Jeffries v. Grocery
| Decision Date | 11 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIV. NO. 20-00304 JMS-RT |
| Parties | DONALD JEFFRIES, Plaintiff, v. FOODLAND GROCERY; RAMONSITA LOGAN; and AUMAUINUUESE S. PUNI, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
On July 9, 2020, pro se Plaintiff Donald Jeffries ("Plaintiff") filed a "Complaint for Violations of Civil Rights" against Foodland Grocery ("Foodland"), Foodland manger Ramonsita Logan, and Foodland security officer Aumauinuuese S. Puni (collectively, "Defendants"). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also filed an Application to Proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP Application"). ECF No. 2. On July 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed Exhibits A-C and E-G to his Complaint, ECF No. 4, and on August 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). ECF No. 5.1 Based on the following, the court GRANTS the IFP Application and DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to amend.
Plaintiff's IFP Application indicates that his gross pay or wages is $1,200 per month, while his take-home pay or wages is only $200 per month. ECF No. 2 at PageID #10. Plaintiff has expenditures of over $1,000 per month, no assets, and has a dependent daughter. Id. at PageID #11. Plaintiff has made the required showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to proceed in forma pauperis (i.e., without prepayment of fees); therefore, the court GRANTS Plaintiff's IFP Application.
The court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the dismissal of any complaint that is "frivolous or malicious; . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) ().
To state a claim, a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the court must set conclusory factual allegations aside, accept non-conclusory factual allegations as true, and determine whether these allegations state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). A complaint that lacks a cognizable legal theory or alleges insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory fails to state a claim. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).
A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 where it fails to provide the defendant fair notice of the wrongs allegedly committed. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (). Rule 8 requires more than "the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]" and "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotations omitted). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (quotation signals omitted).
Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, the court liberally construes the Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The court also recognizes that "[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action." Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2013).
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The FAC3 alleges that Plaintiff entered the "Foodland Dillingham location" on July 8, 2020. ECF No. 5 at PageID #37. When asked by "security" if he had a mask, Plaintiff explained that he has a breathing disability that prevents him from wearing a mask. After further discussion, the security guard called the manager. While Plaintiff was attempting to purchase an item, the manager told him to leave. Id. It appears that Plaintiff then left the store. Later, "a friend told me there was a post of me on a facebook group site the security officer from food land (sic) posted my picture (of incident) and degraded me saying untrue things . . . ." ECF No. 1 at PageID #4-5. Although unclear, Plaintiff appears to claim that he filed a police report and that police arrived on the scene, at which point the manager offered to permit him to wear a face shield, "but she refused to accommodate" when Plaintiff asked to have security help him. Id. at PageID #5.
The FAC appears to allege a claim pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12001, et seq. and a state law defamation claim.4
"Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the 'full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.'" Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 904 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b), 12182(a)). A grocery store is a place of public accommodation under Title III. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E). Discrimination may be in the form of access barriers that violate the ADA and "interfere with disabled individuals' 'full and equal enjoyment' of places of public accommodation." Chapman v. Pier 1 Imps. (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
To establish a prima facie case for discrimination under Title III of the ADA, Plaintiff must show that "(1) [he] is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation"; and (3) the defendant denied public accommodation to the plaintiff because of his disability. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a)-(b)). Only injunctive relief is available to private litigants under Title III. See id.; A.L. by & through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d 1270, 1290 (11th Cir. 2018).
Here, Plaintiff provides insufficient facts showing that he is disabled under the ADA. Not all impairments qualify as a disability under the ADA. See, e.g., Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005); Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. BNSF Ry. Co., 853 F.3d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 2017); Munoz v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 2019 WL 5063463, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2019). A plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA by: (1) having "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual;" (2) having "a record of such an impairment;" or (3) being "regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that he suffers from a breathing disability and that he cannot wear a face mask because it is a health risk to him is insufficient to allege that he has an impairment that is covered by the ADA. Tosurvive screening, Plaintiff must allege facts permitting a plausible inference that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and not just in some generic sense.
Further, individual liability under Title III of the ADA is limited. See Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) () (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)). Here, to the extent Plaintiff intended to bring an ADA claim against Defendant Puni, insufficient facts are alleged to show that he is a person who operated Foodland or is otherwise possibly covered by Title III.
Plaintiff's claim under Title III of the ADA is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Any Second Amended Complaint must make clear how Plaintiff is disabled under the ADA, against which Defendant the ADA Title III claim is brought, and how any individual could be liable as a person who "owns, leases (or leases to), or operates" Foodland.
Under Hawaii law, a plaintiff must establish four elements to sustain a claim for defamation: "(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least tonegligence on the part of the publisher . . . ; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication." Woodruff v. Haw. Pac. Health, 2014 WL 128607, at *9-10 (Haw. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2014) (citation omitted); Diaz v. Argon Agency Inc., 2015 WL 7737317, at *5 (D. Haw. Nov. 30, 2015). Here, the FAC provides only conclusory allegations that Plaintiff was defamed. For example, stating that a security officer posted a picture of Plaintiff on...
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