Jefferson & Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks
| Decision Date | 26 June 1926 |
| Docket Number | 46 |
| Citation | 134 A. 430,287 Pa. 171 |
| Parties | Jefferson & Indiana Coal Co. v. Marks et al., Appellants |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued March 15, 1926
Appeal, No. 46, March T., 1926, by defendants, from decree of C.P. Jefferson Co., Aug. T., 1925, No. 1, awarding injunction, in case of Jefferson & Indiana Coal Co. v. James Marks et al. Affirmed with modification.
Bill for injunction to enjoin unlawful picketing, parading and intimidation of coal miners. Before CORBET, P.J.
The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.
Decree for plaintiff. Defendants appealed.
Errors assigned were, inter alia, various findings of fact conclusions of law and portions of decree, quoting record.
After a careful consideration of all the evidence, with the modification of the paragraphs of the decree as herein indicated, following our usual practice, the decree of the court below is affirmed at the cost of appellants.
Charles J. Margiotti, with him W. M. Gillespie and S. C. Pugliese for appellants. -- Neither a combination to demand more wages or less hours, nor a combination to refuse to deal with those who make such demands is a conspiracy or unlawful combination: Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 420.
No stretch of imagination can bring the acts of any of these defendants within the scope of the definitions of unlawful assembly: Duquesne City v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112; Morris Run Coal M. Co. v. Guy, 14 Pa. Dist. R. 600.
Picketing has been expressly sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court, in the case of American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City C.T. Co., 257 U.S. 184.
Peaceful picketing is expressly upheld in American Engineering Co. v. International Moulders Union, 25 Pa. Dist. R. 564.
Raymond E. Brown, with him James W. Mack, for appellee. -- The injunction was properly granted: Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79; Murdock, Kerr & Co. v. Walker, 152 Pa. 595; O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236; Purvis v. United Brotherhood, 214 Pa. 348; Wick China Co. v. Brown, 164 Pa. 449; Flaccus v. Smith, 199 Pa. 128; Westmoreland Coal Co. v. McCartney, 20 Pa. Dist. R. 58; McCandless v. O'Brien, 38 Pitts. L.J. 435; Com. v. Silvers, 11 Pa. C.C.R. 481; Com. v. Redshaw, 12 Pa. C.C.R. 91; Cook & Sons v. Dolan, 19 Pa. C.C.R. 401.
Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.
Adrian is a small village in Jefferson County. A mining plant located there is owned by the Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal & Iron Company, a member of the central bituminous operators association. A wage scale known as the Jacksonville agreement had been entered into by it with the United Mine Workers, District No. 2. The employees at Adrian and this company were subject to that agreement. Shortly after its execution the Adrian plant closed down. It was leased to appellee, who started operations. The United Mine Workers contend that this was a palpable subterfuge to avoid the effect of the Jacksonville agreement. The mine started on what is known as the 1917 scale. A number of their former employees returned to work at that wage. This action was resented by the members and officers of the United Mine Workers of that district. A general strike was called, when, because of conditions then existing, this bill was filed to enjoin the strikers from unlawful interference of the men at work. It was charged that forcible intercession with the men to persuade them to leave their employment took place; marches and parades, with bands of music on the public highways were of almost daily occurrence; picketing of a greater or less magnitude was engaged in; a dynamite explosion by unknown persons; threatening letters were sent and other acts were committed unlawfully, tending to persuade the men to leave work. Appellants claim that they could not be responsible for all these acts, and that they were making an effort to sustain the Jacksonville agreement as a standard of wages. The sheriff had been called on for protection, the state police appeared on the ground, and finally the appeal to the court below followed.
Appellants contend that in granting the injunction the court withdrew from the defendants their fundamental right to peacefully assemble or march on the highway, their right to picket and to accost workmen on the highway, and to induce them to quit work; it, in effect, prevented workmen from combining to preserve and maintain a wage scale. These questions are here presented to us for decision.
The basic problem involved, being the settlement of a wage dispute, is economic rather than legal. Being of this nature this court cannot settle "the multitude of questions . . . which agitate the public mind." No scheme in itself comprehensively sufficient has been legislatively evolved to meet like situations that has not run counter to some constitutional inhibition. It is well that judges, burdened with administering the law, should not be compelled to embark in another field of effort in which they, as a rule, are not skilled; nor have they had the advantage of previous training therefor. Moreover, the solution of the question involved concerns not only the immediate actors, capital and labor, or employer and employee, but quite seriously the public as consumers. It is true that in somewhat similar situations administrative bodies have been created to equalize the relations flowing from contact with service that is public or quasi public. In none of these efforts has there been a direct attempt to solve the wage problem or the multitude of relations between employer and employee, though, possibly, an order may indirectly affect these questions; but even as to that we know of no case where such order has ever been made by any service commission. So far as these or any related questions are contained in the assignments of error, they must remain, as they are to-day, for the judgment of those whose duty it is to settle them without undue or unnecessary hardship to the parties or the public. If it is possible for any tribunal to take part in the settlement of them, as the question is legislative or governmental, rather than judicial, it is those departments which must act.
However, when situations exist as the result of labor disputes which encroach on the safety, peace and good order of the public, or which test the nerve, courage and strength of those desiring to work, it is the duty of the courts to define the rights of the parties. Enforced action, whether direct or indirect, will not be tolerated by the courts.
The right of workmen to form associations for the mutual aid, benefit and protection of themselves and each other, in matters of wages and other incidental benefits, has been recognized by the courts and the legislature for many years. Our Acts of May 8, 1869, section 1, P.L. 1260; June 14, 1872, section 1, P.L. 1175; April 20, 1876, section 1, P.L. 45, and June 16, 1891, P.L. 300, recognize the right of bodies of men to combine and to refuse to work for insufficient wages, or because of inhuman, offensive or unjust treatment, and to procure others to do likewise. Such combinations have elsewhere been declared lawful. Labor unions are therefore not only legitimate but, because their aim and purpose is to better the living conditions of a large part of the body politic, they are a necessary part of the social structure. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209. It is to be remembered, however, in connection with this subject, that equality of condition is impossible, but equality of opportunity for each workman is possible, and any abridgment or curtailment of this right is against the fundamental law.
The proviso to the Act of 1872, that exempted persons engaged in such combinations from being classed as criminals, prohibits the organization or individuals from hindering "in any way" any person or persons desiring to labor. This was defined by the Act of 1876, P.L. 45, to mean that hindering, by the use "of lawful or peaceful means," having "a lawful purpose" in view, shall not be regarded as a violation of the act. But "the use of force, threat or menace of harm to persons or property," should be regarded as being not only unlawful but punishable by indictment. These, however, are not the only acts which may be committed which contravene the peace, good order and safety of the public, or the rights of workingmen.
Such acts as hostile assemblages, marches, parades or acts of individuals, separately, collectively in combinations, or under a system, which annoy or embarrass, intimidate or terrify those who desire to work, have more potency over men of ordinary nerve than actual violence, and are unlawful: O'Neil v. Behanna, 182 Pa. 236. A court of equity will intervene to protect persons and property by restraining such acts, threatened, done or likely to be done.
Appellants claim that primarily their aim and purpose was to maintain a proper standard of wages by persuading men to stop working for less wages, though the indirect result of this effort was to shut down the Adrian mine, while appellee claims the indirect purpose was the primary one.
A peaceful effort, individually, collectively or concertedly, to bring about a cessation of labor in order to enforce a demand for betterment of wage or living conditions, even though the indirect purpose is accomplished, is not unlawful.
While the right to form combinations, and through a strike to exert means to prevent men from working, may be lawful, it remains so only as long as the means employed are lawful. Undoubtedly workingmen have the right to better their own condition, to abstain and have others abstain from working until they get the wages to which they feel they are entitled, but there is another...
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