the cases have described the nature and degree of that deference, we said in Carrion that

the most recent statements on the subject by the supreme court have solidified the rule to provide that in cases where deference is appropriate under the standards ... discussed [above], the deference to be accorded the agency's interpretation--however it may be characterized--is this: "[W]e will affirm the [agency's] interpretation of the statute if it is reasonable, even if another conclusion would be equally reasonable." DILHR v. LIRC, 161 Wis.2d 231, 245, 467 N.W.2d 545, 550 (1991); see also Lisney v. LIRC, 171 Wis.2d 499, 506 n. 3, 493 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1992). Stated conversely, "[a] court does not ... give deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute when the court concludes that the agency's interpretation directly contravenes the words of the statute, is clearly contrary to legislative intent, or is otherwise unreasonable or without rational basis." Id. at 506, 493 N.W.2d at 16.

Carrion, 179 Wis.2d at 265, 507 N.W.2d at 359. ²

In School Dist. of Drummond v. WERC, 121 Wis.2d 126, 132-33, 358 N.W.2d 285, 288 (1984), the supreme court stated that "[w]hen the legislature charges an administrative agency to apply and enforce a particular statute as it has with [WERC] and ch. 111, STATS., the [commission]'s construction and interpretation of the statute are entitled to great weight and any rational basis will sustain its practical interpretations." And while the court noted in Drummond that such a deferential standard of review will be employed only where the commission's interpretation is "long continued" and "substantially uniform," as opposed to being "one of first impression," it was quick to acknowledge the commission's experience in determining "subjects of mandatory or permissible bargaining" under MERA and applied the deferential standard to the commission's determination in that case. Id. at 133, 358 N.W.2d at 289. We see no reason not to apply that standard to the commission's determination of a prohibited practice under § 111.70(3)(a), STATS.

Among other things, it is a prohibited labor practice under § 111.70(3)(a) 1 and 4, STATS., for a municipal employer to either interfere with municipal employees in the exercise of their rights to bargain collectively, or to refuse to bargain collectively with the employees' union. The commission has, for many years, followed the well-established rule that an employer has a duty to maintain the status quo with respect to wages, hours and conditions of employment during contract negotiations, and that an employer's "unilateral change" in employment conditions or wages breaches the duty to bargain collectively. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-746, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1111-13, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962); School Dist. of Wisconsin Rapids, No. 19084-C, op. at 14 (WERC Mar. 22, 1985).

Prior to 1985, the commission had taken a narrow, "static" view of the status quo concept, especially with respect to changes in compensation, looking only to see whether wages had remained "frozen" during contract negotiations. Wisconsin Rapids, No. 19084-C at 16-17 (discussing Menasha Joint Sch. Dist., No. 16589-B, (WERC Sept. 4, 1981), rev'd, No. 81-CV-1007 (Winnebago County Cir.Ct. Aug. 15, 1983)). If they had been frozen, the status quo had been maintained; if they had changed, it had not.

Then, in Wisconsin Rapids, the commission, citing a national trend in both private and public sector labor relations decisions, expressly adopted a "dynamic" view of the status quo in duty-to-bargain cases, recognizing " 'regular and consistent past pattern[s] of changes in employee status.' " Wisconsin Rapids, No. 19084-C at 14 (quoting ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 450 (1976)). Thus, said the...