Jehle-Slauson Const. Co. v. Hood-Rich Architects and Consulting Engineers

Decision Date01 July 1983
Docket NumberJEHLE-SLAUSON,HOOD-RIC,ARCHITECTS
PartiesCONSTRUCTION COMPANY v.AND CONSULTING ENGINEERS, a partnership composed of Donald L. Rich and Jack K. Hood, et al. 81-1018.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Charles J. Fleming and Edward C. Greene, of Armbrecht, Jackson, DeMouy, Crowe, Holmes & Reeves, Mobile, for appellant.

A. Neil Hudgens, Philip H. Partridge, and Michael S. McGlothren of Brown, Hudgens, Richardson, Whitfield & Gillion, Mobile, for appellees.

ADAMS, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Mobile County granting summary judgment in favor of third-party defendant-appellee, Hood-Rich Architects and Consulting Engineers. This case arises from a complaint filed by Sho-Me Motor Lodges, Inc. of Alabama against Jehle-Slauson Construction Company that alleged that Jehle-Slauson breached its construction contract with Sho-Me by performing certain repairs on the Mobile Howard Johnson's Motor Inn in an unworkmanlike manner. In their answer to Sho-Me's complaint, Jehle-Slauson advanced a third-party complaint against Hood-Rich, alleging that Hood-Rich owed a duty to Jehle-Slauson to use reasonable care in inspecting the work performed and the materials used by Jehle-Slauson, and that Hood-Rich had breached that duty. Jehle-Slauson sought indemnity from by Hood-Rich with respect to any adjudication of liability on its part to Sho-Me. Hood-Rich filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of the dismissal of prior litigation and the release executed with the settlement of that litigation. The trial court granted that motion and Jehle-Slauson appeals.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court acted properly in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Hood-Rich. We believe that the trial court acted properly and affirm its decision.

The salient facts are as follows:

The Howard Johnson's facility, owned by Sho-Me, was damaged by Hurricane Frederic in September of 1979. Sho-Me contracted with Jehle-Slauson to make the necessary repairs on the building, and they also contracted with Hood-Rich to supervise and inspect the work performed by Jehle-Slauson. During the course of the work at the Howard Johnson's, a dispute arose between Jehle-Slauson and Sho-Me with respect to the payment due Jehle-Slauson under the contract. Jehle-Slauson filed a complaint against Sho-Me and named Hood-Rich as a defendant. Jehle-Slauson claimed that Hood-Rich had wrongfully diverted and withheld funds which were intended for the payment of Jehle-Slauson, breached certain contractual obligations to Jehle-Slauson for the approval of request of payment, and wrongfully and in bad faith exerted duress and coercion upon Jehle-Slauson, thereby causing Jehle-Slauson to agree to accept a lesser compensation for its work.

The parties settled, and the court dismissed with prejudice the contract action brought by Jehle-Slauson. In connection with the settlement, Jehle-Slauson executed a release in favor of Hood-Rich. That instrument released Hood-Rich of "all claims, demands, damages, costs, expenses, actions and causes of action, whether contract or tort, arising directly or indirectly out of or in any manner relating to work performed on Mobile Howard Johnson's subsequent to September 12, 1979, under the contract or agreement, express or implied with the parties named above and herein released."

Prior to the execution of the release, Harry W. Jehle received a letter from Michael Salmon, Sho-Me's attorney, informing him that a dry wall problem had arisen at the Howard Johnson's. A dry wall problem occurs when wet sheetrock is used in the repair of the walls, causing excessive mildew in the room. Mr. Salmon informed Mr. Jehle of the possible litigation arising from the dry wall problem and that Jehle-Slauson might be a party to that litigation. Although Jehle-Slauson had knowledge of the dry wall problem, it failed to preserve its rights concerning this litigation against Hood-Rich.

The present action arises as a result of the dry wall problem. Sho-Me claimed that Jehle-Slauson failed to perform its duties in a workmanlike manner. Jehle-Slauson, in its third-party claim against Hood-Rich, alleged that Hood-Rich failed to properly supervise and inspect the work performed by Jehle-Slauson or its sub-contractors.

Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Whatley v. Cardinal Pest Control, 388 So.2d 529 (Ala.1980); Wheeler v. First Alabama Bank of Birmingham, 364 So.2d 1190 (Ala.1978); Rule 56, ARCP. "If there is a scintilla of evidence supporting the position of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, so that at trial he would be entitled to go to the jury, a summary judgment may not be granted." Campbell v. Alabama Power Co., 378 So.2d 718, 721 (Ala.1979); Chiniche v. Smith, 374 So.2d 872 (Ala.1979). Once a motion for summary judgment has been made, the adverse party ordinarily should not rest on his pleadings, but should respond by setting forth specific facts which show that a material issue of fact does exist. Whatley v. Cardinal Pest Control, 388 So.2d 529 (Ala.1980); Real Coal Inc. v. Thompson Tractor Co., 379 So.2d 1249 (Ala.1980).

On appeal from a summary judgment, this Court must look to the same factors considered by the trial court in its ruling on the motion. Chiniche v. Smith, 374 So.2d 872 (Ala.1979); Folmar v. Montgomery Fair Co., 293 Ala. 686, 309 So.2d 818 (1975). Hood-Rich was granted summary judgment on the basis of the release executed by Jehle-Slauson in the settlement of the prior contract litigation. In determining the validity of the release, we must discuss the following issues raised by plaintiff on appeal: whether the release was fraudulently induced; whether parol evidence may be used to determine the intent of the parties in the execution of the release; and whether the release applies to claims that had not matured as of the date of the execution of the release.

Plaintiff, Jehle-Slauson, claims that the release is subject to rescission on the grounds that it was fraudulently induced. Jehle-Slauson has the burden of "establishing the fraud alleged by clear and satisfactory proof." Columbus Electric & Power Co. v. Downs, 214 Ala. 104, 105, 106 So. 593, 594 (1925); Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Brown, 259 Ala. 262, 66 So.2d 74 (1953); Shepard Realty Company, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie of Montgomery, Inc., 418 So.2d 871 (Ala.1982). "To establish a cause of action for fraud, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants knowingly made a false representation of a material fact on which the plaintiffs relied and acted to their detriment." Woodard v. Woodard, 413 So.2d 1060, 1062 (Ala.1982). "The fraud that would entitle a releasor to avoid the release must underlie the execution of the contract of release, not merely affect or infect a subject upon which the release would, if unavoided, operate to the discharge of the release." Barbour v. Poncelor, 203 Ala. 386, 389, 83 So. 130, 133 (1919). The affidavit of Mr. Harry Jehle filed by Jehle-Slauson in opposition to the motion for summary judgment stated that the plaintiff had been informed of the possibility of future litigation concerning the dry wall problem prior to the execution of the release in favor of Hood-Rich. Mr. Jehle testified in the affidavit that Mr. Salmon, Sho-Me's attorney, told him that Jehle-Slauson would be a nominal party in the litigation. Mr. Jehle knew that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
58 cases
  • Mackey v. Judy's Foods, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
    • February 10, 1987
    ...to evade its burdens. Boles v. Blackstock, 484 So.2d 1077, 1083 (Ala.1986) (quoting Jehle-Slauson Construction Co. v. Hood-Rich Architects & Consulting Engineers, 435 So.2d 716, 719 (Ala.1983). Because plaintiffs have made no attempt to return the consideration for the release, under Alabam......
  • St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Duke University
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • October 2, 1987
    ...Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973). 10 See also Jehle-Slauson Constr. Co. v. Hood-Rich, Architects & Consulting Eng'rs, 435 So.2d 716, 720 (Ala.1983); C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 180 (Iowa 1975); Carr v. Maryland......
  • Dominick v. Dixie Nat. Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • February 18, 1987
    ...by retaining the benefits of the releases while seeking to avoid their burdens," (citing Jehle-Slauson Constr. Co. v. Hood-Rich, Arch. and Consulting Eng., 435 So.2d 716 (Ala.1983). As it is, we cannot In Jehle-Slauson Constr. Co. v. Hood-Rich, Arch. and Consulting Eng., the plaintiffs neve......
  • McGuffie v. Mead Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • February 21, 2014
    ...under appropriate circumstances, by summary judgment.”) (alteration supplied) (citing Jehle–Slauson Construction Co. v. Hood–Rich Architects & Consulting Engineers, 435 So.2d 716 (Ala.1983)). Plaintiff relies on the holding of the Alabama Supreme Court in Pierce v. Orr, 540 So.2d 1364 (Ala.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Determining an Insurer's Duty to Defend
    • United States
    • Alabama State Bar Alabama Lawyer No. 74-4, July 2013
    • Invalid date
    ...Inc. v. Franklin County, 623 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Ala. 1993); Jehle-Slauson Constr. Co. v. Hood-Rich Architects & Consulting Eng'rs, 435 So. 2d 716, 720 (Ala. 1983). This doctrine is applied in ordinary contract cases as a "last resort," after other rules of construction have failed to resolv......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT