Jehle v. Jehle, 1:18-CV-00589-KG/JHR

• Decision Date: 22 January 2019
• Docket Number: No. 1:18-CV-00589-KG/JHR,1:18-CV-00589-KG/JHR
• Parties: CHLOE JEHLE, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH JEHLE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

CHLOE JEHLE, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH JEHLE, Defendant.

No. 1:18-CV-00589-KG/JHR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

January 22, 2019

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE [2]

This matter is before the Court upon Kenneth Jehle's Motion to Strike [2] filed June 25, 2018. (The parties have the same last name and for clarity will be referred to by their first names hereafter.) Chloe filed a response [6] with errata [7] on July 5, 2018. Kenneth filed a reply [10] on July 23, 2018, completing the briefing.

BACKGROUND

Chloe filed a Complaint for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress [1-1] on May 4, 2018, in New Mexico's Second Judicial District Court. Kenneth removed the case to federal court [1] on June 25, 2018.

Chloe's complaint [1-1, *2-5] alleges that her father Kenneth "sexually exploited [her] when she was a child" and "[b]y means of coercion, ... unlawfully possessed and/or distributed video of [her] engaged in sexual intercourse." Id., *5, ¶¶ 53-54. Chloe alleges that Kenneth caused her extreme and severe mental distress and did so "intentionally or in reckless disregard for [her] mental health". Id., ¶¶ 57-58.

Kenneth asserts that many of the statements in the complaint should be stricken as false, immaterial, scandalous, or prejudicial, under the authority of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Chloeconcedes that the described events are "scandalous" but denies that they should be stricken from the complaint.

VIOLATION OF CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT

As an initial matter, Chloe asserts that Kenneth failed to follow local rules of procedure when he filed his motion without first consulting with Chloe (through counsel), and that the motion should be denied on that basis. The Court declines to deny the motion on those grounds.

In the U.S. District of New Mexico, a "[m]ovant must determine whether a motion is opposed, and a motion that omits recitation of a good-faith request for concurrence may be summarily denied." D.N.M.LR-Civ. 7.1(a). The rule encourages parties to narrow or even resolve issues without court intervention when possible. By its terms, the rule is discretionary.

Denial of the motion to strike at this time, when all briefing has been done and clearly the parties have broad disagreement about the merits of the motion, would serve little purpose but to delay a ruling on legitimate issues. Therefore, the Court will exercise its discretion to resolve the motion on its merits instead.

MOTIONS TO STRIKE UNDER RULE 12(f)

Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." A party may file a motion to strike or the court may act on its own. Id. Whether to grant a motion to strike is a matter of judicial discretion. See Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 606 n. 3 (10th Cir.1998).

The consensus of federal caselaw is that motions to strike are not favored and "should be denied unless the challenged allegations have no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy". 5C C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ., § 1382 (3d. ed.2004) (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Payne v. Tri-State Careflight, LLC, 327 F.R.D. 433, 445 (D.N.M. 2018). The party filing a motion to strike has a "formidable" burden to show the violative nature of the material. See Siegel v. HSBC Holdings, plc, 283 F. Supp. 3d 722, 739 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (burden on movant); Gates v. District of Columbia, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2014) ("formidable" burden). Some federal courts require an additional showing of prejudice, but authority from the U.S. District of New Mexico does not. See Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 598-600 (D.N.M. 2011).

ANALYSIS: FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENTS

Kenneth challenges specific statements in the complaint (¶¶ 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 44, and 46) as either false or misleading. [2, *2-5]. A challenge to the veracity of a statement is not a proper use of Rule 12(f): a motion to strike does not allow the court to resolve disputed issues of fact. Friedlander v. Cook, NO. CIV 06-1160 JB/DJS, 2008 WL 4868073, *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 4, 2008) (Browning, J.) (The trial court should exercise caution to avoid "making merits decisions that it is not, on the record before it, capable of properly making."). The motion to strike will be denied to the extent that it challenges the veracity of any statements in the complaint.

ANALYSIS: IMMATERIALITY

Kenneth challenges certain statements in the complaint (¶¶ 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 47) as immaterial. For purposes of Rule 12(f), "'[i]mmaterial' matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief or the defenses beingpleaded, or a statement of unnecessary particulars in connection with and descriptive of that which is material." 5C C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1382 (footnotes omitted). "'Allegations will not be stricken as immaterial under this rule unless they have no possible bearing on the controversy.'" Estate of Gonzales v. AAA Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1684599, at *5 (D.N.M. May 8, 2012) (Browning, J.) (quoting Sai Broken Arrow C, LLC v. Guardian Emergency Vehicles, Inc., 2010 WL 132414, at *5 (N.D. Okla. January 8, 2010) (Egan, J.)).

Thus, materiality is evaluated within the context of Chloe's claim that Kenneth intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her over a period of years through sexual and related psychological abuse. [1, *2-5]. Statements that have any possible bearing on that claim are, for this purpose, material. Estate of Gonzales, 2012 WL 1684599, at *5.

The analysis at this stage is not based upon admissibility of evidence at trial. Assertions in complaints can survive a motion to strike even if based upon inadmissible evidence, see Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir.1976). The concept of relevance, though, is common to materiality and admissibility. Because of that commonality, rules of admissibility can illustrate the kind of statements that are material to a claim.

Where the claim concerns emotional distress caused by sexual misconduct, Fed. R. Evid. 415 bears inspection because it carves out an exception to the general exclusion of evidence of other crimes or bad acts to prove current behavior consistent with that character. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Through Rule 415, Congress specifically created an exception "[i]n a civil case involving a claim for relief based on a party's alleged sexual assault or child molestation", allowing admission of "evidence that the party committed any other sexual assault or child molestation." Fed. R. Evid. 415(a), enacted in 1995 as part of Pub. L. 103-322, see note to Fed. R. Evid. 413. As Chloe noted in her response [6, *4], the District ofKansas court has discussed the logical import of such evidence, quoting the legislative history of Rule 413: "In child molestation cases, ...a history of similar acts tends to be exceptionally probative because it shows an unusual disposition of the defendant--a sexual or sadosexual interest in children--that simply does not exist in ordinary people." Rivera v. Rivera, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1226 (D.Kan. 2003), quoting Fed. R. Evid. 413 historical notes, congressional discussion (emphasis by court omitted).

To restate, the analysis under Rule 12(f) is not whether the statements are admissible in evidence, but whether they are material to the claim. The question of admissibility of character evidence, however, arises precisely because such evidence can be relevant. The general character evidence restrictions in criminal cases, for example, exclude relevant evidence in order to serve other judicial values: "The state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant..." Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). At trial, relevance and other values can be in tension. Rule 12(f), however, is not concerned with admissibility at trial; for its purposes, relevance and materiality, or "possible bearing on the controversy", are synonymous.

With those principles in mind, the Court must analyze each challenged statement for materiality:

• "7. Defendant has a long and troubling history of sexual misconduct, including misconduct involving children". Because a claim of sexual misconduct can be bolstered by a history of other sexual misconduct, see Fed. R. Evid. 415, the statement in paragraph 7 is material and should not be stricken.

• "8. Defendant was previously employed as a special education teacher at Harrison Middle School, Taft Middle School, and Cottonwood Classical Preparatory School ('Cottonwood Prep.')." Throughout the entire complaint, Chloe asserts that Kenneth has a long-standing sexual attraction to children of which his behavior toward her is a part; in that context, Kenneth's employment is a setting where he had access to children is material and should not be stricken.

• "10. Defendant faced criminal charges for his conduct at two of the three schools." In context, the allegation of criminal charges impliedly relates to improper sexual behavior toward or in the company of children, which is material to Chloe's claim. Paragraph 10 should not be stricken.

• "11. The secretary at Harrison Middle School used to hide under her desk to avoid Defendant's unwanted sexual advances." Paragraph 11 differs from other statements in that it appears to allege behavior toward an adult; nonetheless, it is an allegation of conduct beyond societal norms of sexual propriety and thus material to Chloe's claim. The same analysis applies to the following paragraph: "12. At least two co-workers at Harrison Middle School sued Defendant for sexual harassment." Paragraphs 11 and 12 should not...