Jeffrey M. v. Kijakazi

Decision Date23 January 2023
Docket Number6:22-CV-02018-LRR
PartiesJEFFREY M., Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
ORDER

LINDA R. READE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION II.

I. INTRODUCTION 2

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ..................................... 2

III. ALJ's FINDINGS 3

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 5

V. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................ 6

VI. ANALYSIS . 7

1. Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff's Subjective Complaints When Formulating Claimant's Residual Functional Capacity Assessment ............................................................ 7
2. Whether the ALJ Articulated Sufficient Reasons to Find the Opinions of ARNP Shelby Allen-Benitz and LISW R. Lang, Jr. to be Unpersuasive ............................................................ 12
3. Whether the ALJ that Decided Plaintiff's Claim was Constitutionally Appointed by Acting Commissioner Berryhill During Berryhill's Second Term as Acting Commissioner ............ 14

VII. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 29

I. INTRODUCTION

The matter before the court is the Complaint (docket no. 4) filed by Plaintiff Jeffrey M. (Plaintiff), requesting judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's (“Commissioner”) decision to deny his application for Title II disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under 42 U.S.C. Sections 401-434 and Title XVI supplemental security income (“SSI”) under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1381-1385. Plaintiff asks that the court reverse the decision of the Commissioner and order the Commissioner to provide him disability insurance and/or supplemental security income benefits. In the alternative, Plaintiff asks that the court remand this matter for further proceedings.

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 13, 2019, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI, with both alleging disability due to major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) due to childhood abuse, eating disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), obesity, irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”), skin cancer in remission and high blood pressure. Administrative Record (“R”) at 196, 199, 201, 372. Plaintiff claims that he became disabled on May 15, 2018. Id. at 368. His applications were denied upon initial review and on reconsideration. Id. at 108, 112, 116, 120. On July 12, 2021, Plaintiff appeared with his attorney for a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Kim Fields (“ALJ”). Id. at 30-67. In a decision dated July 21, 2021, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claims. Id. at 10-29. On July 21, 2021, Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's decision, and the Appeals Council denied review on March 9, 2022. Id. at 1-7, 194.

On April 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action for judicial review. See docket no. 1. A briefing schedule was entered on July 14, 2022. See docket no. 9. An order issued on November 21, 2022, modified the briefing schedule. See docket no. 13. On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Plaintiff's Brief (Plaintiff's Brief”) (docket no. 12). On December 5, 2022, the Commissioner filed the Defendant's Brief (“Commissioner's Brief”) after receiving an extension of time to file (docket nos. 16, 17). On December 12, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Reply Brief (docket no. 18). Additionally, on September 26, 2022, the parties filed the Joint Statement of Facts (docket no. 11). The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision.

III. ALJ's FINDINGS

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income benefits because he was functionally capable of performing work available in the general economy. R at 23. In making this determination, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential process required by the social security regulations for assessing whether a claimant is under a disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); Swink v. Saul, 931 F.3d 765, 769 (8th Cir. 2019); Moore v. Colvin, 769 F.3d 987, 988 (8th Cir. 2014). The five steps an ALJ must consider are 1) whether the claimant is currently employed; (2) whether the claimant is severely impaired; (3) whether the impairment is or approximates an impairment listed in Appendix 1; (4) whether the claimant can perform past relevant work; and, if not, (5) whether the claimant can perform any other kind of work. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). “If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled.” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006).

In considering the steps in the five-step process, the ALJ:

first determines if the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. Second, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a severe medical impairment that has lasted, or is expected to last, at least 12 months. Third, the ALJ considers the severity of the impairment, specifically whether it meets or equals one of the listed impairments. If the ALJ finds a severe impairment that meets the duration requirement, and meets or equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is disabled. However, the fourth step asks whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to do past relevant work. If so, the claimant can perform other jobs in the economy. If so, the claimant is not disabled.

Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 2010). At the fourth step, the claimant “bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to [his] or her past relevant work.” Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pate-Fires v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 942 (8th Cir. 2009)). If the claimant is unable to return to his relevant past work, then, at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that “the claimant has the physical residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with [his or] her impairments and vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.” Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Holley v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2001)). The RFC is the most an individual can do despite the combined effect of all of his or her credible limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.925(a); Toland v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2014). The ALJ bears the responsibility for determining “a claimant's RFC based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of [his or] her limitations.” Myers v Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.

In the case at bar, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2025. R at 15. The ALJ then applied the first step of the analysis and determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from his alleged onset date of May 16, 2018. Id. At the second step, the ALJ concluded from the medical evidence that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: PTSD and depression. Id. at 16. At the third step, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Id. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following limitations:

[Plaintiff] can perform no more than simple, routine tasks and make no more than simple work-related decisions. He can only occasionally interact with supervisors, the public and coworkers.

Id. at 17-18. Also at the fourth step, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff was not able to perform his past relevant work as a machine operator. Id. at 21. At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs available in the national economy as a janitor, warehouse worker and hand packager. Id. at 22. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 23.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner's final determination not to award disability insurance benefits is subject to judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The court has the power to “enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner. . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” Id. The Commissioner's factual findings shall be conclusive “if supported by substantial evidence.” Id. An ALJ's decision must be affirmed “if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Grindley v. Kijakazi, 9 F.4th 622, 627 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pickney v. Chater, 96 F.3d 294, 296 (8th Cir. 1996)). “Substantial evidence ‘is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion.' Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Phillips, 671 F.3d at 702).

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