Jefferson v. HK Porter Co.

• Decision Date: 27 March 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 76-G-1254-S.
• Citation: 485 F. Supp. 356
• Parties: Edward JEFFERSON et al. (see attached copy of docket sheet), Plaintiffs, v. H. K. PORTER COMPANY (now known as Connors Steel Company); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO; and Local Union No. 2250, United Steelworkers of America, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

485 F. Supp. 356

Edward JEFFERSON et al. (see attached copy of docket sheet), Plaintiffs, v. H. K. PORTER COMPANY (now known as Connors Steel Company); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO; and Local Union No. 2250, United Steelworkers of America, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 76-G-1254-S.

United States District Court, N. D. Alabama, S. D.

February 6, 1980.

On Motion to Alter or Amend Findings March 27, 1980.

Oscar W. Adams, Jr., Adams & Clemon, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiffs.

Jerome A. Cooper, Cooper, Mitch & Crawford, Birmingham, Ala., for union defendants.

William F. Gardner, Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, Ala., for Connors Steel Company.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GUIN, District Judge.

The present lawsuit is an outgrowth of objections to a Consent Decree in an earlier case involving the parties.¹ In September of 1975, the Court approved the decree, resolving litigation which had been initiated in 1966. The decree provided monetary compensation for members of the class determined to be entitled thereto under the settlement. The majority of the class members accepted the monetary amounts allocated to them by the decree. A year after the decree had been approved, the present lawsuit was filed by 35 objectors who objected to the monetary provisions of the decree and seek to pursue their claims for monetary compensation.

Following extensive discovery, the cause was heard by the Court on January 14, 1980 on the defendants' joint motion for summary judgment. Having considered the joint motion, the arguments of counsel, and the undisputed facts, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that defendants are due summary judgment on the grounds herein set forth.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

In order to understand the issue now before the Court, it is necessary to review a 14 year history of litigation, as follows:

1. The present case has its roots in a lawsuit styled Muldrow v. H. K. Porter Co., Civil Action No. 66-G-206-S, (herein referred to as "Muldrow"), which was filed in this Court in 1966.

2. Muldrow was brought as a class action by three class members who had filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1965. Following the issuance of right-to-sue notices on March 15, 1966, the Muldrow lawsuit was filed on March 31, 1966. The complaint was dismissed by Judge Lynne on May 15, 1966 for failure to join an indispensable party. An amended complaint was filed on July 15, 1966. The amended complaint was based only on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and not on 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

3. Muldrow was dismissed by Judge Lynne in 1967 on the ground that it had been filed without any conciliation by the EEOC. That ruling was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 265 F.Supp. 56 (N.D.Ala. 1967), rev'd, Muldrow v. H. K. Porter Co., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).

4. The dismissal of Muldrow in 1967 set the stage for the filing of suit by the Attorney General on June 23, 1967, based on the same charges on which Muldrow was based. United States v. H. K. Porter Co., Civil Action No. 67-L-363-S (herein referred to as the "Attorney General case"). The Attorney General case was tried and decided on the merits by Judge Allgood in 1968. United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F.Supp. 40 (N.D.Ala.1968). An appeal taken by the Attorney General lingered in the Court of Appeals until 1974, when the Company, the Union, and the Attorney General worked out a proposed consent decree, which was approved by the Fifth Circuit on March 19, 1974 United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 491 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir. 1974) and was entered by Judge Lynne on March 22, 1974.

5. The settlement of the Attorney General case was followed by a settlement of the Muldrow case. The proposed consent decree in Muldrow consisted of an in toto adoption of the decree in the Attorney General case which had been approved by the Fifth Circuit and entered by Judge Lynne in 1974, with the addition of a schedule of monetary compensation allocations to members of the class determined to be entitled thereto.

6. The plaintiffs in the present action were among class members who objected to the proposed consent decree in Muldrow. Casting their objection in the form of "partial opt-outs", they took the position that they wished to be covered by the decree in all respects except monetary compensation and that as to monetary compensation, they wished to opt-out of the proposed settlement and litigate their monetary claims in the framework of the Muldrow litigation. On September 5, 1975, the Court ruled that the objectors could not partially opt-out and pursue their monetary claims in the Muldrow case but that they would be permitted to elect to reject the monetary amounts allocated to them by the decree and pursue their claims in a separate action. Muldrow v. H. K. Porter Co., 10 EPD ¶ 10,423 (N.D. Ala.1975).

7. The proposed consent decree in Muldrow was approved by the Court by Order entered on September 5, 1975, and the decree itself was signed by the Court on September 9, 1975.

8. An appeal was taken by the objectors from the Orders entered in September 1975. The appeal was withdrawn by the objectors on December 11, 1975.

9. The present action was filed on September 9, 1976 by 35 objectors. The complaint was based on Title VII and § 1981 and alleged that "plaintiffs have filed this individual action, claiming the same rights they intended to pursue under the original action i. e., the Muldrow case."

10. Subsequent to the filing of this action on September 9, 1976, one of the plaintiffs (Edward Jefferson) filed a separate lawsuit asserting his individual claims on the basis of a charge he filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. That lawsuit, which was filed on November 29, 1976, is referred to as Jefferson II in order to distinguish it from this case, which is referred to as Jefferson I. Since Jefferson II is a separate and independent action based on claims other than those involved in the Muldrow case, it is not affected by the disposition herein of Jefferson I.

ANALYSIS

The present action has been brought for the purpose of pursuing the claims which were the subject of the Muldrow case. Except for the objections to the monetary provisions of the decree which are asserted here, the claims which were the subject of the Muldrow case were laid to rest by the entry of the decree in Muldrow in September of 1975. It is therefore unnecessary to consider all of the grounds on which the defendants' joint motion for summary judgment is based. The determinative issue is whether the present action is time-barred. Analysis of this issue entails separate consideration of the plaintiffs' reliance on § 1981 and on Title VII as the basis for subject matter jurisdiction.

A. § 1981:

Since § 1981 contains no limitations period of its own, the controlling period is "the most appropriate one provided by state law." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). It is well established that the appropriate limitations period of the forum State for this purpose is the one year statute of limitations provided by § 6-2-39(a)(5), Alabama Code 1975. Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1977); Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F.Supp. 1108 (N.D.Ala.1972), aff'd per curiam, 476 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1974).

The plaintiffs contend that the one year statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of Muldrow from 1966 to 1975 and that since this action was filed on September 9, 1976, one year to the day after the signing of the decree on September 9, 1975, it avoided the bar of the one year statute of limitations.

The Court agrees with the plaintiffs' computation of the one year period from September 9, 1975 when the decree was signed rather than from September 5, 1975 when the Order approving the decree was entered.² However, the plaintiffs' contention that Muldrow tolled the running of the statute of limitations until the decree was signed on September 9, 1975 cannot be accepted for two reasons.

In the first place, Muldrow could not be viewed as having tolled the statute of limitations applicable to actions under § 1981 because Muldrow was not a § 1981 case. The amended complaint, filed on July 15, 1966, was based on Title VII only and contained no reference to § 1981. It is settled law that an amended complaint "supersedes the original complaint and renders it of no legal effect." International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014, 98 S.Ct. 730, 54 L.Ed.2d 758 (1978). As stated in Wright and Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1476, pages 389-390 (1971):

"A pleading that has been amended under Rule 15(a) supersedes the pleading it modifies and remains in effect throughout the action . . .. Once an amended pleading is interposed, the original pleading no longer performs any function in the case . . ."

It follows that since the plaintiffs in Muldrow did not invoke subject matter jurisdiction under § 1981, the pendency of the case could not toll the running of the statute of limitations applicable to § 1981.

In the second place, the filing of charges with the EEOC by the Muldrow plaintiffs in 1965 could not toll the running of the statute of limitations applicable to § 1981 because the Supreme Court has held that Title VII and § 1981 provide separate and independent causes of action and that the filing of a Title VII claim does not toll the limitations period on a § 1981 claim. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). See also Jones v. City of San Antonio, 568 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978).

It should be said further that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, is to be accorded retroactive effect. See Page v. U. S. Industries, 556 F.2d 346 (5th...