Jeffries v. Pitman-Moore Company

• Decision Date: 21 May 1925
• Docket Number: 12,215
• Parties: JEFFRIES ET AL. v. PITMAN-MOORE COMPANY ET AL
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

147 N.E. 919

83 Ind.App. 159

JEFFRIES ET AL. v. PITMAN-MOORE COMPANY ET AL

No. 12,215

Court of Appeals of Indiana

May 21, 1925

From Industrial Board of Indiana.

Application for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Elizabeth Jeffries and another against the Pitman-Moore Company. From a denial of an award, the claimant appeals.

Reversed.

R. P Bundy, for appellants.

Joseph G. Graham and Turner, Adams, Merrell & Locke, for appellees.

OPINION

REMY J.

Emmett M. Jeffries was employed by appellee Pitman-Moore Company hereinafter designated as appellee, as a department foreman of its manufacturing business. The building in which Jeffries was required to work was located on appellee's premises about seven hundred feet from a public highway; and for the use of employees and others having business with appellee, there was an improved private roadway, constructed and maintained by appellee, from the public highway over appellee's premises to the building. At a point about two hundred feet from the building, and between the building and the highway, the private roadway was crossed at right angles by an interurban electric railway over which cars were regularly operated. Under his contract of employment, Jeffries, on the days he worked, was required to commence work at 7:00 o'clock a. m. On July 2, 1924, at 6:45 in the morning, when Jeffries was on his way to work at the "regular time of going," and while riding in his own automobile on appellee's private roadway, as had at all times been his custom, he was accidentally killed at the crossing of the private way and the interurban railroad, as a result of a collision of the automobile and an interurban car. The private roadway over which Jeffries was going at the time of the accident was in general use by the employees of appellee as the way over appellee's premises to the place of work, and was the "only and customary way" to go.

The facts as stated having been established by the evidence and found by the Industrial Board, there was an order denying compensation to appellants, the dependents of Jeffries. From the order this appeal is prosecuted.

The question for determination is: Under the facts as found by the Industrial Board, did the accident which resulted in the death of Jeffries arise out of and in the course of his employment?

It is urged by appellee that the accident did not occur in the course of the decedent's employment, because the time for him to commence work had not yet arrived, and for the further reason that the accident did not occur in the building which was his place of work.

Under the rule that the Workmen's Compensation Act must be liberally construed to the end that its humane purposes may be accomplished, a construction of the act that would limit its benefits to the time the workman was actually at work with his tools at his place of work would be too narrow; so also a construction that would deny compensation for all accidental injuries which did not occur until at or after the moment when work under the employment contract was to begin. Indian Creek Coal, etc., Co. v. Wehr (1920), 74 Ind.App. 141, 151, 127 N.E. 202.

This court has correctly held that an accident occurs in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the compensation act, when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is fulfilling the duties of his employment, or is engaged in doing something incidental to it. Granite Sand, etc., Co. v. Willoughby (1919), 70 Ind.App. 112, 123 N.E. 194; In re Ayers (1918), 66 Ind.App. 458, 118 N.E. 386. It is also well settled that the period of employment generally includes a reasonable time for ingress to and egress from the place of work, while on the employer's premises. Artman's Manual p. 37, and cases cited; Pace v. Appanoose County (1918), 184 Iowa 498, 168 N.W. 916. In the case of Wabash R. Co. v. Industrial Com. (1920), 294 Ill. 119, 128 N.E. 290, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in a well-considered opinion, said: "It is ordinarily held that if an employee is injured on the premises of the employer on going to or from work he is entitled to compensation for such injuries. * * * The employment is not limited to the exact moment when the workman reaches the place where he begins his work, or to the moment when he ceases that work. It necessarily includes a reasonable amount of time and space before and after ceasing actual employment, having in mind all the circumstances connected with the accident."

Nichol v. Young's Paraffin Light, etc., Co. (1915), 52 S. L. R. 354, 8 B. W. C. C. 395, is a case in which the facts are similar to those in the case at bar. There, as here, the employee when injured was on his way to work over a private way provided by his employer. As in the case before us, the question was whether the employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court in holding that the accidental injury to the employee while on his way to work over the private way furnished by the employer was compensable, in discussing the question, said: "The accident occurred at the place I have mentioned. The question is, did it arise out of and in the course of the man's employment? I think it did, for it is now well-settled law that an accident arising out of and in the course of a man's employment may befall him before he has actually reached the place at which he is engaged to work, when he is on his way to that place or is leaving that place. The circumstances will determine whether or no the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment; but a man may be within the scope and sphere of his employment...