Jeffries v. United States

Decision Date09 October 2018
Docket NumberCivil No. 4:17cv75,Criminal No. 4:15cr83
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesDYLAN ALLEN JEFFRIES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Dylan Allen Jeffries' ("Petitioner") Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF Nos. 39, 42. Petitioner's § 2255 motion advances seven grounds for relief. After such motion was fully briefed, Petitioner filed an unopposed motion seeking leave to file an amendment to his § 2255 petition adding an eighth ground for relief. ECF No. 59. This Court granted such unopposed motion, although it expressly noted that the Court was not making any finding regarding the timeliness of such amendment. ECF No. 66. The Government has now filed a response to the amendment and Petitioner has filed his reply.

For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner's § 2255 motion, as amended, is DISMISSED and DENIED. Additionally, Petitioner's associated "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," "Motion Requesting Status" of his § 2255 motion, and Motion for Release on Bond pending resolution of his § 2255 motion, are DISMISSED and DENIED. ECF Nos. 58, 70, 71.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a written plea agreement, in February of 2016, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to one count of a multi-count indictment: Count Three - Coercion or Enticement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). ECF No. 20. As set forth in the written plea agreement, the statutory punishment for such offense is a mandatory minimum term of ten (10) years imprisonment and a maximum term of life imprisonment. Id. ¶ 1. At Petitioner's guilty plea hearing, he not only stated, while under oath, that he understood the charge, the elements, and the punishment, but he indicated that he read and understood each page of the plea agreement, and that counsel fully discussed the plea agreement with Petitioner before he decided to sign it. ECF No. 43, at 12-13. Additionally, Petitioner stated that he understood that the statute under which he was charged established the mandatory minimum and the maximum possible sentences, and that while an "advisory sentencing guideline range" would be calculated, the Court would ultimately impose a sentence "not less than the mandatory minimum sentence in this case, which is ten years." Id. at 17-18. Later in the proceeding, Petitioner entered a plea of "guilty" to Count Three, further indicating, while under oath, that he was pleading guilty because he was "in fact, guilty" of such offense. Id. at 24.Petitioner also admitted that he read and understood the signed "Statement of Facts," that he reviewed such document with his attorney, and that: (1) such facts were "true and correct"; and (2) there was not anything in the signed Statement of Facts that he disagreed with. Id. at 24-25.

In May of 2016, Petitioner appeared before the undersigned judge for sentencing. At that time, the preliminary calculation of Petitioner's advisory Guideline range recommended a sentence of 188-235 months. See ECF Nos. 27, 30. However, Petitioner's counsel objected to such Guideline calculation, ultimately leading the Court to continue Petitioner's sentencing hearing. ECF No. 32. On June 26, 2016, the Court resumed the sentencing hearing, sustained defense counsel's objection to the Guideline calculation, and recalculated the advisory Guidelines. Although the Court found that the updated Guideline calculation resulted in an unrestricted sentencing range of 87-108 months imprisonment, in light of the ten-year statutory mandatory minimum, the "restricted guideline range" was 120 months. ECF No. 46, at 13-15. Adopting the joint recommendation of counsel for both parties, the Court imposed the minimum sentence authorized by law: 120 months imprisonment. Id. at 31.

Consistent with Petitioner's express waiver of appeal, his desire to be debriefed by the Government in an attempt to secure a sentence reduction, as well as his self-identified desire toshow "good faith in not breaching the agreement," ECF No. 56, at 8, Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence to the Fourth Circuit.

Petitioner subsequently filed the instant § 2255 motion, as well as a brief in support, advancing seven claims for relief. ECF Nos. 39, 42. After such motion was fully briefed, Petitioner was allowed to file a supplement adding an eighth claim asserting actual innocence, and such eighth claim was fully briefed on July 19, 2018. ECF No. 68. The pending § 2255 motion is therefore ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal prisoner, in custody, may collaterally attack his sentence or conviction by moving the district court "to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To obtain such relief, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence or conviction was "imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," that the district court "was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence," that the sentence exceeds "the maximum authorized by law," or that the sentence or conviction is "otherwise subject to collateral attack." Id.; see Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546, 547 (4th Cir. 1958).

A § 2255 motion is, in essence, a statutory federal habeas corpus action that enables a petitioner to collaterally attack hissentence or conviction through the filing of a new proceeding, as contrasted with a direct appeal. United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 663 (4th Cir. 2007). The existence of the right to pursue a collateral attack does not displace a direct appeal as the "usual and customary method of correcting trial errors." United States v. Allgood, 48 F. Supp. 2d 554, 558 (E.D. Va. 1999). On the contrary, with limited exceptions, a petitioner advancing new claims asserted for the first time in a § 2255 motion "must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982). Accordingly, a § 2255 collateral challenge "may not do service for an appeal." Id. at 165.

The "higher hurdle" applies because, once a Petitioner's opportunity to pursue a direct appeal has been waived or exhausted, there is "a final judgment [that] commands respect." Id. at 164-66. Accordingly, the doctrine of procedural default generally prevents a district court from reaching the merits of § 2255 claims that were not raised on direct appeal unless a petitioner can show: (1) "cause" excusing the failure to directly appeal such alleged errors; and (2) "actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he complains." United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1999). The "existence of cause" excusing a procedural default "must turn on something external to thedefense," such as the "denial of effective assistance of counsel." Id. at 493.

A § 2255 petitioner need not, however, overcome such "higher hurdle" to advance a freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is properly asserted for the first time in a § 2255 motion. See United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is well settled that 'a claim of ineffective assistance should be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court rather than on direct appeal, unless the record conclusively shows ineffective assistance.'" (quoting United States v. Williams, 977 F.2d 866, 871 (4th Cir. 1992))). To obtain relief based on an allegation of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must establish both: (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel's inadequate performance caused the petitioner prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Satisfying the first prong of Strickland requires a petitioner to establish that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. The second prong of Strickland requires a petitioner to "affirmatively prove prejudice," which requires a showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would havebeen different." Id. at 693-94. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.

The prejudice prong of the Strickland test is slightly modified when a habeas petitioner challenges defense counsel's handling of plea negotiations. "In the context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice." Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012). Accordingly, based on the posture of the instant case, to establish Strickland prejudice regarding counsel's pre-plea behavior, Petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability either that: (1) "but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial," Hooper v. Garraghty, 845 F.2d 471, 475 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); or (2) Petitioner would have accepted a more favorable plea deal that "would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it . . . ." Merzbacher v. Shearin, 706 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 147 (2012)).

Congress and the President have established a one-year limitations period within which a petitioner must file a § 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The one-year limitations period begins running on the latest of four dates: (1) the "date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final"; (2) the date on whichcertain government-created impediments to filing are removed; (3) the date on which a new right has been recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which facts supporting the claim could be discovered...

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