Jeffery v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Greenwich

• Citation: 155 Conn. 451,232 A.2d 497
• Parties: Elizabeth M. JEFFERY et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the TOWN OF GREENWICH et al.
• Decision Date: 26 July 1967
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 497

232 A.2d 497

155 Conn. 451

Elizabeth M. JEFFERY et al. v. PLANNING AND ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the TOWN OF GREENWICH et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

July 26, 1967.

George W. Scott, Jr., Greenwich, with whom were Robert C. Barnum, Jr., and, on the brief, Norman E. Davis, Greenwich, for appellants (plaintiffs).

Orson L. St. John, Greenwich, for appellee (defendant Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Greenwich, Conn., Inc.).

Joseph A. Izzillo, Greenwich, for appellee (named defendant).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

KING, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the defendant planning and zoning board of appeals of Greenwich, hereinafter referred to as the board, which, after a hearing, granted an application of the Young Women's Christian Association of Greenwich, Connecticut, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Y.W.C.A., for a special exception to permit the construction of a building and other facilities on a tract of land zoned for single-family residences. ¹ The subject property fronts on the Boston Post Road, which is a heavily traveled main highway known as United States route 1, having a daily traffic volume of about 17,000 motor vehicles. The plaintiffs herein own and reside in single-family houses in the vicinity of, and largely in the rear of, the subject tract. The Greenwich zoning regulations are of a permissive, rather than a prohibitory, nature. Therefore, the Y.W.C.A. application was validly granted if, but only if, some portion of the regulations expressly permits the uses proposed for the land in question. See cases such as Park Regional Corporation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 677, 682, 136 A.2d 785; and 'The Connecticut Law of Zoning,' 41 Conn. B.J., pp. 262, 264.

Section 6(a) of the Greenwich zoning regulations provides as follows as to uses in R-12 and R-20 zones: 'The following principal uses are permitted and all other principal uses are expressly excluded. (1) Detached single family dwellings, one per lot. (2) The following uses when authorized by the Board of Appeals as special exceptions: * * * (b) Clubs, recreational areas and fall-out shelters not open to the general public and not operated for commercial profit, and community centers operated by civic associations * * * (f) Churches; educational institutions not operated for commercial profit. * * *' Subdivisions (b) and (f) were the only portions of § 6(a)(2) relied upon by the Y.W.C.A. in its application for the special exception.

I

The board, in granting the special exception, found that the Y.W.C.A. is 'a non-profit club devoted to recreational, educational and religious purposes for its members and guests.' It thus clearly appears that the board granted the special exception under the provisions of subdivision (b) of § 6(a)(2) on the ground that the applicant's proposed use was that of a club. ² The plaintiffs claim that the Y.W.C.A. is not a club and that its proposed uses are not those of a club.

The word 'clubs' is not defined in the zoning regulations, but, whether defined or not, its meaning is a question of law. Schwab v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 479, 482, 226 A.2d 506; Park Regional Corporation v. Town Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 144 Conn. 684, 136 A.2d 785; Langbein v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 135 Conn. 575, 579, 67 A.2d 5. Whether on the evidence the Y.W.C.A. qualified under the legal meaning of the word 'club' was a question of fact to be determined by the board, subject to a review of the reasonableness of its conclusion.

The plaintiffs claim that the word 'club' must be construed to refer only to '(l)imited membership clubs of restricted size, whose membership * * * (is) limited by traditional committee or ballot methods', and that this construction is required by the statutory history of § 6(a)(2)(b). This claim is without merit. Indeed, the statutory history requires a contrary construction. Formerly, the regulations authorized '(c)ountry clubs, yacht clubs, hunt clubs, riding clubs * * * and other clubs of similar character, and not open to the general public and not operated for commercial profit'. See Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 426, 427, 226 A.2d 380. The section was subsequently amended by eliminating the recital of the various types of clubs and substituting the single word 'clubs'. Clearly, the amendment broadened the scope of the regulation to encompass all clubs, subject to the two limitations retained in the present regulation that the club facilities (1) not be open to the general public and (2) not be operated for commercial profit.

The word 'club' has been defined as 'an association of persons for social and recreational purposes or for the promotion of some common subject (as literature, science, political activity) * * * (usually) jointly supported and meeting periodically, membership in social clubs * * * (usually) being conferred by ballot and carrying the privilege of use of the club property.' Webster, Third New International Dictionary, p. 430; sec, generally, note, 52 A.L.R.2d 1098, 1100 § 2, 1101 § 4, and 5 Later Case Service 224. The word 'club' has a very broad meaning. ³ Almost any group of persons would qualify as a club if it has (1) an organizational structure and (2) some distinct purpose or purposes, such as the recreational, educational and religious purposes, which the board found the Y.W.C.A. to have.

(a)

There can be no question that the Y.W.C.A. possesses the organizational structure of a club. Its articles of association, constitution, and bylaws demonstrate that it is a corporation without capital stock having a board of directors and the usual corporate officers; that regular meetings of the members are held semiannually and special meetings may be called as may be necessary; and that its membership is limited to women and girls over twelve years of age who express an interest in belonging to the Y.W.C.A. and who pay the required membership fee, although men and boys who pay certain fees may become 'Y.W.C.A. Associates', who while they are not considered members of the Y.W.C.A. and have no voting rights at meetings, nevertheless acquire a status within the organization entitling them to participate in certain Y.W.C.A. programs and to attend members' meetings.

(b)

The principal use actually to be made of the property must be determined by the evidence before the board. The Y.W.C.A. contemplates no substantial change in its activities and thus the proposed principal use is largely to be determined by its present purposes and activities. See cases such as Shulman v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 154 Conn. 431, 226 A.2d 380.

The articles of association state that the purposes of the Y.W.C.A. are to develop the highest conception of Christian womanhood and to aid women by bringing to them opportunities for all-around development. There was evidence that the Y.W.C.A. program includes classes in academic subjects, such as French and Bible study, in homemaking subjects, such as cooking and sewing, and in physical education subjects, such as tennis and swimming. There are also numerous 'special interest' groups, or subordinate clubs, such, for instance, as bridge and rug hooking clubs, and a 'World Friendship' club for newcomers to the United States. The board could reasonably have concluded, as it did, that the Y.W.C.A. uses its facilities, and proposes to use them, for recreational, educational, and religious purposes. The fact that the purposes of the Y.W.C.A. in part are 'educational' and in part, in a broad sense, charitable, does not make its principal use of its facilities that of an 'educational institution', nor, as the plaintiffs seem to claim, that of a 'charitable institution' under subdivision (d) of § 6(a)(2). Section 6, by its express terms, is concerned with the 'principal use' by the Y.W.C.A. of its proposed new facilities, not with its subordinate or occasional use or uses of those facilities. Fox v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 146 Conn. 70, 75, 147 A.2d 472.

From the evidence before the board of the existing program of the Y.W.C.A. and of its plans for the new facilities and their uses, the board could reasonably have concluded that the proposed facilities would be used principally as a club, within the meaning of § 6(a)(2)(b).

(c)

Section 6(a)(2)(b) imposes two limitations on clubs permitted as special exceptions. They may not be open to the general public, and they may not be operated for commercial profit. No claim has been made that the Y.W.C.A. facilities will be operated for commercial profit. But some claim was made that the uses of the building by the Y.W.C.A. would be open to the general public. That some activites of the Y.W.C.A. are open to nonmembers seems clear. But in general, use of its facilities is restricted to its members, who pay membership fees. Although no discriminatory restrictions based on race, creed, or status in life are imposed on membership, the members comprise no substantial portion of the general public of the area.

In this connection it must not be overlooked that § 6 of the zoning regulations, by its express terms, is concerned only with 'principal' uses, permitting such 'principal' uses as are enumerated therein, and expressly prohibiting all other 'principal' uses. From the use of the word 'principal' in § 6(a), as hereinbefore quoted, it is obvious that the regulation expresses no intent that subordinate or occasional uses, even if outside the scope of the principal uses expressly allowed, will bar the granting of a special exception. Thus, the mere fact that the Y.W.C.A. proposes to make some use of its facilities for the betterment and welfare of the general public of the Greenwich area, as well as for its members, did not require the board to conclude that the principal uses of the proposed facilities would be open to the general public, nor, we may add, does it require a conclusion that the...