Jefferson v. Jefferson

• Decision Date: 29 June 2004
• Docket Number: No. ED 83583.,ED 83583.
• Citation: Jefferson v. Jefferson, 137 S.W.3d 510 (Mo. App. 2004)
• Parties: Simuel JEFFERSON, Respondent, v. Darlene JEFFERSON, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

137 S.W.3d 510

Simuel JEFFERSON, Respondent, v. Darlene JEFFERSON, Appellant.

No. ED 83583.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division One.

June 29, 2004.

Nadine V. Nunn, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.

Raymond Howard, St. Louis, MO, for respondent.

MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.

Darlene Jefferson ("Wife") appeals from the judgment holding Simuel Jefferson ("Husband") not to be the father of her child, A.A.O.J. ("Daughter"), and dismissing her petition to have Husband declared Daughter's "equitable parent." Wife asserts the trial court erred in that it did not exercise its equity powers to find Husband to be Daughter's father because he supported Daughter since her birth. We disagree in that Missouri has not recognized the "equitable parent" theory. We affirm the judgment.

Simuel Jefferson ("Husband") and Darlene Jefferson ("Wife") were married in 1989. The parties had two children born during the marriage, and Daughter, who was born two years before the marriage. Daughter is the biological daughter of Wife. Acting on Wife's representation that he was Daughter's father, Husband held himself out as, and acted as, her father, as well as the father to the two other children.

Husband filed for dissolution in 2001. He sought court-ordered blood tests to determine the paternity of Daughter and one of the children born during the marriage after Wife revealed that she had sexual intercourse with other men before and during the marriage. The blood test excluded Husband as Daughter's biological father.¹

In response to the results of the blood test, Husband filed a Petition for Determination of Father-Child Relationship, Order of Custody, and Reimbursement for Past Child Support. Wife moved to dismiss Husband's petition, asserting that he did not have standing to bring an action for determination of parent-child relationship under Missouri law. Wife also filed a Counter-Petition for Declaration of Equitable Parent-Child Relationship, which Husband moved to dismiss. The trial court denied Wife's motion to dismiss Husband's petition, and it sustained Husband's motion to dismiss Wife's counter-petition, finding that Husband is not Daughter's father. Wife's subsequent Motion to Reconsider was denied and she now appeals.

We will affirm the judgment in a judge-tried case unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).

Wife asserts three points on appeal. In her first point, she argues that the court erred in sustaining Husband's motion to dismiss her Counter-Petition for Declaration of Equitable Parent-Child Relationship, in that the Court should have exercised its equity powers to declare Husband an "equitable parent." Her second point asserts the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss Husband's petition in that Husband did not have standing to bring an action for determination of parent-child relationship. Wife's third point asserts the trial court erred in not equitably estopping Husband from denying paternity. She asserts in all three points that the trial court's judgment was a misapplication of law in that it was not in Daughter's best interests.

Because Wife's first and third points assert that the trial court erred in not exercising its equity powers to decree Husband to be Daughter's father, we will address them first.

Wife's first point alleges that the court erred in dismissing her Counter-Petition for Declaration of Equitable Parent-Child Relationship because the court should have exercised its equity powers to declare Husband Daughter's "equitable parent."

We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, examining the pleadings to determine whether they invoke principles of substantive law. Weems v. Montgomery, 126 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Mo.App. 2004). When the trial court's judgment does not state the basis for its granting the dismissal, as in the instant case, we presume the dismissal was based upon one of the grounds presented by the moving party. Wineteer v. Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Ass'n, 121 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Mo.App.2003). We will affirm the trial court's ruling so long as it could be sustained on any of the grounds asserted by the movant. Id.

Husband's motion to dismiss is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As such, our review tests the adequacy of Wife's petition, assuming all her averments are true and liberally granting her all reasonable inferences therefrom. Hammond v. Mun. Corr. Inst., 117 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Mo.App.2003). We do not weigh the facts, but review the petition in an "almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case." Id. (internal citations omitted).

Courts in other jurisdictions have declared a person who is not the biological parent of a child an "equitable parent" if he or she has assumed a parenting role in the child's life. Alan Stephens, Annotation, Parental Rights of Man Who Is Not Biological or Adoptive Father of Child But Was Husband or Cohabitant of Mother When Child Was Conceived or Born, 84 A.L.R.4th. 655, 666-67 (1991). An "equitable parent" is substituted for the biological parent and can, therefore, be granted custody and ordered to maintain child support. See id.

Missouri has not adopted the "equitable parent" theory. Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo.1998). Our Supreme Court, in addressing this issue, found that "equitable parenting" is not a widely accepted theory and has no fixed meaning or application. Id. In Cotton, the trial court had applied the "equitable parent" theory in awarding custody of two children to their half-sister, where the children's only living parent showed a history of abuse. 977 S.W.2d at 263-64. The Supreme Court, however, found that the trial court erred in applying the "equitable parenting" theory because Missouri's statutory scheme was adequate under the circumstances to resolve the dispute without requiring the court to exercise its equity powers. Id. at 265.

Wife argues that Cotton is distinguishable from the instant case because neither party shows a history of abuse or has been adjudged an unfit parent. She reminds us that Cotton held that "[u]nless a statutory scheme is plainly inadequate under circumstances where a court has a duty to act, there is no need for the court to exercise its equity powers to fashion a `better' remedy than exists in the statutes." 977 S.W.2d at 264. She asserts that the statutory scheme applicable in this case does not adequately protect Daughter's rights and best interests and, therefore, the court should exercise its equity powers in adopting the "equitable parent" theory.

One of the applicable statutes, the Uniform Parentage Act ("UPA"), was largely adopted and codified by Missouri in 1987 and provides the statutory procedure for determining paternity. In re Marriage of Fry, 108 S.W.3d 132, 135-36 (Mo.App.2003) (holding the provisions of the UPA apply in determining paternity in dissolution actions). The other applicable statutes, Missouri's Probate Code for Guardianship, Chapter 475, provide the procedure for establishing a minor's legal guardian. Wife argues that both the UPA and the Probate Code for Guardianship do not provide an adequate statutory scheme by which Husband can be found to be Daughter's father.

Section 210.834.4, RSMo 2000,² of the UPA provides that a blood test is conclusive evidence of nonpaternity if results so indicate. Dobyns v. Phillips, 936 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Mo.App.1996). In the case at hand, a blood test established that Husband is not Daughter's biological father. Guardianship statutes also do not provide a category by which Husband could be assigned parentage or guardianship of Daughter. Section 475.030.4 allows for letters of guardianship to be granted where the minor has no parent living, the living parent or parents are adjudged unfit, or where the living parent or parents have had their parental rights terminated. None of these conditions exist in the instant case.

We agree with Wife that Missouri's statutory scheme does not allow Husband to be adjudged Daughter's father. We disagree, however, with her assertion that Cotton requires equity to be applied to overcome this allegedly inadequate statutory scheme and appoint Husband as Daughter's "equitable parent." A court should exercise its equity powers only when the statutory scheme is plainly inadequate. Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 264 (emphasis added). Since the Supreme Court's refusal in 1998 to recognize the "equitable parent" theory in Cotton, our legislature has not chosen to enact legislation codifying this theory. The trial court did not err in dismissing Wife's petition seeking to apply the "equitable parent" theory because that theory is not recognized in Missouri. See Cotton, 977 S.W.2d 263 (Mo.1998). In Cotton, the Supreme Court stated that "[the] legislature has provided standards under which the courts of this state may abrogate or abridge the rights and prerogatives of natural parents," and these legislative standards "are entitled to be observed." Id. at 265. The Court pointed out that "[t]he problem with a court-fashioned `equitable parent' theory is that the court has to improvise, as it goes along, substantive standards and procedural rules about ... matters that already have well-charted passageways under state statutes and related court decisions." 977 S.W.2d at 265. "Courts may not disregard a statutory provision, for where the Legislature has enacted a statute which governs and determines rights of the parties under stated circumstances, equity courts equally with courts of law are bound thereby." McGhee v. Dixon, 973 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Mo.1998) (quoting Kuenzle v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 865 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. banc 1993)). We cannot find Missouri's statutory...