Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Lightsey

• Decision Date: 29 April 1931
• Docket Number: No. 3041.,3041.
• Citation: 49 F.2d 586
• Parties: JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. v. LIGHTSEY.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

49 F.2d 586 (1931)

JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. v. LIGHTSEY.

No. 3041.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

April 29, 1931.

Robert McC. Figg, Jr., of Charleston, S. C., and Julius C. Smith, of Greensboro, N. C. (Brooks, Parker, Smith & Wharton, of Greensboro, N. C., and Hyde, Mann & Figg, of Charleston, S. C., on the brief), for appellant.

Randolph Murdaugh, of Hampton, S. C., for appellee.

Before PARKER, Circuit Judge, and McCLINTIC and SOPER, District Judges.

SOPER, District Judge.

This action at law was brought to recover the sum of $5,000 under the provision for double indemnity in a life insurance policy upon the life of Jacob Calvin Lightsey. The policy provided for the payment of $5,000 to the wife of the insured upon receipt of due proof of death, and for the payment of the sum of $10,000 if the death of the insured should result, directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injury effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means.

The insured died on August 16, 1928. Proofs of death were submitted, and the sum of $5,000 was paid by the company to the beneficiary in October of that year by check containing the indorsement that the payment was accepted in full and complete settlement of all claims under the policy. During this period, the beneficiary was not in possession of the policy and was not aware of the double indemnity provision. She found the policy in January, 1929, and thereupon made demand upon the company for the additional sum of $5,000 on the ground that the death of her husband fell within the terms of the double indemnity clause. This demand having been refused, suit was brought.

The first question which is raised on this appeal is whether the evidence that the death of the insured resulted from accident independently of all other causes was of such character as to justify the submission of this issue to the jury. It is urged by the company that the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that the death was not caused solely by accidental injury, but that, on the contrary, diseases and ailments from which the insured was suffering at the time co-operated and contributed to bring about his death. The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that on the 9th day of August, 1928, one week before the insured's death, he was engaged at his garage at his home in cranking his Ford car, when it fired loudly, lunged forward a few inches, and knocked him down. He arose after a minute and walked around through the house, but some time later fell and was carried to his bed, from which he was taken to the hospital, where he subsequently died. This testimony was given by the daughter of the insured, who, on cross-examination, emphasized the fact that the car moved only a few inches and pushed her father over. But the jury would have been warranted in concluding from her testimony, taken as a whole, that her father was struck a blow by the car and knocked to the ground. A physician was called in on the day after the accident, and found evidence of a blow to the back of the patient's head, and came to the conclusion that he was suffering from a concussion; that the blow was sufficient to cause concussion and death, and was the direct and sole cause of death. He was of the opinion that the injured man suffered a cerebral hemorrhage from the blow, resulting in paralysis and death. It was, in his opinion, a very slow hemorrhage, and the period of one week between the injury and the death indicated that the arteries of the patient were not at fault, for otherwise they would have ruptured and the patient would have died within forty-eight hours. The physician concluded that the arteries of the insured were at least in fair condition for one of his age.

The conclusions of this witness were assailed by witnesses and documentary evidence offered on behalf of the defendant. There was evidence tending to show that, although the plaintiff's witness had previously known the insured, he had never before treated him; that the physician's certificate, attached to the proof of death at the time of the original settlement, showed that, although the death was caused by cerebral hemorrhage, following cranking of the automobile, his last illness was complicated with or induced by hypertension or high blood pressure, and his death did not result independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries effected solely by accidental means. Other physicians testified that the insured was suffering from syphilis, that his blood pressure, on admission to the hospital, was very high, that he had arteriosclerosis of long standing, and chronic nephritis, and that no external bruises or injuries were found. It was the opinion of these physicians that the death of the insured was caused by cerebral hemorrhage, chronic nephritis, and hardening of the arteries; and that even if an accidental injury contributed to the cause of death, the existing diseases of the insured co-operated to produce that result.

It must be admitted that the evidence produced by the insurance company for the consideration of the jury made out a strong case tending to show that the death of the insured was not due solely to the accident; but, on the contrary, there was the evidence of the plaintiff's physician which tended to show that the accident was the sole cause of death, and we are unable to say, after a consideration of the whole case, that only one reasonable inference, and that favorable to the defendant's contention, could be drawn. We think, rather, that the conflict of testimony created an issue for the jury to decide, and that the action of the District Judge in refusing to direct a verdict in the defendant's favor was correct.

The second question is directed to a portion of the District Judge's charge wherein he endeavored to make plain to the jury the meaning of the double indemnity clause of the policy. This clause, in full, is as follows: "The Company will pay the beneficiary in full settlement of all claims hereunder the sum of $10,000, if, during the premium paying period of this policy and before a default in the payment of any premium, the death of the insured result from bodily injury within ninety days after the occurrence of such injury, directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, not intentionally inflicted by another person or by the insured himself."

The particular portion of the charge objected to is as follows: "I charge you that if a man...