Jenkins v. Area Cooperative Educ. Services

• Decision Date: 10 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.3:99CV2371(CFD).,CIV.A.3:99CV2371(CFD).
• Citation: 248 F.Supp.2d 117
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Brian JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. AREA COOPERATIVE EDUCATION SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

248 F.Supp.2d 117

Brian JENKINS, Plaintiff, v. AREA COOPERATIVE EDUCATION SERVICES, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A.3:99CV2371(CFD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 10, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John R. Williams, Dawne Westbrook, David G. Toro, Williams & Pattis, New Haven, CT, for plaintiff.

James M. Sconzo, Jonathan C. Sterling, Halloran & Sage, Hartford, CT, Michael Peter McKeon, Sullivan, Schoen, Campane & Connon, Hartford, CT, Michelle L. Treadwell, Fairfield, CT, for defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DRONEY, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Brian Jenkins ("Jenkins"), filed this action in the Connecticut Superior Court against Area Cooperative Educational Services ("ACES"), its Executive Director Peter C. Young, and its Deputy Executive Director Cheryl S. Saloom. It was removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446.¹

The complaint contains five counts asserted against all three defendants. Count one alleges that by discharging Jenkins from his employment with ACES the defendants violated his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count two asserts that the discharge deprived Jenkins of "procedural due process of law" also in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count three asserts a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut law arising out of Jenkins' termination. Count four alleges that the termination constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Finally, count five asserts a state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Previously, this Court denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice to the defendants renewing their motion for summary judgment in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sen. Athletic Ass'n., 531 U.S. 288, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001). The defendants have since filed a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 36] and the parties have submitted additional briefs on Brentwood`s impact.

For the following reason, the Renewed Motion [Doc. #36] is GRANTED as to counts one and two for all defendants.

1. Factual Background²

The defendant Area Cooperative Educational Services ("ACES") is a regional educational service center in Hamden, Connecticut. It was created to serve 26 local boards of education in the New Haven Area. ACES coordinates and staffs programs for children with special needs. It is governed by a Board of Directors (the "Board") comprised of individuals appointed by the boards of education that ACES serves. The powers of the ACES Board are derived from Connecticut General Statutes § 10-66a et seq. and the Amended Agreement Creating ACES (the "Amended Agreement"). See Def.s' Mem. in Supp. of Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. [Doc. # 37], Ex. 1. Defendants Peter Young and Cheryl Saloom were both officers of ACES at the time of Jenkins' termination. Young was ACES's Executive Director and Saloom its Deputy Executive Director.

Jenkins, an African-American, was hired by Young on June 14, 1989, as a "Teacher Aide/Driver." His job responsibilities included assisting ACES teachers and driving children to and from ACES programs in a vehicle provided by ACES. Jenkins was a member of a collective bargaining unit, which was covered by an agreement between ACES and the union. The collective bargaining agreement provided that employees were entitled to bring a grievance for any disciplinary action they received. The agreement also provided that employees could not be discharged without just cause. See Ex. To Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, or in the Alt. For Summ. J. [Doc. # 15], Ex. F, Art. 12 ("An employee may be discharged, suspended or given a reprimand resulting in written documentation in his/her personnel file only for just cause.").

Jenkins was discharged on April 21, 1999. According to the defendants, the decision to terminate Jenkins's employment was motivated by a combination of two factors: 1) Jenkins had been disciplined four times for speeding in ACES vehicles while transporting children, and 2) Jenkins had been involved in an incident with an ACES student that occurred in February 1999, which the State Department of Children and Families ("DCF") investigated and then concluded constituted "physical neglect" by Jenkins. Each of these two factors is described more fully below.

Speeding Violations

The defendants' have submitted evidence that speeding incidents involving Jenkins occurred on four separate occasions: July 13, 1990, July 25, 1990, November 28, 1994, and February 26, 1997. See Exhibits to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J. [Doc. # 15], Ex. G-K. According to the defendants, the first three incidents resulted in written employment warnings, and the fourth speeding incident resulted in a one-week suspension without pay. None of these disciplinary actions was grieved by Jenkins pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. In his Local Rule 9(c)2 statement, Jenkins appears to deny that any of these alleged speeding incidents ever took place or that he was disciplined for them. See PL's Loc. R. 9(c)2 statement, at ¶ 24. However, in Part II of his 9(c)2 statement, Jenkins does concede to at least one speeding incident, on July 13, 1990, but he claims that it was "reported by the plaintiff to the defendant contemporaneously as it was happening and was caused by a student in the plaintiffs vehicle. It did not result in any form of discipline ...." Id. at Part II., ¶ 2.³ While apparently denying that he was ever disciplined for these speeding incidents, Jenkins asserts that "[a]fter each one of the alleged `disciplinary' incidents involving the plaintiff ... the defendants rehired the plaintiff at increased rates of pay." Id. at Part II., ¶ 3.

February 1999 incident

On February 3, 1999, a school nurse reported to Saloom that she had witnessed Jenkins grab a student by his shirt front, push him to the floor, and drag him in his chair. After hearing of this incident, Saloom spoke with two other aides who had been in the room with Jenkins and the child. Although one of the two aides did not witness the incident, the other aide reported seeing Jenkins pick up the child after the child refused to stand and witnessed a table leg break because the child's shoelace had been tied to it.

Jenkins disputes these versions of the incident. According to him, the child he was supervising was "sexually fondling" another child. Jenkins asked the boy to stop. When the child did not respond, Jenkins physically moved him to another part of the room and was able to get him to stop. Jenkins denies having dragged or in any way injured the child. See PL's Loc. R. 9(c)2 Statement, Part II, ¶ 11.

This incident eventually led to an investigation of Jenkins by the State Department of Children and Families ("DCF").⁴ The DCF investigator spoke with Jenkins, the nurse, and the two aides who were present at the time of the incident. The investigator also questioned the child, who reported that he had tied his shoelace to the table leg because Jenkins had previously grabbed him by his shirt. Based on its investigation, DCF concluded that Jenkins had engaged in "physical neglect of the child."

Following the DCF investigation, Saloom recommended to Young that Jenkins be terminated and Young agreed; Jenkins was then terminated. The defendants assert that the decision to fire Jenkins was based on both the DCF report and the four speeding incidents.⁵ Jenkins disputes this, contending that his firing was motivated by racial animus.

Jenkins appealed his dismissal to the ACES Board, which denied his appeal. Jenkins then submitted a grievance, under his collective bargaining agreement, regarding his termination, which was heard by an arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). The arbitrator found in favor of ACES, concluding that, based on the findings of the DCF investigation and the most recent speeding incident, ACES had just cause to terminate Jenkins. The defendants have moved for summary judgment. As to Jenkins' § 1983 counts, the defendants assert that under Brentwood, there is no state action. If the Court finds state action, the defendants assert they are still entitled to summary judgment on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity, qualified immunity, and that Jenkins has failed to present any evidence that he was discriminated against intentionally or that he was not afforded due process.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

In a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "`if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.'" Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist, 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Anderson, All U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). After discovery, if the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 411 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The Court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a...