Jefferson v. State

• Decision Date: 04 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2001-KA-00159-SCT.,2001-KA-00159-SCT.
• Citation: 818 So.2d 1099
• Parties: Fitzgerald JEFFERSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

818 So.2d 1099

Fitzgerald JEFFERSON v.STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2001-KA-00159-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 4, 2002.

Rehearing Denied June 6, 2002.

Morris Sweatt, Columbia, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General, by Dewitt T. Allred, III, Jackson, attorney for appellee.

Before PITTMAN, C.J., EASLEY and GRAVES, JJ.

PITTMAN, C.J., for the Court.

¶ 1.Fitzgerald Jefferson shot and killed Kentrell Brister after an argument over a game of cards.He was convicted of unpremeditated depraved-heart murder under § 97-3-19(1)(b) of the Mississippi Code by a jury in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Judge R.I. Prichard presiding.He was then sentenced to life imprisonment.He now appeals this conviction.

FACTS

¶ 2.Fitzgerald Jefferson and Johnny Bullock went to the house of Monroe McGowan after lunch on August 18, 1999, to obtain an electrical breaker box for an old house.After learning that McGowan was not there, they decided to wait for his return.They joined three other people watching a card game being played by Tony Ervin, Kentrell Brister, and two others in the carport.Jefferson and Bullock eventually began playing cards with Ervin and Brister, and Jefferson placed a wager on his success.A scuffle broke out when Jefferson accused Ervin and Brister of cheating and grabbed the wagered money as if to leave.Taking offense, Ervin grabbed and punched Jefferson in the left eye a few times causing it to swell shut immediately.The fight ended when Jefferson released the money, and Ervin relented.

¶ 3.After the fight, Jefferson and Bullock began to leave McGowan's house when Jefferson testified he overheard Ervin say to an onlooker "get me my gun."When Jefferson got to his car, he pulled out a 9 m.m. pistol and a rifle.Jefferson shot one round into the air with the rifle and then began shooting at Ervin.One of these shots struck Brister in the neck.Brister fled into the house, and someone locked the door behind him.Ervin escaped around the side of the house and saw Brister coming out the back door.Thinking Ervin had gone into the house, Jefferson shot the doorknob twice with the pistol in an unsuccessful attempt to gain entry.Upon seeing blood on the backdoor, Jefferson reasoned that Ervin might have gone through the house to the back yard, and he began to circumvent the house.It was then that he noticed Brister bleeding and lying on the ground in the backyard.

¶ 4.Jefferson gave his guns to Brister's brother for safekeeping and attempted to take Brister to the hospital in his own car.When the car overheated, Jefferson transferred Brister to a following car which reached the hospital.Brister died at the hospital from the gunshot wound in his neck.While he was at the hospital, Jefferson confessed to Deputy Sheriff Kevin Haddox that he shot Brister.Haddox took Jefferson to the Marion County jail where he was photographed and advised of his Miranda rights.Jefferson then gave a written confession to the crime.He was arrested the following day.

¶ 5.For reasons which the record does not disclose, the Marion County grand jury impaneled that September did not indict Jefferson.Unable to make bail, Jefferson remained in jail and was rearrested there on October 25, 1999.He then filed a demand for a speedy trial in the circuit court on November 3, 1999.The next grand jury was seated the following May, and Jefferson was indicted for murder on June 16, 2000.He was held without bail from then until his trial began on December 11, 2000.At no point between his first arrest and trial was Jefferson released from jail.He was arraigned on August 21, 2000.After a two-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on December 12, 2000.Jefferson was sentenced to life imprisonment the same day.

DISCUSSION

I.WHETHER IT WAS ERROR FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT NOT TO ALLOW DEFENDANT'S WITNESS, CHARLES COLEMAN, TO TESTIFY FOR THE DEFENSE.

¶ 6.Jefferson's first claim of error is the trial court's refusal to allow him to call a witness because the witness's testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible."A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence.Unless the judge abuses this discretion so as to be prejudicial to the accused, the Court will not reverse this ruling."Hughes v. State,735 So.2d 238, 270(Miss.1999)(quotingFisher v. State,690 So.2d 268, 274(Miss.1996)(citations omitted)).

¶ 7.Before the presentation of evidence, Jefferson announced his intent to call Charles Coleman, a Pentecostal preacher and active highway patrol officer, to the stand.Coleman was going to testify 1) that he had been praying with Jefferson the morning of the shooting and 2) had told Jefferson he had a vision that something bad was going to happen to Jefferson that day; specifically, that someone was going to try to kill him.He also told Jefferson as a precaution not to go where he was planning to go that day.The State objected to this proffered testimony, and the Court sustained its objection stating such evidence was inadmissible and irrelevant.Specifically the court said:

The Court just finds that this remote incident some few hours before is not relevant....And furthermore, if the defendant was so grasped by the vision that Reverend Coleman had that he believed he was in danger, he wasn't so grasped by the vision that caused him not to go.So he chose to at this point in time utilize part of that vision, that is to claim self-defense, but ignore the other part, don't go.

So the testimony based on where they were having prayer ... and the vision the Reverend Coleman had, this Court finds is inadmissible and not relevant and objection will be sustained.

Jefferson now claims this was error as the testimony is relevant to show his state of mind at the time of the shooting.

¶ 8.This Court has stated, "We cannot sanction the withholding of evidence from the jury which is highly probative of the defendant's state of mind or allow the trial judge to determine the reasonableness of the testimony."Brown v. State,464 So.2d 516, 520(Miss.1985).There, a defendant on trial for aggravated assault and pleading self-defense had approached the city prosecutor for assistance with an ongoing quarrel he was having with the victim.Id. at 518.The victim had threatened Brown on several occasions prior to Brown shooting him.Id.This Court reversed and remanded the case after it determined the trial court had erred in withholding this information from the jury.Id. at 520.The Court noted, the jury is "entitled to be made fully aware of all relevant facts which reflect apprehension, fear or anxiety in [Brown's] state of mind."Because such apprehension, fear or anxiety is a crucial element of self defense, the exclusion of this testimony had the effect of "whittling down" Brown's defense.Id.(citingEaton v. State,200 Miss. 729, 28 So.2d 230(1946)).

¶ 9.At best, Coleman's testimony is minimally relevant.As Jefferson suggests, it would have informed the jury what might have been running through his mind several hours later when he overheard Ervin tell a bystander to "get my gun."However, this evidence is unlike most state of mind evidence this Court has examined when a defendant argues self-defense to the jury.Typically this evidence is of prior confrontations between the victim and the accused, as in Brown, which may also establish the possibility the victim was the first or initial aggressor in the case.See generallyRussell v. State,607 So.2d 1107, 1116(Miss.1992).The instant case involves a nonspecific warning issued by a third party who had no prior contact with Ervin, and therefore could not know if Ervin ever intended to kill Jefferson.There is also no evidence in the record to suggest there were prior confrontations between Jefferson and Ervin.Therefore, there is little to suggest the warning had any other substance to support the truth of its message than its stated source: a vision.A trial judge is capable of determining when such information is "highly probative" and should reach the ears of a jury without the danger of confusion or wasting time.SeeMiss. R. Evid. 402.

¶ 10.As the State correctly points out, Jefferson told the jury he had been at a prayer meeting that morning thereby eliminating the need for Coleman's testimony to that end.As to the prophetic warning, we find that the information is relevant, and the trial court abused its discretion when it denied its submission to the jury.However, we find the error to be harmless in light of the evidence of Jefferson's overwhelming guilt as retold in the facts and examined in detail in Issue IV.

II.WHETHER THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED.

¶ 11.Jefferson next claims his constitutional right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States ConstitutionandArticle 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, was violated by the delay between his imprisonment and trial.The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches when a person is accused of a crime.Smith v. State,550 So.2d 406, 408(Miss.1989);Perry v. State,419 So.2d 194, 198(Miss.1982).A person is accused of a crime when they have been arrested.State v. Magnusen,646 So.2d 1275, 1278(Miss.1994);Perry,419 So.2d at 198.Once the right to a speedy trial has attached, the Court must apply the fourpart balancing test found in Barker v. Wingo,407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101(1972), to determine whether the defendant's right has been violated.Smith,550 So.2d at 408.See alsoBrengettcy v. State,794 So.2d 987, 992(Miss.2001);Wells v. State,288 So.2d 860, 862(Miss.1974).The four Barker factors are 1) the length of the delay, 2) the reason for the delay, 3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and 4) prejudice to the defendant.Barker,407 U.S. at 530,92 S.Ct. at 2192,33 L.Ed.2d at 116-17.No one factor is...