Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Jefcoats

• Citation: 164 Miss. 659,143 So. 842
• Decision Date: 17 October 1932
• Docket Number: 30122
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Parties: JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. v. JEFCOATS

143 So. 842

164 Miss. 659

JEFFERSON STANDARD LIFE INS. CO. v. JEFCOATS

No. 30122

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 17, 1932

(Division A.)

1 INSURANCE.

In action on ordinary life policy, burden of proof held upon insurer to establish by preponderance of evidence that insured committed suicide.

2 INSURANCE.

Whether insured, struck by train, committed suicide or not held for jury under evidence reasonably permitting of either inference.

3 EVIDENCE.

There is rebuttable presumption against suicide (Code 1930, section 1138).

4 TRIAL.

Everything must be considered as proved which evidence established either directly or by reasonable inference, against party requesting peremptory instruction.

5. INSURANCE.

As to burden of proof as to suicide under double indemnity clause in life policy, burden of proof held upon plaintiff throughout case, aided by presumption against suicide, to show death was caused by "accidental means," such term not embracing suicide.

6. TRIAL. In action for double indemnity under life policy instruction that burden was upon insurer to prove suicide held erroneous as conflicting with instruction that plaintiff had burden to prove accidental death.

Instruction presented irreconcilable conflict, since one who intentionally inflicts injury upon himself resulting in death cannot be said to have died of "accidental means," and burden was upon plaintiff to prove death by "accidental means" within double indemnity clause, although as to action for face amount of policy burden was upon insurer to prove suicide.

Division A

APPEAL from circuit court of Jones county.

HON. W. J. PACK, Judge.

Action by Mrs. Claude Jefcoats against the Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Company. From a judgment in favor or plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed on condition that plaintiff enter a remittitur.

Affirmed with remittiur.

Welch & Cooper, of Laurel, and Watkins, Watkins & Eager, of Jackson, for appellant.

The two instructions necessarily left with the jury the impression that the burden of proof was at all times upon the defendant, the appellant here, to prove by a preponderance of all of the testimony that the deceased met his death by suicide, when in reality the appellant was faced with such burden in the one instance and the same burden was upon the appellee in another instance --in other words, before the appellant could defeat a recovery for the face amount of the policy it was faced with the burden of proof of death by suicide, but before the appellee could recover the double indemnity feature she was faced with the burden of proving accidental death and further proving that the insured did not meet his death by suicide.

The presumption against suicide or self-destruction is a rebuttable one, and cannot properly prevail, except in the absence of evidence as to the cause of death, or where there is such evidence, and it is conflicting, or some of it is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of death by accident or by the act of another.

The hypothesis of accidental death is inconsistent with facts established by uncontroverted evidence.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bradshaw, 2 F.2d 457.

Of course, the plaintiffs in error were not entitled to recover if the deceased committed suicide. It is not fairly open to dispute that the uncontroverted evidence that deceased's death was voluntary was of such conclusive character as to warrant the setting aside of a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. In that situation it was not reversible error to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.

Connally v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 4 F.2d 539.

Where the cause of one's death is unexplained or undisclosed by evidence, or where evidence tending to prove self-destruction is contradicted or impeached, or some evidence adduced is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis that the death was not self-caused, the presumption against suicide or self-destruction may prevail. But such presumption cannot properly prevail where uncontroverted evidence whether direct or circumstantial, shows how the death was caused and that it was self-inflicted, and not by accident or the act of another.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Weaver, 8 F.2d 680.

Touching the contention of plaintiff that it was here and always is the duty of the court to charge the jury that a presumption of law existed against the fact of suicide, it is enough to say of the contention that this is sometimes true and sometimes not true. In this particular case, since there was evidence, from what the insured said as to his intent to kill himself, and from the circumstances, evidence that he had killed himself, the presumption against suicide as a matter of law disappeared from the case. There was no longer any reason to invoke any presumption of law about the matter.

Von Crome v. Travelers Ins. Co., 11 F.2d 350; Planter's Bank of Tunica, Mississippi v. New York Life Ins. Co., 11 F. 602.

From the evidence relating to the situation and physical facts, as detailed, we are convinced that the death of the insured came from a self-inflicted shot. It does not seem reasonable that an accidental discharge could have accounted for it, considering the situation of the body, the location of the pistol with reference to the right hand of the insured, the nature of the wound, the course of the bullet, the improbability of an accidental discharge from a pistol of the character that caused the death, and the strained position necessary to account for the wound, if caused by an accidental discharge of the pistol. We think the district judge could have reached no other conclusion than that the evidence showed convincingly enough to overcome the presumption against suicide, and to sustain the burden resting on the defendant to make out the defense of death by suicide, that the death of the insured was caused by his own voluntary act, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Davis v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 12 F.2d 248.

The presumption of the law is against suicide, and therefore defendant bore the burden of proving its plea that Tooley committed suicide. As this is a civil case, that burden of proof was sustainable by a preponderance of the evidence. Manifestly, it could not be sustained merely by evidence that was equally consistent with the inference that death was the result of an accident or was caused by the act of another. But in the case of a violent death, such as this was, where natural causes are excluded, the presumption against suicide is overcome, where the preponderance of the evidence is consistent with the theory of suicide, and is at the same time inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of death by accident or by the act of another.

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tooley, 16. F.2d 243; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Alman, 22 F.2d 98.

Even in the absence of proof of motive, the circumstances in evidence would naturally lead to the conclusion that death was self-inflicted.

New York Life Ins. Co. v. Alman, 22 F.2d 98.

If all the facts indicate suicide, and there is nothing reasonably having a substantial tendency to show that the death might have occurred in any other way, the issue is one of law and not of fact.

Mutual Life Ins. Co. et al. v. Gregg et al., C. C. A. 6, 32 F. 567.

Upon the uncontradicted testimony we think that all fair-minded jurymen must undoubtedly conclude that the insured took his life intentionally; there is no room for any inference or presumption to the contrary.

Porter v. Insurance Co., 51. F.2d 15; Frankel v. New York Life Ins. Co., 51 F.2d 933.

The burden of proof was on the plaintiff in the lower court to show accidental death.

Burkett v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 F.2d 105.

The presumption of law is against suicide, but such presumption is not conclusive; it is only prima facie; it may be overcome by the evidence. In order, however, to justify the court in taking the issue of suicide, or not, from the jury, and directing a verdict in favor of suicide, the evidence going to establish suicide, must be so strong as that no other reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom than that of suicide. If the evidence is such, although it is with conflict, that two reasonable inferences can be drawn therefrom, one in favor of suicide and the other against, then, plainly, it is a question for the jury. On the other hand, if only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence and that is suicide then there is no question for the jury; there is only a question of law for the court.

Life & Casualty Co. v. Andrews, 149 Miss. 306, 115 So. 548.

The burden of proof rested on the appellee, plaintiff below, throughout the case to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the death of the decedent was, directly and independently of all other causes of injury, inflicted solely through violent and accidental means while insured was sane and sober, before a recovery could be had for the double indemnity feature of the policy.

Burkett v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 F.2d 105; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ollich, 42 F. 399.

G. W. Hosey, of Laurel, for appellee.

A person intending to destroy himself, all reasoning would point that the man would take the surest route and that in this instance he would have placed himself across the rail or directly in the path of the train between the rails and not on the outer end of the crossties.

There is not a scintilla of evidence in this record to show any motive whatever to have caused the said Jefcoats to commit suicide.

When as in this case, circumstantial evidence alone is relied on to establish suicide, it is at least within bounds to say the evidence must be of a character to exclude, with reasonable certainty, any other cause of death. If the...