Jefferson v. Southworth

Decision Date03 February 1978
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 77-554.
Citation447 F. Supp. 179
PartiesLeonard JEFFERSON et al. v. Bradford E. SOUTHWORTH et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

Matthew L. Myers, National Prison Project of ACLU, Washington, D. C., Robert B. Mann, Providence, R. I., for plaintiffs.

John E. Farley, Providence, R. I., for State of R. I.

Paul L. Foster, Dept. of Corrections, for the State of R. I., Cranston, R. I., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In Re Lockup1

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

This is a class action challenging the constitutionality of a lockup at the Maximum Security facility of the Adult Correctional Institution (ACI), brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202. Jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).2

The defendants, in the absence of an existing emergency, have locked the prisoners in their cells for approximately 22 hours a day; and although there has been a modification of this confinement, over fifty percent are still so confined on the day of this writing. Such isolation has exacerbated the uncontradicted, indeed admitted, inhumane living conditions set forth in Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F.Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977) (Palmigiano). Even more devastating, the isolation has undermined the inmates' emotional capacity to cope with those inhumane conditions by depriving them of the aid, emotional support and social context, which they derived from contact with other inmates, their families and attorneys. This confinement has resulted in increased tensions, depression and a sense of hopelessness in the inmates. The deleterious effects, alone and in conjunction with the inhumane conditions existing before the lockup, are of such magnitude as to constitute a clear violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.

I. The Facts of This Case

This Court entered judgment in Palmigiano, on August 10, 1977, that conditions at the ACI violated the Eighth Amendment and issued its remedial decree. The State of Rhode Island admitted to the Court's findings of fact; it did not appeal from the finding of a violation or the remedial decree. The Court's uncontradicted findings, confirmed also by various nationally respected prison experts, were that conditions at the ACI were inhumane, intolerable and brutish.

On August 26, 1977, within 16 days of the issuance of the Palmigiano opinion, Director of Corrections, Bradford Southworth, ordered a general lockup at the Maximum Security facility (Maximum). This brought an abrupt halt to all activities for all of the inmates, numbering over four hundred, although only a couple were involved in the incident that the administration claimed constituted good cause for the lockup. There was a cessation of all vocational, educational and hobby programs; deprivation of visits and exercise; restricted access to attorneys who had to visit their clients at the cell doors and speak to them between bars. All meals were served in the prisoners' cells.

The incident on August 25 setting off the lockup involved only two prisoners and a guard. When the inmates were ordered to return to their cells, there was no refusal or resistance, whatsoever. The prisoners were told that they would be returned to their normal routine the next morning. However, without first-hand knowledge of conditions in Maximum and against the advice of their own warden of Maximum, Ronald Brule, the defendants determined to continue the lockup thereafter. As late as November, the Director of Corrections, Bradford Southworth, was indicating that he would continue the lockup "indefinitely," perhaps a year.

The defendants claim that, although a fight triggered the lockup, that incident cannot be viewed in isolation. Prior thereto, there had been a series of inmate assaults upon each other, a gun was discovered, and contraband flowed into the prison. Defendants maintain that this general situation threatened the security of Maximum and required the total confinement of the prisoners. The inconsistency of the State's position is apparent. None of these acts had received any particular administrative reaction prior to August 26. Nor was there evidence that at the time the lockup was ordered, any of these prior acts were discussed or determinative of the ultimate action taken.

Following the initial complete lockup, defendants have urged and implemented a slow process of phasing out the lockup in stages. The first phase began, on September 6, 1977, with visits permitted once every four days.

On October 21, 1977, defendants instituted Phase II. A two hour visit every four days was allowed. Exercise for one hour a week was permitted, but this coincided with the every other day shower so that inmates had to choose, once a week, between a shower and exercise. Visits with attorneys continued to take place at the inmate's cell, with bars in between. In Phase II, only 45 of the over 400 inmates were permitted to attend an education, arts and crafts program 4½ hours a week for three weeks of each month and 6½ hours for the fourth week of the month. It follows that close to four hundred prisoners were spending 23 hours a day locked in their cells, and that the few others, who attended classes, averaged 22 hours a day in total confinement. This confinement, coupled with the cold, noise and filth, created a bitter atmosphere and intolerable conditions for the inmates.

To complete the picture, it must be noted that there were periods when all prisoners were denied all privileges: from August 26 — September 5, 1977 and from October 22 to November 3, all visits were denied; from October 24 to November 3, all exercise was also denied. It is clear the defendants have been routinely using the deprivation of these basic human activities as punishment. Smaller groups of prisoners have been routinely denied these activities periodically.

Defendants next justify the extension of this lockup with only a very slow and minimal decrease in confinement by reference to inmate disobedience during the lockup. The defendants state that

Since the onset of the general lockup, inmates have engaged in a variety of acts which were intended to disrupt, diminish or destroy the efforts of the administration to return the maximum facility to some degree of normalcy. Specifically, inmates . . . refused to clean their cell block areas even when ordered to do so and that they refused to participate in programs designed to allow them time from out of their cells . . . only when they refused orders to clean their cell areas were they booked and suffered a loss of visiting privileges and exercise privileges.
Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum, at 2.

The attitude that Director Southworth and Associate Director Laurie displayed in their testimony was that all signs of overt disobedience and wilfulness must be crushed before they would consider any letup in the lockup. It is true that since August 26 some of the inmates have refused to work when ordered out of their cells to clean the tiers and have thrown food outside their cells. These actions, however, were in protest to what the inmates felt was unfair, unjust treatment. The Court does not condone prisoner disobedience nor does the Court evaluate the inmates' conduct as it may have been prompted by the emotional effect of the lockup. One thing is certain, such disobedience was not of any emergency magnitude that would justify a lockup. One of the most drastic and disruptive measures a prison can take is a total lockup. To use this weapon for the disobedience at bar is a classic example of "overkill."

Indeed, the lawlessness and violence in Maximum, which emerges from the testimony, appears to be as much caused by the actions or inactions of the administration as by the prisoners. The defendants' concern over halting contraband within the institution should start with the guards and employees. Ronald Brule, Associate Director of Maximum at the time of his testimony, stated that he could not say that, since the lockup, there were fewer incidents of inmates being booked for intoxication or drug usage than during the period prior to August 26. The inescapable conclusion from the fact that prisoners obtain drugs and liquor, although locked in their cells 22 hours a day under the supervision of guards, is that the guards themselves are pari delicto. Mr. Brule also testified that either correctional officers or employees destroyed prisoner property during the lockup. Prior to August 26, certain inmates had property in an industrial building. Although no inmate since August 26 had access to this building without a guard, many of the inmates' "files were ripped into and desks overturned." According to Mr. Brule, however, his repeated efforts to discipline guards for these kind of problems were undermined by Messrs. Southworth's and Laurie's refusal to suspend guards.

Captain Costa, a correctional officer, corroborated the destruction of inmate property. In addition, he stated that in a room formerly used by the Afro-American Society, the word "niggers" was written on pictures they had hanging on the walls. The following colloquy took place with the Court:

COURT: I understand your testimony that at this time, the lockup was in effect, and no prisoner could possibly have gotten — watch my words now — could possibly have gotten into these areas without a guard?
WITNESS: Yes sir, that's true.
COURT: You know the conclusion from that, don't you, Mr. Costa? No prisoner could have been in there alone to do these things; that a guard would have had — have been a party and part and parcel of it.
WITNESS: No inmates were permitted in that area unsupervised, yes.
COURT: So it leaves one or two conclusions, and I wonder if you realize these conclusions: either a guard and an inmate had to do it or the guards had to do it themselves.
WITNESS: Yes, I realize that.

The defendants Southworth and Laurie have attempted to solve their problem of poor...

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