Jefferson v. State
| Decision Date | 27 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 78507,78507 |
| Citation | 595 So.2d 38 |
| Parties | , 17 Fla. L. Weekly S139 Tony JEFFERSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Joan Fowler, Bureau Chief, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. and Carol Cobourn Asbury, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
Barbara Green of Freidin, Hirsh, Green & Gerrard, P.A. and Roy D. Wasson, Miami, amicus curiae for The Academy Of Florida Trial Lawyers.
We review Jefferson v. State, 584 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the district court certified the following question as being of great public importance: 1
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT FINDS THAT A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IS BASED UPON RACIAL BIAS, IS THE SOLE REMEDY TO DISMISS THE JURY POOL AND TO START VOIR DIRE OVER WITH A NEW JURY POOL, OR MAY THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO DENY THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IF IT CURES THE DISCRIMINATORY TAINT?
We hold that, absent injury to a party's constitutional right to an impartial jury, it is within the trial court's discretion to seat the improperly challenged juror in order to remedy a discriminatory peremptory challenge.
The State charged Jefferson, a black man, with armed robbery. During the voir dire portion of Jefferson's trial, the State exercised one of its peremptory challenges against a black venireperson. Jefferson objected and the trial court proceeded to evaluate the appropriateness of the peremptory challenge. The inquiry was conducted outside the presence of the potential jurors and without their knowledge as to the nature of the proceedings. The trial court concluded that the challenge was racially motivated and denied the peremptory challenge.
The trial court also denied Jefferson's request to discharge the venire and repeat voir dire with a new jury pool. Jefferson was convicted of armed robbery and subsequently appealed to the district court asserting that the trial court's use of an alternative remedy to the one put forth by this Court in State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984), was reversible error. The district court affirmed Jefferson's conviction holding that the trial court's use of a different remedy in the instant case was harmless error because it did not cause prejudice to Jefferson.
In Neil, we held that peremptory challenges could not be used to excuse potential jurors on the basis of race and "if the party has actually been challenging prospective jurors solely on the basis of race, then the court should dismiss that jury pool and start voir dire over with a new pool." 457 So.2d at 487. However, this Court tailored the remedy in Neil to the particular facts of that case. Because the trial court had already dismissed the improperly excluded jurors, the alternative remedy of denying the peremptory challenges was not available. We did not intend for Neil to set forth the exclusive remedy for discriminatory peremptory challenges. 2
The rationale behind striking the entire jury pool is to provide the complaining party with a proper venire and not one that has been partially or totally stripped of potential jurors through the use of discriminatory peremptory challenges. If, as occurred in the instant case, the trial court denies the improper peremptory and the improper challenge has no effect upon the composition of the jury pool, the complaining party is not deprived of a proper venire. Thus, the defendant's rights to an impartial jury and to equal protection under the law are not violated. Further, the trial court in the instant case conducted the Neil inquiry outside the presence of the jury, and, thus, there was no danger that the improperly challenged juror would bear animosity toward the party attempting to exercise the peremptory. Therefore, under the facts of the instant case, we can see nothing to be gained by striking the entire jury panel and incurring the additional time and expense of drawing a new venire.
We also do not see a constitutional barrier to the remedy of seating the improperly challenged venireperson in the instant case. To the contrary, under the facts of this case, the remedy of seating the improperly challenged juror is in greater accord with judicial economy and the advancement of public confidence in our system of justice. 3
Moreover, an individual venireperson has the constitutional right not to be excluded from jury service on the basis of race. Powers v. Ohio, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988). While striking the venire and beginning selection over with a new jury pool may protect the constitutional rights of the defendant, 4 it does nothing to remedy the recognized discrimination against those improperly removed from the jury. Further, it is generally impractical for excluded jurors to bring suit to enforce their rights 5 and courts should attempt to fashion remedies which protect a juror's right not to be excluded on the basis of race. Therefore, under certain circumstances and in the absence of prejudice to one of the parties, proceeding with the improperly challenged juror may be the more appropriate remedy.
While we recognize the importance of peremptory challenges to the guarantee of an impartial jury, the seating of an improperly challenged juror does not violate the constitutional rights of the party who attempted to exercise the challenge. It is the right to an impartial jury, 6 not the right to peremptory challenges, that is constitutionally protected. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Neil, 457 So.2d at 486. Peremptory challenges merely are a "means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury." Batson, 476 U.S. at 91, 106 S.Ct. at 1720.
The elimination of potential jurors by discriminatory criteria is an invalid exercise of peremptories and does not assist in the...
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State v. Franklin
...can be subordinated to a venire person's constitutional right not to be improperly removed from jury service." Jefferson v. State, 595 So.2d 38, 41 (Fla.1992). "While striking the venire and beginning selection over with a new jury pool may protect the constitutional rights of the defendant......
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Alen v. State
...The state's use of the ethnically motivated strike against the second juror, however, was constitutionally forbidden, see Jefferson v. State, 595 So.2d 38 (Fla.1992); Smith v. State, 574 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), aff'd on other grounds, State v. Washington, 594 So.2d 291 (Fla.1992), an......
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